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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

INTERGENERATIONAL DYNAMICS AND POLITICAL OUTCOMES

This dissertation explores the relationship between intergenerational dynamics and
politics outcomes in several distinct contexts. It is motivated by the remarkable
demographic shifts exhibited by people in advanced countries over the past several
decades. Individuals on average have longer lives and fewer children than ever before.
Combining these shifts with the large intergenerational public policies that exist in many
such states (education, old-age social welfare, healthcare) provokes several distinct yet
related research questions addressed in the chapters below. First, do political traits matter
for fertility behavior? If so, could the presence of differential fertility behavior across
political groups lead to a shift in the position of the future median voter? Second, what
are other significant determinants of fertility in contemporary Europe and the United
States? Does more recent data support the findings of established “determinants of
fertility” models? Finally, does the relationship between age and Social Security benefit
preferences (and confidence in the Social Security system) seem to suggest the potential
for intergenerational conflict over Social Security? The chapters below tie together
disparate bodies of literature from multiple academic disciplines and use empirical
evidence to answer these research questions. The results suggest political traits are
significant determinants of fertility in some cases. The results also demonstrate that the
relationship between wealth/education and fertility in many European states is positive –
in contrast to much of the literature on this relationship and the common wisdom. Finally,
the last empirical chapter illustrates the existence of potential age-based political conflict
over Social Security in the United States.
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Chapter One: Introduction
This dissertation examines intergenerational dynamics and their relationship with
political outcomes. This interest area and subsequent research questions are stimulated by
significant demographic and policy changes witnessed in the advanced world over the
last 50-100 years. The demographic changes are numerous: fertility is lower, mortality is
lower, old-age life expectancy is higher, and migration is in many ways more attractive to
large numbers of people. There have been many significant policy changes over this time,
but of special interest here is the expansion of policies with intergenerational
components. Public old-age pensions, publicly funded K-12 education, public debt, and
publicly funded environmental protection can all be described as policy ventures with
intergenerational features: payments and/or benefits cut across different generations.
These significant changes motivate the empirical core of this dissertation, which
addresses two distinct but related research questions. First, are political characteristics
significant determinants of fertility behavior in the United States and Europe? Second,
does there appear to be the potential for intergenerational conflict over Social Security in
the United States? Before visiting these questions in more detail, the following
paragraphs provide a brief examination of the aforementioned changes in demographics
and policy that motivate this dissertation.
1. Demographic Changes
Figure 1.1 illustrates the total fertility rate1 (TFR) for selected countries over the
last 100 years. This graph illustrates several dynamics: lower fertility in times of
instability (world wars, especially), lower fertility overall over time, and more recent
convergent fertility behavior among these countries.
1

Children born per woman in her lifetime.

1

All are now within the 1.25 to 2.1 range – significant as the replacement level
TFR is 2.1. Clearly women in these countries have fewer children in a more consistent
pattern than in previous decades.
Figure 1.1: Total Fertility Rate (Children per Woman) for Selected
Countries, 1913-2012

Figure 1.2 illustrates another significant demographic change: a visible positive
change in life expectancy over the last 100 years – again, the world wars are quite
noticeable. There is something of a convergence toward the right hand side of the graph :
life expectancy at birth in these countries hovers around 80 on average in 2012, while it
was about 55 only 100 years ago. A similar dynamic is displayed in Figure 1.3. Figure
1.3 presents life expectancy at age 65 (or expected years until death) for females in
selected countries. The figures for males are similar, but the curves are less steep and the
2

intercepts are lower. These two graphs taken together illustrate a simple but critical point:
life expectancy at birth and at age 65 has increased dramatically in the advanced
countries over the last 100 years or so.

Figure 1.2: Life Expectancy at Birth for Selected Countries, 1913-2012

Certainly these demographic changes are interesting from an academic
perspective. Demographers have developed “Demographic Transition Theory” and the
concept of the “Second Demographic Transition” in order to explain decreases in fertility
that seem to follow decreases in mortality. Demographers are especially interested in the
below-replacement fertility levels currently present in many advanced countries – as well

3

Figure 1.3: Expected Years Until Death for Females Aged 65, Selected
OECD States

as less wealthy countries, as in much of Eastern/Central Europe. These theories are a
dominant area of study in the academic discipline of demography. However, these
demographic changes are interesting from a public policy and politics point of view as
well. Figure 1.4 illustrates why – this is a graph of the old-age dependency ratio in
selected countries. In other words, it shows how many retirees (age 65+) there are per
100 workers (age 15-64).
There is clearly an upward trend in old age dependency, although the steepness of
the slope varies greatly by county. Japan is clearly the outlier: they currently have over 35
retirees for every 100 workers: greater than a four-fold increase over sixty years. Of
course, under some settings these demographic trends might only be interesting for
4

Figure 1.4: Old Age Dependency Ratio (Age 65+ per 100 Age 15-64) for
Selected Countries, 1950-2010

demographers: why care if people are living longer and having fewer children? These
changes matter for public policy and politics because of the presence of policies with
intergenerational components.
2. Policy Changes
Public policies with significant intergenerational features are a relatively recent
phenomenon: in most countries they are decades-old, not centuries old. Examples of
policies of this type can be split into two groups: forward directed intergenerational
policies benefit the relatively young (or unborn/future generations) at the expense of the
relatively old. Policies of this type present in the advanced world today include publicly
funded K-12 and higher education, environmental protection, policies designed to

5

subsidize low-income children (like WIC and SCHIP), public investment in research, and
infrastructure expansion and maintenance.
Of course, there are also backward directed intergenerational policies: policies
which benefit the relatively old at the expense of the young or future generations.

Figure 1.5: Public Pension Expenditure as a Percentage of
GDP, 1960-2010

Policies of this type include old-age public pensions, old-age health insurance and
healthcare subsidization, and public debt of different types.
Figure 1.5 illustrates increased levels of public spending on public pensions, or
old-age social welfare/income support programs. Policies of this type are generally one of
the largest (if not the largest) federal budget items in many advanced countries. Social
Security spending is the largest single federal budget item in the United States in FY12:
about 21% of all federal spending.

6

Old-age support programs (social security and old-age healthcare) are not the only
policy areas in which public spending has grown - certainly spending growth has
occurred in other areas with intergenerational components. K-12 education,
environmental protection, and spending on infrastructure have all experienced increases
in public funding over the last 100 years or so: government involvement in such areas
was either negligible or non-existent at the turn of the last century. Public debt may also
be viewed as a type of intergenerational policy: providing national defaults do not occur
such debts will need to be paid at some point, likely by future generations. Large public
debts provoke a point related to equity: backward-directed intergenerational goods (those
that benefit the old at the expense of the young) are more of a concern from a political
equity point of view as those who are paying for the benefits/debt do not get much of a
say in the policymaking process. Such individuals may be paying for policies that were
approved before they were born, much less able to vote or contribute to policymaking.
3. Intergenerational Dynamics and Political Outcomes
As a result of both the demographic changes and policy changes discussed above
we now have in most advanced countries a situation in which different generations are
tied together through large national-level policies and significant demographic changes
are continuing to occur. It is certainly true that generations were tied together at previous
points in human history but such ties tended to exist at the family level, not as a result of
government action. This dissertation is motivated by this demographic/policy change
dynamic; especially as it contributes to two sets of research questions that address
political outcomes.

7

First, what factors account for fertility behavior in the U.S. and Europe, and do
political traits matter as a determinant of fertility? If political traits matter, is it possible
that high-fertility groups could gain political power in the future as a result of their
current fertility patterns? Second, does there appear to be a possibility of
intergenerational (age-based) conflict over Social Security policy in the United States?
The following section describes the remainder of the dissertation in more detail.
4. Dissertation Chapter Description

This dissertation examines intergenerational dynamics, with special attention to
political factors. First, the determinants of fertility behavior in contemporary Europe and
the United States are examined, then opinions of Social Security and preferences for
Social Security policy reforms in the United States are assessed. The “determinants of
fertility” chapters argue political traits can be inherited, while the “Social Security
opinions/preferences” chapter features issues that can lead to cleavages between different
generations.
The empirical chapters below not only address these research questions but
demonstrate several methodological aspects of count data. A dependent variable like
“number of children in the respondent’s household” demands specific methodological
treatment. Social Security opinions and preferences are measured using index variables
compiled from survey data, and also demand a specific and rigorous methodological
approach. The dissertation proceeds with a literature review (Chapter 2) that addresses
literature on intergenerational conflict and cooperation, the determinants of fertility, and
the formation of political traits.
Empirical chapters follow, with Chapter 3 addressing fertility behavior in the
contemporary United States. This chapter adapts “determinants of fertility” models from
8

existing literature but adds in political traits as a potential determinant of individual
fertility. Chapter 4 is very similar to Chapter 3 in its modeling and estimation but applies
these techniques to contemporary data from twenty-six European countries. The same
research question holds: Do political traits help predict fertility? What are other
significant predictors of individual fertility?
The next chapter (5) addresses research questions which change the focus of the
intergenerational dynamics discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. While Chapters 3 and 4
explore the possibility of political ties across generations, Chapters 5 discusses a potential
source of intergenerational conflict: unfunded old-age social welfare. Chapter 5 examines
individual preferences for potential Social Security reforms as well as individual
confidence in the fiscal stability of the Social Security system. The latter half of Chapter
5 tests the assumptions of the ordered probit estimation employed earlier in the Chapter
using generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation and finds support for the
application of the ordered probit model to the Social Security policy questions. Chapter 6
briefly concludes by discussing the implications and limitations of the dissertation, as
well as future extensions.
This introduction is concluded by a discussion of the ties between the empirical
chapters in this dissertation. First however, the paragraphs below summarize the research
question, methodology, and findings of each of the 3 empirical chapters in more detail.
Chapter 3 explores the relationship between political characteristics and fertility
behavior in the United States using relatively recent survey data. This chapter addresses
two related research questions: Does it appear to be the case that political traits are
significant determinants of fertility in the United States? What other factors appear to be

9

significant predictors of individual fertility behavior of Americans? It seems possible that
different political cohorts may be having children at different rates. If this is true, and it is
also true that some majority of children adopt the political characteristics of their parents,
such a scenario could lead to one political cohort “out-reproducing” others over several
generations.
This chapter uses National Annenberg Election Study data from 2004 and 2008.
Political traits are shown to have a varied relationship with fertility: partisanship was not
a strong predictor of fertility behavior (in either direction), but respondent political
ideology (a “very conservative” to “very liberal” five point scale) was a statistically
significant and meaningful predictor of fertility. On average, and controlling for other
factors, political conservatives had significantly more children in their households than
did political liberals. The “determinants of fertility” model is estimated with negative
binomial regression to account for the overdispersion of the dependent variable, i.e. each
additional child is not independent of the size of household, as a Poisson model would
assume. The dependent variable is “children in the respondent’s household” which has a
median outcome of zero. The results suggest the inclusion of political traits as a
determinant of fertility, and the possibility of a shift in the future U.S. ideological
distribution, assuming that children tend to adopt the political characteristics of their
parents.
Chapter 4 addresses the same research questions as Chapter 3 and employs a very
similar model, but the data comes from twenty-six European countries (tested separately)
via the European Social Survey (2010). Again, this chapter addresses two distinct but
related research questions: are political characteristics (generic left-right ideological
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scale) meaningful predictors of individual fertility? This analysis suggests there is no
pattern of such an interaction among the twenty-six sample countries. There are several
countries in which the “left” seems more fertile, and several in which the “right” is more
fertile, but in most cases the relationship is fairly weak.
The second research question, other factors that determine individual fertility,
leads to far more statistically significant results. The analysis employs a fairly standard
“determinants of fertility” model and estimates it with negative binomial regression due
to the same overdispersion issue of the dependent variable as mentioned above. This
estimation provides evidence of a surprising relationship between wealth and fertility and
education and fertility – both relationships are strongly significant and positive in a large
number of European countries (especially Nordic Europe and Western Europe). This
finding is counter to much of the existing literature on this relationship and the common
wisdom of “poor people have larger families.” The findings suggest an intriguing
possibility: are children luxury goods in contemporary Europe?
Chapter 5 shifts to discussing an issue over which there could be age-based
cleavages over policy direction – pay-as-you-go old age social welfare. This chapter uses
cross-sectional survey data (2004 National Annenberg Election Study Special Inaugural
Survey) to investigate the relationship between respondent age and preferences for Social
Security tax and benefit policy, as well as respondent confidence in the Social Security
system’s ability to continue to distribute benefits. This study contributes to the literature
on intergenerational conflict over policy, most of which has focused on the proportion of
elderly residents in a jurisdiction and support for K-12 educational spending. Several
previous studies in this vein that have focused on age and support for old-age social
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welfare spending like Social Security have not found evidence that age is a meaningful
predictor of respondent support for policies that benefit the elderly.
Chapter 5 takes advantage of unusually detailed survey items on respondent
Social Security preferences in order to construct two index scores: one measures
respondent preference for Social Security tax and benefit policy, and the other measures
respondent confidence in the viability of the Social Security system. The model is
estimated using ordered probit. The analysis concludes that age is a significant
determinant of both respondent Social Security confidence and tax/benefit preferences.
Relatively old respondents were significantly more confident in Social Security than
younger respondents, and also were more likely to support Social Security tax increases
and oppose benefit cuts than were relatively young respondents. These results are
contrary to the findings of previous survey-based research on intergenerational conflict
over old-age social welfare, and are suggestive of a potential age-based political conflict
over Social Security.
The latter half of Chapter 5 tests the methodological rigor and appropriateness of
the estimation employed earlier in the chapter – ordered probit of two possibly related
indices. The analysis of Social Security preferences and confidence in Chapter 5 uses two
indices that take on values which would lead many analysts to use ordered probit
models. The two indices clearly could be correlated. However, the assumption of
bivariate normally distributed underlying preferences is clearly a strong assumption, and
it is good to test that assumption.
This test is performed using a generalized methods of moments (GMM) test
which takes the extra information provided by an ordered probit about the probabilities of
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the values of the individual indicators, which is not employed in maximum likelihood
estimation, as it is based entirely on the gradients of the log likelihood function and not
on the marginal distribution of each indicator. The extra information can be written as
testable extra orthogonality conditions in a GMM setup. It is logical that two Social
Security indices (preferences for policy and confidence in the system) could be based on
underlying normal distributions, but it is not at all obvious that that must be true,
especially jointly. The theory and testing are explained in the chapter, but the
conclusions are straightforward: the underlying propensities are positively correlated at a
statistically significant level (correlation = 0.11, p<0.001) and there is no statistical
evidence against joint normality (chi square of 76.4 with 75 d.f., p=0.433). This provides
unusually strong evidence that the technical assumptions are not biasing the political
analysis.
These three empirical chapters are distinct (although Chapters 3 and 4 are closely
related), but they all address scenarios in which demographic factors may lead to changes
in political (and policy) outcomes. Of course, there are many ways in which changes in
demographic factors can impact politics and policymaking. One obvious example is
migration: immigration (or emigration) can change countries (or smaller jurisdictions)
along several demographic dimensions that can have implications for political dynamics
and policymaking. For example, immigration can lead to a population that is younger,
more fertile, poorer, more religious, and more racially/ethnically diverse - or it may lead
to exactly the opposite, depending on the immigrants and the host country. Changes
along each of these dimensions can have political implications – a large number of recent
poor immigrants may require a host country to change social welfare benefits for the
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poor, to mention only one possible scenario. While immigration may occur for
completely non-political reasons, it can have important impacts on politics and policy.
Other demographic shifts and factors can also be expected to have implications
for politics and policymaking in a country or jurisdiction. A changing proportion of
elderly residents in a jurisdiction could change the dynamics surrounding old-to-young
intergenerational policies, such as the funding of K-12 education. Perhaps the most
obvious current example of a relationship of this type is population aging, which has
significant policy and political implications. On the policy side, such aging poses stability
problems for unfunded old age social welfare benefit programs – there are more
relatively old people to pay benefits to (for a longer time, as life expectancy increases)
and fewer young people to pay them. Population aging can also lead to political
obstacles: it can be difficult to reform programs that benefit the elderly as the median
voter becomes older – cutting benefits to the elderly is politically unpopular. Population
age is the primary explanatory variable of interest in Chapter 5.
Chapters 5 describes a setting in which an aging U.S. population (with a relatively
old and aging median voter) may have the potential to come to political conflict over an
intergenerational policy – the pay-as-you-go U.S. Social Security system. Age is a
significant predictor of Social Security attitudes, suggesting the possibility that Social
Security policy may become a mechanism through which the relatively old extract wealth
from the relatively young as the population (and the median voter) ages. The idea that
different age cohorts may compete over some policy with intergenerational implications
is not new: there has been a significant amount of similar research on the implications of
a population age structure for policy outcomes. Most research of this type to date has
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focused on the proportion of relatively old residents in a jurisdiction and the behavior of
those residents with respect to state and local level funding of K-12 education.
The relatively recent population aging experienced by the U.S. is due to two
factors: decreased fertility and increased life expectancy. While the U.S. has not
experienced the dramatic decline in fertility rates exhibited by other advanced
democracies over the past several decades, it has still displayed decreased fertility over
the past forty years or so (although U.S. fertility rates currently sit at about 2.1).2 Fertility
behavior has played a critical role in forming the aging populations that drive the research
questions of the first two chapters, but also plays a significant role in the 3rd and 4th
chapters, which investigate whether political cohorts (people of different
parties/ideological groups) have children at different rates. Chapters 3 and 4 also explore
the predictive power of other determinants of fertility.
The 3rd and 4th chapters discuss the possibility of shifts in the distribution of the
population’s political characteristics due to different patterns of fertility behavior by
different political cohorts. In the abstract (polar) case, large differences in fertility
behavior by different ideological/partisan groups can lead to sizeable shifts in the position
of the median voter over only one or two generations, assuming children adhere to the
political traits of their parents in the majority of cases. Chapter 3 suggests a strong link
between political ideology and fertility in the U.S., but the analysis in Chapter 4 does not
find evidence of such a link for the bulk of European countries. Chapter 4 does find
evidence of positive relationships between education and fertility and income and fertility
in many European states; a result that suggests many Europeans may wish to have more
children than they do but do not feel secure enough to have a child or additional children.
2

Fertility rate of 2.1 = 2.1 live births per woman in her lifetime, on average.
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Continued academic investigation of micro-level fertility behavior is justified by
the relatively unusual fertility patterns we witness in much of the advanced world: in
many countries fertility rates are far below replacement rates, and appear to be holding at
very low levels. This pattern is unprecedented in human history: it is a full-blown
“second demographic transition,” to borrow a term from demographers, and it is worthy
of extensive study.
These significant changes in both fertility and life expectancy have significant and
immediate policy implications due to the extensive nature of many pay-as-you-go or
unfunded old age social welfare systems distributed throughout the advanced world. As
the median voter ages it is conceivable that such systems (including Social Security in the
U.S.) could be mechanisms by which the relatively old extract wealth from the relatively
young in an “intergenerational conflict” context. This possibility justifies the continued
study of intergenerational dynamics and potential intergenerational conflict in the
advanced world.
To summarize, this dissertation contains three distinct central chapters: Chapters 3
and 4 examine the explanatory power of political characteristics as determinants of
fertility in both the United States and Europe while discussing the possibility that such
differences could lead to shifts in the future political distribution. These chapters also
assess the importance of other determinants of fertility, such as wealth, education level,
and relationship status. Chapter 5 investigates the relationship between respondent age
and attitudes towards Social Security using survey data. All three of these chapters have
at their core a discussion that centers on the relationship between a demographic factor or
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process (population aging or age distribution, and fertility behavior) and a political
outcome (possible median voter shifts, intergenerational conflict over policy).
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Chapter Two
Review of Relevant Literature

1. Chapter Introduction
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the core of this dissertation consists primarily of three
empirical chapters that each explore intergenerational dynamics, with special attention
paid to political factors. This chapter discusses the literature that underpins this
dissertation. It introduces some of the general conceptual intuitions behind each
analytical chapter and discusses how these intuitions relate the literature to the findings of
each chapter. The literature discussed in this section is grouped by its relationship to the
relevant empirical chapter.
Section 2 below discusses the literature related to the relationship between
political traits (and other traits) and personal fertility and the implications these
relationships can have for future political outcomes. Accordingly, this review covers
several bodies of literature: it discusses previous research on the formation of political
preferences (2.1), including the role of intergenerational political socialization in the
formation of such preferences. Research on the determinants of fertility is discussed in
Section 2.2.
Section 3 below discusses the literature concerning potential intergenerational
conflict over policy. This research can be broken down into two major groups: research
that uses theoretical tools to discuss the potential for intergenerational conflict over
certain policies (Section 3.1), and empirical research that looks for evidence of actual or

18

potential age-based policy conflicts (3.2). Much of this empirical research focuses on the
impact of the elderly on K-12 public educational spending.
2. Research on the Formation of Political Preferences and the Determinants of
Fertility
2.1. Policy Preference Formation Literature
In order to understand the implications demographic shifts can have for policy
preferences and outcomes, it is necessary to consider the mechanisms behind the
formation of individual political preferences. This section summarizes several pieces on
preference formation. General preference formation literature is examined below, along
with research that considers age, income, education, and parental factors
(intergenerational political socialization).
Much of the literature on public opinion is marked by a discussion on the
rationality (or lack thereof) of the American public. Page and Shapiro (1992) provide
evidence of collective rationality and meaningful shifts in American public opinion. The
authors discuss the work of Lippman (1925) and Converse (1970), who argued that the
public seemed to display highly unstable preferences over public policy. Page and
Shapiro follow up on the work of Key (1961) in finding evidence of meaningful and
consistent positions among the American public. The authors use a variety of polling data
to show that collective policy preferences are generally coherent, stable, and change in
predictable ways. They mention that information asymmetries can allow public opinion
to be deficient in some ways: political education can be improved, and elites are capable
of misleading the public and manipulating policy preferences in some cases.
Franklin (1984) argues that individual partisanship adapts to fit with individual
policy preferences, in contrast to the traditional view, articulated in The American Voter,
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which argued that partisanship is largely fixed in childhood and stable throughout life
(Campbell et al, 1960). Franklin concludes that policy/issue preferences explain both
partisan preferences and the stability of partisanship throughout later periods of life.
Druckman and Lupia (2000) examine the roots of political preference formation.
They argue that most preferences occur due to individual encounters with environmental
factors. The authors review literature on both the mechanism of preference formation and
the impact of external factors on individual preferences and behavior. Druckman and
Lupia conclude that it is important to consider strategic interactions when studying
preferences: political preferences are not formed in isolation, but often in anticipation of
the behavior of other actors.
Krosnick (1988) uses polling data to show that policy issues considered more
important by voters have a larger impact on voter preferences for presidential candidates
than issues perceived as relatively unimportant by those voters. The author suggests that
this difference could be due to the greater memory accessibility of important issues, and
notes that people are more likely to perceive larger differences between the candidates on
issues that are relatively more important to them.
2.1.1. Age
It is reasonable to expect age to affect preference formation, especially on issues
over which age-based cleavages may occur, such as education funding, Social Security,
and Medicare. A substantial body of literature examines the importance of the elderly
portion of the local demographic for public school funding (Button, 1992; Poterba, 1997;
others).
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Others have undertaken a broader examination of the importance of age for policy
preferences. Day (1990) found an inconsistent relationship between age and policy
preferences: the elderly do not always support seemingly “pro-elderly” policies.
Rhodebeck (1993) uses American National Election Study data (1972-1988) to study the
relationship between age cohort and preferences on political issues that may lead to
opposing cohorts based on age group. The author determines that respondent age does not
overwhelmingly predict political preferences on age-related issues, such as federal
spending on Social Security and health care. Rhodebeck finds that partisanship and
income are as important as age in predicting individual preferences. The role of age and
policy preferences is discussed in more detail in Section 3, which covers literature on
intergeneration conflict and cooperation.
2.1.2. Income
One may also expect income to impact certain political preferences. The
“Postmaterialism” work by Inglehart specifies a mechanism by which material security
can impact the formation and content of political preferences. Inglehart (1971, 1977a,
1990) suggests that economic security at the period of life in which an individual begins
to mature politically can lead to what he terms “Postmaterialism.” Postmaterialists place
higher importance on non-physiological needs (such as “self-expression and aesthetic
satisfaction”) than materialists, who are more concerned with physical well-being and
security (Inglehart, 1990). Inglehart refined this argument to suggest the occurrence of
aggregate or society-wide changes in postmaterialist attitudes, particularly an increase in
such attitudes in modern industrial democracies (1990).
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Dutch and Taylor (1993) use Euro-Barometer data to attempt to evaluate
Inglehart’s economic security argument. They do not find evidence that economic
security at the time of political maturation leads to higher incidences of “postmaterialist”
values. The authors do find higher levels of education to be associated with more
postmaterialist tendencies. Other authors have also failed to find support for Inglehart’s
economic security argument (Davis and Davenport, 1999; Clarke et al, 1999).
Hansen and Tol (2003) assess Inglehart’s argument that industrial societies are
undergoing a shift toward postmaterialist values by using actual measures of several
items on the “Inglehart index” survey item. The authors use actual rates of inflation,
crime, and unemployment and find a link between low crime and inflation: both lead to
more postmaterialistic valuations. They note that the trend toward postmaterialism in
their results is not as strong as that specified by Inglehart after they account for actual
inflation, crime, and unemployment.
2.1.3. Education
Education or knowledge can also be expected to impact the formation of political
preferences. Much of the early research on political preference formation focused on the
knowledge (or lack thereof) held by individuals (Key, 1961; Converse, 1970). While
education level seems to be important in forming certain attitudes (Bobo and Licari
[1989] found a positive relationship between education level and political tolerance),
knowledge of specific facts or concepts has been shown to be an important factor in
determining political preferences.
Gilens (2001) argues policy-specific facts (such as changes in the crime rate) can
be important in the formation of political judgments. He shows that measurements of

22

general political knowledge do not account for information of this type, and notes that the
effect of policy-specific facts is greatest for those Americans with high levels of political
knowledge. Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006) examine the impact of education on
individuals’ preferences for trade openness. They find that higher education levels are not
strictly associated with support for trade openness: economic literacy seems to be more
important than personal considerations (such as employment security) in determining
preferred levels of trade openness.
Education level and political knowledge can be expected to be related to one
another, and one may expect them to depend to a great degree on individual background.
The next section describes how individual upbringing, specifically parentage, can impact
individual political preferences.
2.1.4. Intergenerational Political Socialization
Another factor that may impact political preferences and is often strongly related
to both income and education is family background. If any significant differences in
fertility behavior among ideological groups are found in this study such differences are
made more meaningful if children tend to adopt the political ideology and partisanship of
their parents with some regularity. Accordingly, several pieces focusing on
intergenerational political socialization are summarized below.
An introduction to political socialization (from an American context) is found in
Erickson and Tedin (2005). The authors note that children tend to share partisan identity
with their parents. They observe that all political systems attempt some form of
socialization: such a practice is seen as necessary to creating a “stable political order
(117).” The authors examine the socialization of children at four stages in childhood then
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examine several agents of political socialization. The family is the first agent they
examine, and the most pertinent one to this review. They observe (from Jennings and
Niemi, 1974) that the relationship between parent and child attitudes on various political
issues is merely moderate. However, partisanship is transmitted much more successfully:
when parents agree on partisanship (26% do not), 76% of adolescents match the partisan
preferences of their parents. Transmission of partisanship seems to have declined
somewhat over time, although children who wish to rebel against their parents’
partisanship most often choose to register as independents. The authors note the finding
of Beck and Jennings (1991), which suggests that highly politically active and aware
households tend to transmit partisan preferences more successfully to children than do
non-politicized households.
The next issue discussed is political socialization during adulthood. While
political attitudes are generally quite stable over time, the authors do discuss the existence
of generational shifts in attitudes (birth cohorts shift as a result of some collective
experience) and life-cycle shifts in political attitudes (individual political shifts as a result
of aging - older persons tend to become less idealistic, more politically conservative).
Period effects can also impact political attitudes during adulthood: period effects are
events that affect all age cohorts (end of the Cold War, 9/11). Erickson and Tedin note
that older persons tend to have stronger partisan attachments than do younger persons.
The authors conclude with a discussion of the stability of political orientation.
They argue that such orientation is stable relative to one’s peers: the conservatives in a
young cohort remain the conservatives in that same cohort when it is older. Orientation
on core political attitudes is defined as “malleable” in the pre-adult years, but becomes
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far more stable (relatively immobile) during the adult years. This piece reinforces the idea
that knowing the partisan/political preferences of parents allows one to say something
about the likely preferences of their children (that is, something far more accurate than
random assignment).
Other pieces on intergenerational political socialization have found variation on
the strength and nature of the relationship between the political behavior of parents and
children. Some authors have argued that the impact of parental political behavior on that
of children is significant and fairly straightforward. Jennings and Niemi (1974),
Converse (1969) and Beck and Jennings (1991) argue for the existence of a strong and
fairly direct relationship between the partisanship of parents and children. Alford and
Hibbing (2004) argue that simple genetic heritability of traits is likely to shape political
behaviors and lead to similarities in such behavior between parents and offspring. Plutzer
(2002) finds that parental socioeconomic status and political activity plays a large role in
predicting turnout among young, first-time voters. This parental impact on the likelihood
of voting persists in a weakened form as young voters age.
Other pieces have presented evidence of a more complex and indirect relationship
between the political behavior of parents and children. Niemi and Jennings (1991) find
parents have the ability to determine the initial partisan preferences of their children, but
that the policy and issue preferences of those children at later points in time will be an
important determinant of any partisan shifts, apart from parental partisanship. However,
parental partisanship still plays a significant, if reduced, role in determining partisanship
throughout the life of the children.
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Barker and Tinnick (2006) also present evidence of a significant and somewhat
complex relationship between the political preferences of parents and children. The
authors evaluate the argument of the linguist George Lakoff, who theorizes (2002) a
relationship between an individual’s ideal parental role (nurturing-dominant or disciplinedominant) and that individual’s political ideology (liberal or conservative). They find
empirical support for Lakoff’s argument and posit that this relationship could have
important effects on the parent-child political socialization process: as children are
exposed to nurturing (discipline) -intensive parental techniques, they develop an idea of
the proper role of authority figures, both parental and governmental, which can shape
political preferences and ideology in adulthood.
Another example of research of this strain is Conover (1988). The author
examines the impact of social groups on individual political thought. She finds that
individuals tend to have more sympathetic assessments of groups of which they are a
member. As a primary example, females tend to be more sympathetic towards the
“working women” social group. Similarities of political sympathies for certain groups
might be expected to be relatively high for parents and children as the likelihood of
parents and children being members of many of the same social groups is relatively high.
Marsh (1975) argues against the existence of a direct and highly significant
parental impact on political socialization. He argues that surveys which ask respondents
to recall the political party of their parents are subject to considerable biases as
respondents will often falsely recall their parents’ political party as similar to their own.
While Marsh recommends that the “notion of the supremacy of the family in political
socialization” be “regarded with skepticism,” he notes that there does appear to be some

26

intergenerational stability in political attributes, specifically political party membership.
Marsh concludes by presenting his own findings on various political attitudes held by
parents and children. He argues that parents and children are not overly similar on
specific political considerations (political freedom, political equity, etc), and wonders if
intergenerational socialization has significant implications for the political landscape.
While there is debate over the specific mechanism, the consensus of the literature
on intergenerational political socialization appears to be that more often than not children
adopt the political party and something of the broad political traits of their parents
(Converse, 1969).
2.2. Determinants of Fertility Literature
Chapters 3 and 4 examine the role of political characteristics as a significant
determinant of fertility behavior, but these chapters also consider the roles of many other
factors in this relationship. Many factors can feed into an individual’s decision to have
one or more children. Such factors can also affect the timing of such decisions.
Academics from several fields have been suggesting and testing various determinants of
fertility for several decades. The following section briefly discusses this body of research.
The standard determinants of fertility behavior (and/or fertility change) in the
literature may be grouped into two general types. Micro level determinants of fertility
impact the individual decision to have a child (or additional children) but exist at the
individual level: these factors include things like education level, personal wealth, and
relationship status. Macro level determinants of fertility are also expected to potentially
impact individual fertility behavior, but these effects exist at a group wide level – usually
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across a country. An example of such a factor is the economic health of the country as a
whole.
2.2.1. Micro Level Determinants of Fertility
Micro level determinants of fertility consider personal or individual factors faced
by individuals or couples as they make decisions on their ideal family size, ideal number
of children conceived in a given time period, and their actual fertility behavior. An
important theme in this research is that mismatches between fertility preferences and
behavior are fairly common and can exist for multiple reasons (Meron and Widmer,
2002; Toulemon and Testa, 2005).
Partnerships and Marital Status
Recent changes in patterns of marriage and cohabitation in wealthy states have
important implications for fertility behavior. Many authors have noted shifts away from
early marriage and toward either delayed marriage or a permanent state of cohabitation
(Bumpass et al, 1991; Corijn and Klijzing, 2001; Mills, 2004; Gibson-Davis et al., 2005).
This behavior tends to depress fertility in certain states: individuals are less likely to have
children when they are not in a stable relationship - including marriage, obviously (Brien
et al, 1999; Baizan et al., 2003; Philipov et al., 2006; Testa, 2006). This relationship does
not hold in all states: in some cases married and cohabitating couples have nearly equal
fertility rates (Toulemon and Testa, 2005). However, the general trend of delayed and
reduced marriage rates in wealthy countries appears to delay and reduce childbearing in
those countries. For example, crude marriage rates3 in the OECD fell from 8 to 4.5 in the
period 1970-2009, and of course fertility fell in the OECD over this time period as well
(although this alone says nothing about any causal relationship).
3

Crude marriage rates are marriages per 1000 members of the population in a year.
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Technical/Biological Factors
This class of determinants is largely dominated by the work of Davis and Blake
(1956), who detailed eleven intermediate fertility variables that arguably determined the
likelihood of childbirth in a given population. These variables (potential determinants)
are largely, but not entirely biological. An example of a variable of this type is ‘duration
of the fertile period,’ which is simply the length in years that an average female in a
population can bear children.
The eleven factors in Davis and Blake (1956) were distilled into four technical
determinants by Bongaarts (1976): index of proportion married, index of lactational
infecundability, index of contraception, and index of abortion. Hobcraft and Little (1984)
test the importance of Bongaarts’ (1976) determinants on a very similar population and
get results that differ from Bongaarts’. These technical determinants are most often tested
using a small population in a less-developed state, perhaps limiting their applicability to
industrialized democracies.
Wealth and Human Capital
Individual wealth and human capital (and education) have been heavily studied as
possible determinants of fertility behavior. An especially early effort is found in
Notestein (1936), where the author discusses the relatively low fertility of comparatively
wealthy and urban individuals. The relationship between wealth and family size has
perhaps been most notably examined by Becker (1960) and coauthors (Becker and Lewis,
1973; Becker and Murphy, 1988; Becker et al., 1990). Becker (and others) assume
children (and the utility of such children) contribute to the utility of the householder:
having more well-cared-for children makes people happy. However, this relationship is
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not linear – there is a point at which householders will choose to emphasize quality over
quantity of children, which will result in an increased cost of raising such children.
Becker sees children as having characteristics similar to most other commodities: cost
determines demand. Rural children cost less because the value of the labor they provide
offsets some of their cost. When the value of a mother’s time increases (as wages
increase), the cost of potential children also increases – higher wages increase the
opportunity cost of children. Becker argues that the industrial modernization and
increased opportunities for women have combined to make children relatively more
costly, and it is this increase in the relative cost of children that can account for the drop
in fertility in modern industrialized countries. Therefore, wealth and total fertility can be
said to have a curvilinear relationship. Householders choose to have more children as
they can support them, but reduce the number of children when the cost per child
becomes prohibitive (as the children of wealthy families demand higher investment).
Other studies that focus on the relationship between individual resources (wealth
and human capital/education) often examine the opportunity cost of having one or more
children for a given individual (Happel et al., 1984; Cigno and Ermisch, 1989; Kraval,
1992). These studies generally focus on fertility decisions as they relate to women, with
the expectation that childbirth may be costly to the career trajectory of relatively highearning women. Many authors have studied this relationship in various states, with a
fairly reliable consensus that the primary reason women delay childbirth is related to their
concern for their career arc (Ameudo-Dorantes and Kimmel, 2005; Gustafsson, 2005;
Kneale and Joshi, 2008; Miller, 2010). This relates to the point made by Becker and
others: it is another reason that one may expect to see lower fertility among wealthy
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families: the opportunity costs of raising one or more children, especially for women, are
higher than for poor or middle income families.4
Some authors who focus more specifically on the education level of women argue
that highly educated women are not necessarily less likely to have one or more children
than their less-well-educated counterparts (Oppenheimer, 1994; Behrman and
Rosenzweig, 2002; Mills et al., 2008). While highly educated women tend to delay
fertility (in some ways simply due to societal norms about the timing of education and
childbearing, as in Goldscheider and Waite, 1986), they may still have high overall
fertility for several reasons.
Economic Uncertainty
Many studies have explored the idea that levels of economic uncertainty faced by
individuals can impact fertility behavior. The mechanism behind such a relationship is
straightforward: as individuals are aware larger families will demand more resources they
will delay the addition of one or more children until they reach an acceptable level of
economic stability. Behavior of this type is well illustrated by examining fertility during
the US Great Depression and other economic downturns, including the energy crisis of
the 1970s and the 2008 housing crisis (Figure 2.1).

4

It is also important to consider that delayed fertility is likely to lead to lower overall fertility for
most women for biological reasons. Women who begin having children in their mid to late 30s are
biologically unlikely to have large numbers of own children.
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Figure 2.1: U.S. Fertility Rate (Births/1000 Women 15-44), 19252009
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Becker’s theory of fertility is largely demand-based, but an alternative that
incorporates the supply-side of fertility may be found in Easterlin (1978, 1980). Easterlin
(1976, 1978, 1980) discusses this relationship between resources and fertility behavior by
noting the historical patterns of reduced demand for both marriage and children during
times of economic hardship. Easterlin includes many of the technical determinants of
fertility (including infant mortality) in his theory, and argues that income is a critical
determinant of fertility that corresponds with the size of a given cohort. When a relatively
large cohort enters the labor market, competition for jobs is high and wages are likely to
be relatively low, which can lead individuals to delay marriage and fertility until they
become more financially comfortable (1980). Many other studies that consider
relationships of this type specifically estimate the role of the labor market in impacting
fertility, with the expectation that higher unemployment rates (and thus higher labor
market uncertainty) will depress fertility. These suspicions are largely confirmed in
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several studies over the past few decades (Oppenheimer, 1988; Rindfuss and
Vandenheuvel, 1990; Oppenheimer, 2003; Mills and Blossfeld, 2005).
Cultural, Social, and Value-Based Factors
One can easily envision the role of non-economic factors in determining demand
for children (and thus total fertility) – societal pressures, individual desires, and cultural
norms can all impact the fertility behavior of women and couples. An early example of
this literature is Fawcett and Arnold (1975), which discusses the social status offered by a
large family in many cultures, as well as the value of tradition. Religiosity is also tied to
higher levels of fertility in this literature: adherence to pronatalist theology/philosophy
and tradition appears to matter in determining individual fertility behavior (Chamie,
1981; Heaton, 1986).
The idea of political factors being important determinants of fertility would fit
under this subsection: while there are currently no major studies of this relationship one
can imagine adherence to the political ideology of a group (either “left” or “right,”
depending on the country) impacting individual fertility behavior in a significant way.
The desires of individuals and couples could lead them to smaller or larger family sizes
depending on the norms and culture present in the groups they most strongly associate
with, be they religious or political/ideological. For example, in the U.S. political
conservatives are potentially more likely to endorse traditional large families and gender
roles. Political conservatives are also potentially less likely than liberals to employ
abortion, the lack of which can of course lead to higher fertility. Political characteristics
can be considered a non-economic (alongside cultural/ social/ familial/ religious)
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determinant of fertility, and such characteristics arguably subsume some of the
mechanisms behind other non-economic determinants.
Some recent research suggests a fundamental shift in the cultural view of fertility
in many OECD states: younger women in such states are less likely than older women to
value traditional family/gender roles and more likely to endorse the participation of
women in the labor market (D’Addio and d’Ercole, 2005; Gilbert, 2005). However, it is
extremely interesting that there seems to exist in every OECD country a gap between the
“ideal number” of children for women and their actual terminal number of children:
women in advanced counties appear to be having fewer children then they say they would
like to (D’Addio and d’Ercole, 2005).
Summary: Micro Level Determinants of Fertility
In sum, it seems that individuals desire a “floor” or threshold of economic and
relational stability before deciding to engage in childbearing: those who are financially
stable and in stable relationships seem to be more likely to have a child (or additional
children) then those with greater uncertainty in their personal or economic situation.
However, after this threshold is reached those with higher levels of wealth/wages and
education/human capital are expected to be less fertile than otherwise comparable
counterparts due both to the increased cost of child rearing they face (due to their desire
to invest heavily in their child’s upbringing) and the high opportunity costs associated
with childbearing – Becker (1960, 1991) suggests at high income levels householders
begin to shift demand for children downward but they invest more in each child, trading
quantity for quality. Highly educated women face a substantial cost in both wages and
career experience when they engage in childbearing. Finally, while it seems that the
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modernization of norms is putting downward pressure on the demand for children there
exists a significant gap in the fertility desires and behaviors of women in OECD states:
on average, they have fewer children in their lifetime than they desire to. This finding is
suggestive of a dynamic that will be discussed in the results section of this study.
2.2.2. Macro Level Determinants of Fertility
Macro level determinants of fertility are factors experienced by groups of people
that can be expected to impact the fertility desires and behaviors of a significant portion
of the group. One can think of these as factors that may impact an entire country jointly,
such as changes in social norms or shifts in the labor market. Of course, these factors may
influence fertility behavior (and ideals) more for some than others – while not all
individuals may shift fertility behavior due to an unstable labor market, there is reason to
think such a change may have a significant effect on average.
Economic and Labor Market Conditions
While the previous section discussed research on the role of micro-level economic
and labor-related variables (employment status, income) other studies focus on the role of
macro-level economic indicators and the impact these broader economic conditions have
for fertility behavior in a country. Most of these studies operate by linking the TFR (total
fertility rate, or average births per woman) in a country and time period to changes in
GDP and unemployment in that country.
There is a fairly broad consensus among a subset of these studies that downward
shifting GDP (as in a national economic downturn) is associated with lower levels of
fertility, and higher levels of GDP increase (as in a national economic expansion) are
associated with higher fertility rates (Santow and Bracher, 2001; Martin, 2004; Sobotka
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et al., 2011). Several authors suggest this reduction is largely due to delayed fertility,
especially of first children, and will likely be “recovered” as the economy expands
(Kohler et al., 2002; Mills and Blossfeld, 2005). Studies that examine the relationship
between fertility and other measures of national wealth (consumer confidence, human
development index [HDI] generally demonstrate the existence of a positive relationship
between wealth and fertility at the national level (Van Giersbergen and de Beer, 1997;
Bryant, 2007; Fokkema et al, 2008).
There are other studies, however, which suggest economic expansions make
childbearing more “expensive” for women in some countries given the opportunity costs
of such, and thus demonstrate an association between wages for women and the
postponement of childbearing – when women can earn more (generally in wealthier
countries) the opportunity costs of a child or children are high (Butz and Ward, 1979;
Macunovich, 1996; Kohler and Kohler, 2002).
Some studies examine the impact of national level unemployment trends on
fertility rates. These studies consistently demonstrate a negative relationship between
unemployment rates and fertility rates (Macunovich, 1996; Adsera, 2004, 2010, 2011;
Örsal and Goldstein, 2010). Easterlin (1968) suggests members of large birth cohorts face
increased labor market competition and uncertainty, and are thus likely to have relatively
low levels of fertility.
Public Policies – Pronatalist and Other Intergenerational Policies
Many governments have instituted national social welfare expansions of different
types over the past several decades. While these policies may not be explicitly designed
to encourage fertility, one can imagine how the public subsidization of childcare, for
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example, could encourage higher levels of fertility. The relationship between childcare
provision and fertility is heavily studied; however a consensus does not appear to result
from this research in this area – some authors find a negative relationship (Kravdal, 1996;
Rosen, 2004) while others show a positive relationship (Del Boca, 2002; Rindfuss et al.,
2010). Other social welfare policies appear to have an impact on fertility as well – when
old-age social welfare benefits are generous children are needed less to provide old-age
care, and fertility can fall as a result (Rendall and Bahchieva, 1998; Galasso et al., 2009;
Mills and Begall, 2010). One can see how policies instituted during a period of relatively
high (or even replacement rate: 2.1 births per woman/lifetime) fertility can quickly
become fiscal liabilities if they encourage lower fertility in future generations.
Norms and Values
Some authors suggest societal changes in attitudes or values can have a profound
impact on fertility behavior (Lesthaeghe, 1983; Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa, 1986;
Surkyn and Lesthaeghe, 2004, 2010; Billingsly, 2010). This research is largely theoretical
and is based in the study of demographic transition theory, and especially focuses on the
idea of the so-called “second demographic transition,” a term used to describe the
mechanism many authors (van de Kaa, Lesthaeghe, Neidert, and others) think is behind
the persistent below-replacement fertility seen in many parts of the advanced world over
the last several decades. This body of research suggests the existence of a shift in certain
societal norms over this time, most notably an increase in the individual pursuit of
personal fulfillment. Such personal realization or fulfillment is placed above the
importance of societal institutions, leading to changes in behavior that can be tied to
delayed or reduced fertility: pursuit of more education, high income, ideal relationships,
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and increased consumption (Lesthaeghe and Neidert, 2006; van de Kaa, 1997). While
there is not an overwhelming amount of empirical work on this relationship, several
studies suggest increased individual independence can lead to delayed fertility behavior
(Liefbroer, 2005; Bernhardt and Goldscheider, 2006; Thornton and Philipov, 2009).
Fertility Related Technology
A final macro-level determinant of fertility behavior is technology; specifically
technology related to contraception and technology designed to increase fertility for
individuals or couples who are experiencing difficulty conceiving or birthing a first child
or additional children.
The bulk of studies on modern contraceptives (“the pill”) conclude that such
drugs have a causal link with postponed and reduced overall fertility (Sobotka, 2004;
Goldin, 2006; Frejka, 2008; Bailey, 2010). This research could be considered to be at
odds with Becker (1960, 1981), who argues that demand for children determines their
supply above and beyond the existence of modern contraceptive technologies. Perhaps
one can conclude that modern contraceptives permit women and couples to avoid
accidental contraception and truly live up to their name as “family planning” aids. There
is of course evidence of significant voluntary reductions in fertility prior to the
widespread use of modern contraceptives: US fertility during the Great Depression is a
prime example. Fertility dropped by over 30% in this period (CDC), apparently in
response to reduced demand for children, likely prompted in many cases by the concern
for the welfare of current and potential children in a period of great economic instability.
Demand based fertility behavior of this type is comprehensively discussed in Becker
(1980, 1991).
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Of course, technology has also aided individuals and couples who have had
trouble conceiving: Sobotka et al. (2010) suggest that this technology (often abbreviated
ART, or Assisted Reproductive Technology) had a significant impact on the fertility
behavior of the relatively middle-aged in Denmark. Other authors note the role of ART in
postponing childbirth: ART seems to make later-life attempts to conceive more
successful, in a way that not would have been possible five or six decades ago (Billari et
al., 2007; Leridon et al., 2008). Therefore, this technology may make it feasible for
modern individuals and couples to delay fertility by a significant amount of time while
still achieving something close to a desired family size.
Summary: Macro Level Determinants of Fertility
In summary, macro level factors can impact fertility in several ways. National
level economic conditions appear to impact childbearing in a fairly consistent way:
people respond to a contracting economy by putting off conception. In a similar way,
higher national level unemployment rates are associated with lowered or delayed fertility
among residents. National policies can impact national TFR (total fertility rate) as well:
while childcare subsidies and provision seem to have inconsistent and rather
unimpressive effects on fertility, other public polices seem to matter more. In particular,
expansive old-age social welfare systems seem to have a relationship with fertility: as
individuals can be relatively assured of government funded care in their old age they may
be less concerned about having one or more own children in order to provide for such
future care. Changes in societal or macro level norms also appears to be tied to delayed
and depressed fertility in some cases: societal/cultural emphasis on values like
individuality, self-actualization, high levels of education, high income, increased
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consumption, and ideal relationships appear to put downward pressure on fertility
behavior. Presumably these “new” values are replacing more traditional norms that would
emphasize the importance of a large number of own children and an extensive domestic
role for women. Finally, technical changes related to fertility have had two sets of
impacts: pill-form contraceptives appear to depress fertility by reducing unplanned
pregnancy, and ART (Assisted Reproductive Technology) appears to make higher levels
of “later life” fertility more feasible: ART permits women and couples to delay fertility
significantly while still achieving something close to their optimal family size.
2.2.3. Political Characteristics as a Determinant of Fertility
Chapters 3 and 4 attempt to determine if political characteristics are indeed a
significant determinant of fertility behavior, as they are hypothesized to be – politically
conservative individuals are expected to display higher levels of fertility than political
liberals. Political characteristics can be considered a non-economic (alongside religion
and values) determinant of fertility, and such characteristics arguably subsume some of
the mechanisms behind other non-economic determinants. Political conservatives are
potentially more likely to endorse traditionally large families and gender roles. Political
conservatives are also potentially less likely than liberals to employ abortion, the lack of
which can of course lead to higher fertility. The ‘determinants of fertility behavior’
literature appears to largely focus on the technical and economic determinants of fertility.
However, it seems possible that political characteristics are not only heritable (Converse,
1969); they may have a significant impact on fertility. The interaction of these two
occurrences can lead to scenarios in which one political cohort “out-reproduces” another.
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The empirical analyses in Chapters 3 and 4 determine the significance of political
characteristics as a determinant of fertility.
2.3. The Impact of Immigrants
A large number of studies have attempted to assess the variety of ways in which
immigrants can impact the host country. A sizable portion of these studies focus on the
fiscal impact of immigrants in the host country, with varying results (Borjas, 1990; Lee
and Miller, 1997; Lee and Miller, 1998; Auerbach and Oreopoulos, 2000). Other similar
studies focus on immigrant impact on the host country labor market (Friedberg and Hunt,
1995; Borjas ,1987; Borjas, 2003; Borjas, 2006).
Immigrants can also impact other aspects of a host country: several studies
discuss the implications of immigrantion for poverty and income inequality (Borjas,
1990; Camarota, 1999b; Kazemipr and Halli, 2001; Van Hook et. al., 2004). Coleman
(2006) discusses the impact of immigrants on the long term racial/ethnic makeup of the
population of low-fertility countries, including the U.S.
Immigrant populations can also have implications for political outcomes: a
number of studies assess the political participation of immigrants in the United States
(Tam, 1995; Alvarez and Bedolla, 2003; Claassen, 2004). These studies broadly agree
that immigrants become politically active with more political exposure/socialization, and
that immigrants tend to adopt the partisanship of their fellow sending-country migrants:
Mexicans/Cubans/Koreans tend to adopt the partisan preferences of other
Mexicans/Cubans/Koreans, not the political preferences of Latinos/Asians generally.
These studies tend to focus only on the short-term political impact of immigrants.
Chapters 3 and 4 are focused on the relationship between political characteristics and
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fertility, and the long-term implications of this relationship, and thus has meaning for the
long-term political impact of immigrants in the United States.
2.4. Connection to Dissertation Chapters 3 and 4
Chapters 3 and 4 draw from several bodies of literature. Perhaps the most
important previous finding is the tendency of children to adopt the partisan preferences of
their parents (Converse, 1969). This tendency suggests that differences in fertility across
political cohorts can lead to changes in the future distribution of political preferences.
This study also contributes to two different bodies of literature. First, it
contributes to the literature on the social/value-based determinants of fertility. This
literature mentions concepts such as the value of tradition/preferences for traditional
gender roles (Fawcett and Arnold, 1975; D’Addio and d’Ercole, 2005) and religion
(Chamie, 1981; Heaton 1986) as determinants of fertility, but political characteristics are
generally not discussed as a potential determinant of fertility. Second, it contributes to the
literature on other determinants of fertility by providing a contemporary test of such
determinants in the US and twenty-six European countries.
3. Research on Intergenerational Conflict over Policy
Chapters 5 addresses the relationship between age and attitudes towards U.S.
Social Security in order to determine if the potential for age-based political conflict over
Social Security policy exists. Several strains of research have addressed the dynamics of
intergenerational conflict and cooperation. Some of these studies have used a theoretical
approach to model policy scenarios with overlapping generations, while others have used
empirical evidence to examine cases of potential intergenerational conflict over policy.
This literature is largely defined by a distinction between those who assess the potential
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for intergenerational conflict over policy (often, but not always, from an
economic/theoretical perspective) and those who examine empirical evidence for cases or
indications of actual intergenerational conflict over some policy area (usually education
or elderly-directed social welfare), often finding little evidence that significant age-based
differences in policy preferences exist. Some of these empirical studies use survey data,
while others examine policy outcomes (often per-pupil educational spending in a
jurisdiction) or voting on referenda that could be expected to elicit age-based differences
in preferences (such as spending on local public schools).
While most studies seem to agree that the potential for intergenerational conflict
of some type exists given certain conditions, there is great variation in supporting
evidence found (or not found) for such conflicts. The major findings of this body of
research are summarized in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 below. Section 3.1 discusses the
literature that examines the potential for intergenerational conflict over policy, while
Section 3.2 covers the empirical research that attempts to gauge the existence or severity
of intergenerational conflict over policy using survey or policy outcome data. Section 3.3
briefly discusses the conclusions of this research area.
3.1. Research on Intergenerational Conflict and Cooperation: The Potential for
Intergenerational Conflict over Policy
A common assertion in this literature is that jurisdictions with relatively old
population age structures have the potential to develop intergenerational political
conflicts over certain types of policy: those that benefit one age cohort at the expense of
another. Two primary examples of such policies are spending on public education and
social welfare benefits for the elderly – for the former, the relatively old fund the benefits
of the relatively young, while the opposite is true for the latter. The mechanism by which
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conflict over these policies can occur is straightforward: self-interested age cohorts can
vote for polices that benefit their cohort while being funded by other age cohorts. Several
studies have addressed this possibility. Kotlikoff and Rosenthal (1990) show that
cooperation on intergenerational policies can difficult to achieve: older generations are
able to control bargaining as they have the “first move” advantage. Older generations are
able to impact the economic standing of younger generations before younger generations
even enter the picture. Thus, older generations have (more or less) perfect control over
the bargaining agenda. Collard (2001) also discusses the ability of “first move”
generations to leave later generations at a disadvantage. Other studies have taken a
position similar to that of Kotlikoff and Rosenthal (1990), suggesting that the
combination of an aging population, redistributive policy, and self-interested voters could
lead to intergenerational policy conflicts over scare resources in the relatively near future
in developed states (Preston 1984; Kotlikoff et al. 1992; MacManus 1995; Lee 1996;
Pratt 1997). Such a possibility is considered even more likely in the United States, where
voting is voluntary and elderly residents are a highly active political cohort (Pratt 1993)
with a disproportionate share of votes, especially in local elections (MacManus 1995;
Binstock 2000; Duncombe et al 2003).
While much of the theoretical literature on intergenerational dynamics focuses on
potential conflict, such an outcome is not a certainty. It is possible that different age
cohorts can develop mechanisms of exchange and cooperation. Several authors suggest
ways in which generations can cooperate to solve certain moral hazards present when
populations are relatively old and may borrow from future generations. Collard (2001)

44

and Rangel (2003) both use economic models to detail conditions under which different
generations can cooperate with one another.
Collard (2001) endorses the idea of thinking about social policies in terms of
“generational bargains,” and examines the nature of transfers between overlapping
generations. Collard lists a number of ways in which generational bargains are robust
against “cheating” in most circumstances. However, generations can cheat by borrowing
great amounts of resources and leaving repayment to future generations – again, the
“first-move” advantage discussed in Kotlikoff and Rosenthal (1990). Rangel (2003) also
examines generational bargains in a piece on forward intergenerational goods (such as
education and environmental protection) and backward intergenerational goods (such as
social security). Rangel models several scenarios (both at the family and government
level) in which investment in backward intergenerational goods proves crucial in
sustaining a sufficient level of investment in forward generational goods. Investment in
backward intergenerational goods procures the support of the older cohorts in a
population and effectively purchases their support for investment in forward
intergenerational goods.
Boldrin and Montes (2005) specify a model with three overlapping generations
(young, middle, and old). They show that public support for investment in education is
sub-optimal without some sort of social security system (when credit markets are
unavailable to the young). In their model, the young borrow from the middle aged to pay
for their education and repay the debt to the middle aged cohort in the form of old-age
pensions. They mention that their research is an extension of Becker and Murphy’s
argument (1988) that public institutions can replace families in the provision of
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intergenerational exchanges, especially as related to human capital investment/old age
support.
A sizeable body of research outlines the potential for conflict between generations
over certain policy types with varying degrees of grimness over the likely future of
intergenerational conflict. These studies note the increasing electoral power the elderly
will have over the next several decades as they make up a greater portion of eligible
voters (especially in the United States, where voting is voluntary and the elderly are a
politically active age cohort). While there seems to be a consensus that intergenerational
conflict is plausible given the aging populations and redistributive spending in developed
states, this research also details ways in which generations can cooperate with one
another, primarily by tying support for young-benefitting goods like education to support
for old-benefitting goods like medical care for the elderly and social welfare spending.
3.2. Empirical Research on Intergenerational Conflict and Cooperation: Evidence of
Age-Based Conflict over Policy
There are two strains of literature that use an empirical approach to examine the
potential for intergenerational conflict (or the existence of such conflict) in certain policy
areas. One approach involves examining policy outcomes, either at the budgetary level
(most often focusing on an educational output, such as per-pupil spending in a
jurisdiction) or in voting on referenda that address policy issues upon which voters might
be expected to differ by age group (again, usually related to public education spending).
Another approach involves examining survey data for evidence of age-based differences
in preferences for certain types of policy; usually focusing on social welfare and medical
spending for the elderly and education spending. While the evidence for intergenerational
conflict over education policy is mixed, the consensus of the literature that uses survey
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data to assess this issue is that there is not strong evidence of intergenerational conflict
over social welfare benefits for the elderly – that is, age does not appear to be a highly
significant determinant of preferences for old-age social welfare policy.
Spending on public education is a relatively high-profile policy area in which
coalitions could be expected to form among age cohorts: the young and middle-aged
might be expected to support increases in such spending, while the elderly might be
expected to oppose such spending as they see very little direct benefit from higher levels
of education spending (although they may see benefits in the form of higher property
values resulting from the quality of schools). A significant amount of research has
examined the relationship between the percentage of elderly residents and the level of
spending on public education in a given jurisdiction. This relationship is perhaps one of
the best examples of an area in which noticeable intergenerational conflict could arise.
A certain portion of the research on the proportion of elderly residents in a
jurisdiction and the effect on school funding indicates a negative relationship between
these two variables: more elderly residents in a jurisdiction appear to depress public
school funding in that jurisdiction. Button (1992), Miller (1996), and Poterba (1997) are
all relatively early examples of this research that found such a relationship. Additionally,
Poterba (1997) and Ladd and Murray (2001) show that when the elderly and
schoolchildren in a district are of different races there tends to be an additional negative
impact on the willingness of the elderly to approve additional public education funding.
Berkman and Plutzer (2004) found that elderly “migrants” to a jurisdiction were less
likely to support education spending than were elderly “natives.”
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Other studies have found something of an ambiguous relationship between the
number of elderly in a jurisdiction and education spending. Ladd and Murray (2001) and
Harris, Evans, and Schwab (2001) both find a less powerful relationship between elderly
residents and school funding than does Poterba (1997). Ladd and Murray (2001) do not
find evidence that an increased proportion of the elderly reduces public K-12 education
spending in counties. The authors believe they may have found a weaker relationship
between proportion of elderly and support for K-12 education than Poterba (1997) due to
their use of counties rather than states as units of analysis. Ladd and Murray believe that
when education revenues and expenditures largely exist at the county level, it is possible
for the elderly to sort themselves into either favorable (low proportion of children and
thus lower education taxes) or unfavorable counties. Harris, Evans, and Schwab use
school district (county) level panel data similar to that of Ladd and Murray (2001) and
Poterba (1997) and find that the level of elderly residents in a district does significantly
depress per-pupil spending in that district. However, the magnitude of this effect is
markedly less (60 percent less) than that found by Poterba (1997). Harris, Evans, and
Schwab (2001) also show that elderly persons are far more likely to oppose state-level
increases in educational spending than they are to oppose local-level increases in
spending on K-12 schools. They believe this distinction the elderly make between statelevel and local-level revenue collection and funding accounts for the different results
found by Poterba (1997) and Ladd and Murray (2001). Berkman and Plutzer (2004) and
MacManus (1997) also find a mixed impact by the elderly on local education spending
and voting on education funding referenda, respectively.

48

Some studies have found little or no evidence that elderly residents in a
jurisdiction depress education spending. Button and Rosenbaum (1990) find little support
for the idea that the elderly can greatly impact local budgets at the expense of other age
groups, but argue that such an outcome is not inconceivable at some point as the elderly
are a well-organized and growing political cohort in many jurisdictions. Ladd and Murray
(2001), Duncombe et al. (2003) and Lambert et al. (2009) all fail to find evidence of an
age-group (elderly) effect on public education spending (or in the case of Duncombe et
al, voting on an education funding referendum). Fletcher and Kenny (2008) argue (from a
median voter framework) that while the elderly in a district may desire less spending on
education, having more elderly residents likely means there are fewer children to educate
in the jurisdiction, and may actually lead to a very small rise in per-pupil spending on
balance.
The survey data strain of research on intergenerational conflict is smaller than the
education-policy-based research in this area and is not as varied in its findings: there is a
consensus in the majority of this literature that survey data does not tend to indicate agebased differences in preferences over salient policy areas (old age social welfare and
education). Kingson et al. (1986) argue that the perception of “conflict” over crossgenerational policy like social welfare for the elderly is due to the way the discussion of
such policy is framed. Reno and Friedland (1997) make a similar argument: they assert
that the contradiction between individual ‘low confidence-in’ but ‘high support-for’
Social Security is mostly due to low-quality information and survey-biased snap
judgments. Baggette et al. (1995), Hamil-Luker (2001), and Street and Sittig Cossman
(2006) analyze survey data and fail to find evidence of age-based differences in
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preferences for social welfare spending on the elderly. Plutzer and Berkman (2005) note
that public opinion in the U.S. has become more favorable toward education spending
even as the nation has aged, though they note the possibility of local conflicts over
education spending when there exists a large cohort of elderly “migrants.” Binstock
(2000) notes that while elderly voters do not behave as a “monolithic” voting group, they
will play an increasingly important role in future elections as they are highly participatory
and will continue to grow in number.
While the survey-based research tends to find little evidence of current age-based
differences in policy preferences, several studies (along with Binstock [2000] and Plutzer
and Berkman [2005]) discuss the possibility of intergenerational conflict over policy in
the future due to the political participation behavior of the elderly (MacManus 1995;
Campbell 2002, 2003; Day 1993).
3.3. Discussion of Intergenerational Conflict and Cooperation Literature
This review of the research on intergenerational bargaining and conflict makes it
apparent that significant political conflicts can potentially emerge in aging and aged
populations. It is reasonable to expect age-cohort-based coalitions to form over several
types of policy issues, such as education spending and spending on social welfare for the
elderly. These age-based coalitions often have conflicting interests and it is conceivable
that political conflict could arise in certain policy areas. Such conflicts could make it
quite difficult for policymakers to solve certain policy problems (old-age social welfare
problems, for example) in representative governments.
The theory-based literature on intergenerational dynamics lays out plausible
conditions under which different age cohorts can come into conflict over policy: older
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cohorts have a “first move” advantage, are politically active, and are growing in size in
aging developed states. However, the empirical literature in this area does not appear to
provide evidence of rampant intergenerational conflict over scarce resources.
The literature on age-based intergenerational conflicts over the funding of public
education is something of a mixed bag: while certain pieces can point to some evidence
that more elderly individuals in a jurisdiction depress school spending, they are varied on
the estimated strength of this effect, and even whether or not it is strong enough to be
meaningful. This literature indicates a less straightforward relationship than “more
elderly = less spending on education.” Factors like race, the “migratory” status of the
elderly in an area, and the level of education spending being considered (state vs. local)
are all important in determining the nature of this relationship.
The survey-based research on individual preferences for elderly-directed social
welfare provision and education does not indicate the presence of age-based conflict over
these policy areas – age is not found to be a significant determinant of support for Social
Security/Medicare policy or education spending. Despite this lack of evidence for agecohort conflict over policy, a common thread in both the theoretical and empirical
research is the caveat that intergenerational conflict could become a significant problem
in the future as the population continues to age (at greater rates in some jurisdictions).
It is clearly not the case that intergenerational conflict over policy is unavoidable.
The series of pieces on elderly support for the funding of public K12 education and
intergenerational exchange suggests something of a mix exists between the self-interest
of each generation and some type of intergenerational exchange. These analyses raise an
issue that is at the heart of intergenerational bargaining and is likely to become
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increasingly important as the relatively old age cohorts gain increased electoral power:
what can keep generations from acting selfishly?
3.4. Connection to Dissertation Chapters 5
As discussed in Chapter 1, Chapter 5 uses survey data to determine if age and
other factors are significant determinants of attitudes related to Social Security. This
approach places these chapters alongside the literature discussed in Section 3.2 above:
this chapter is a further examples of survey-based research on potential intergenerational
conflict over policy. Chapter 5 discuss its relationship with the current intergenerational
conflict literature, and also discusses literature that has previously used the relatively
unique technique employed in the latter part of its estimation section (bivariate ordered
probit).
Why might age (and political characteristics) be expected to impact attitudes
toward Social Security? The nature of this relationship depends on the nature of those
particular attitudes. Chapter 5 features a discussion on two different types of attitudes
related to Social Security: confidence in the stability of the Social Security system and
preferences for levels of Social Security taxes and benefits.
For the first category of attitudes (confidence in the Social Security system) the
relationship between age and confidence should intuitively be quite straightforward: the
relatively old might be expected to indicate higher levels of confidence in the system than
the relatively young as the old are closer to collecting benefits, or possibly are already
collecting benefits. The longer time horizon of the relatively young, combined with the
possibility that they are aware of certain structural issues with Social Security (especially
as related to population aging) could lead them to be less optimistic about the stability of
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the system and the likelihood that they will reap Social Security benefits at the age of
eligibility.
The relationship between age and the second category of attitudes – preferred
levels of Social Security taxes and benefits – might be somewhat less clear. While the
relatively old might be expected to support higher taxes and benefits it is somewhat
difficult to imagine the relatively young holding radically different preferences. The
young may perceive a direct benefit from Social Security even at the present: they may
believe Social Security benefits provide for the financial support of elderly relatives they
themselves might otherwise have to provide. The survey items used ask two questions
about increasing Social Security taxes (rate and income cap), and one question about
cutting benefits. It might be more reasonable to expect age-based differences on the
taxation items.
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Chapter Three
Political Characteristics and Determinants of Fertility in the United States

1. Introduction
This study uses survey data to assess the impact of political characteristics on
fertility. It is not difficult to imagine a hypothetical scenario in which one ideological or
partisan cohort out-reproduces other competing cohorts over several generations. If we
assume that some majority of children adopt the political preferences of their parents,
such an occurrence could lead to a significant shift in the position of the future median
voter, when holding constant certain other factors. Is such a scenario possible in the near
future of the United States? In order to answer this question this study draws from
existing literature and uses recent survey data in order to answer two more fundamental
questions. First, to what degree do children adopt the political characteristics of their
parents? Second, are political characteristics (like partisanship and political ideology)
meaningful predictors of individual fertility?
The remainder of this study is organized in the following fashion: Section 2
provides a justification for this research question. Section 3 summarizes relevant
literature, largely focusing on studies of the determinants of fertility and intergenerational
political socialization. Section 4 describes the mechanism through which differences in
fertility behavior can have long-term political impacts. Section 5 introduces the data used
in this study and provides some descriptive statistics and cross-tabulations, while Section
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6 describes the models used and the results of the statistical analysis. Section 7 discusses
the limitations of this approach and concludes.
2. Justification
Why might we expect political traits to impact fertility? It is possible that political
traits capture some of the social/cultural/value-based determinants of fertility discussed in
Chapter 2’s explanation of micro-level determinants of fertility. It is conceivable that
some individuals may strongly self-identify based on their membership in a group with
common political traits (perhaps “conservatives” or “liberals” in the United States). It is
not unreasonable to expect political cohorts to emphasize different sets of values that may
play a role in determining fertility: for example, values that emphasize traditional family
structures (common among conservatives) may encourage higher fertility.
Why is it worthwhile to assess the impact of political characteristics on
individual fertility behavior? The research question explored here has both academic and
practical implications. First, the central research question (do political characteristics
significantly impact fertility?) has straightforward implications for the literature on the
determinants of fertility. A significant amount of previous work has specified various
factors that contribute to the likelihood of individuals choosing to have children
(Bongaarts, 1976; Easterlin, 1978, etc.), and this study specifies another significant
determinant of such behavior.
Second, this study also contributes (perhaps somewhat indirectly) to the literature
on intergenerational political socialization. If it is indeed true that children tend to adopt
the political characteristics of their parents (Converse, 1969), this finding gains additional
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significance if different political cohorts (liberals/moderates/conservatives) are having
children at different rates. The combination of these two findings could suggest the
presence of something of a Darwinian survival mechanism: the cohorts best able to pass
down their (political) characteristics to future generations are the best positioned for
survival.
Third, this study discusses the potential impact of recent domestic demographic
shifts from something of a different perspective: it considers the possible long-term
political impact of such shifts. The U.S. population has recently returned to a fertility rate
of 2.1 after a decline from 3.7 to 1.7 in the period 1960-1976 (World Bank WDI). Much
of this positive change in U.S. fertility is attributable to the influx of immigrants from
Central and South America. Many authors have discussed some of the implications of
this demographic shift: studies like Coleman (2006) discuss the long term racial/ethnic
implications, while others (Borjas, 1994) discuss the likely impact of this shift on poverty
and income inequality. There has been a significant amount of discussion on the shortterm political impact of recent demographic trends in the U.S. (mostly focusing on the
voting behavior of recent immigrants: Wong, 2000; Alvarez and Bedolla, 2003), but
virtually no academic discussion of the potential long term political impact of these
shifts.
Finally, a study of this type can have implications for policymakers. One can
imagine policymakers in democratic states attempt to assess the amount of latitude their
constituents grant them to legislate in a given policy area. Knowing something about the
profile of the likely future median voter could be of use to policymakers: they could use
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information about the profile of the likely future median voter in order to prioritize
attempted policy implementations. For example, imagine a jurisdiction in which liberals
display high fertility relative to conservatives. Holding other factors constant,
policymakers may reasonably expect the jurisdiction to grow more liberal in future
generations. If a group of policymakers wishes to implement a package of relatively
conservative policies (for example, trade liberalization, pension privatization, etc.), they
would best be served by advancing this package of policies sooner rather than later, and
by structuring the legislation so that it is relatively resilient. On the other hand, this group
of policymakers could more easily implement a set of liberal policies if they choose to
wait until a future date, as the median voter will presumably be more liberal in the future.
In sum, to get some sense of the latitude policymakers will have over drafting
policy solutions to any number of problems in the future, we can examine the fertility
behavior of present constituents. If we assume that a sizable portion of children reflect
the political ideology and preferences of their parents (Beck and Jennings, 1991), we can
say something about possible shifts in the distribution of political preferences in future
generations. Such information has obvious value to those who study the determinants of
fertility, intergenerational political socialization, and the implications of demographic
shifts, and possibly even to political actors themselves.
3. Relevant Literature
This study is associated with several different bodies of literature. It draws from
the findings of the public opinion/policy preferences formation literature; specifically the
portion of this literature that discusses intergenerational political socialization. Political
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characteristics as a significant determinant of fertility are especially important when
children tend to adopt the political characteristics of their parents; a tendency that this
literature suggests exists. The primary findings of this literature are discussed in 3.1
below. This study also contributes to the literature on the determinants of fertility,
summarized in 3.2. Finally, this study contributes to the literature on the implications of
recent demographic changes, specifically immigration, briefly summarized in 3.3 below.
A more detailed discussion of relevant literature is featured in Chapter 2.
3.1. Policy Preference Formation Literature
In order to understand the implications demographic shifts can have for policy
preferences and outcomes, it is necessary to consider the mechanisms behind the
formation of individual political preferences. This section summarizes several pieces on
political preference formation.
3.1.1. Age
It is reasonable to expect age to affect preference formation, especially on issues
over which age-based cleavages may occur, such as education funding, Social Security,
and Medicare. A substantial body of literature examines the importance of the elderly
portion of the local demographic for public school funding (Button, 1992; Miller, 1996;
Poterba, 1997; Ladd and Murray, 2001; Harris, Evans, and Schwab, 2001; Berkman and
Plutzer, 2004).
Others have undertaken a broader examination of the importance of age for policy
preferences. Day (1990) found an inconsistent relationship between age and policy
preferences: the elderly do not always support seemingly “pro-elderly” policies.
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Rhodebeck (1993) finds that partisanship and income are as important as age in
predicting individual preferences for age-specific policies like Social Security.
3.1.2. Wealth and Income
One may also expect income to impact certain political preferences. The
“Postmaterialism” work by Inglehart (1971, 1977a, 1990) specifies a mechanism by
which material security can impact the formation and content of political preferences.
Inglehart suggests that economic security at the period of life in which an individual
begins to mature politically can lead to what he terms “Postmaterialism.” Postmaterialists
place higher importance on non-physiological needs (such as “self-expression and
aesthetic satisfaction”) than materialists, who are more concerned with physical wellbeing and security (Inglehart, 1990).
Several authors have failed to find support for Inglehart’s economic security argument
(Dutch and Taylor, 1993; Davis and Davenport, 1999; Clarke et al, 1999).
3.1.3. Education
Education or knowledge can also be expected to impact the formation of political
preferences. Much of the early research on political preference formation focused on the
knowledge (or lack thereof) held by individuals (Key, 1961; Converse, 1970). While
education level seems to be important in forming certain attitudes (Bobo and Licari
[1989] found a positive relationship between education level and political tolerance),
knowledge of specific facts or concepts has been shown to be an important factor in
determining political preferences (Gilens, 2001; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006).
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3.1.4. Intergenerational Political Socialization
Another factor that may impact political preferences and is often strongly related
to both income and education is family background. If any significant differences in
fertility behavior among ideological groups are found in this study such differences are
made more meaningful if children tend to adopt the political ideology and partisanship of
their parents with some regularity. Accordingly, research focusing on intergenerational
political socialization is summarized below.
Some authors argue that the impact of parental political behavior on that of
children is significant and fairly straightforward. Jennings and Niemi (1974), Converse
(1969) and Beck and Jennings (1991) argue for the existence of a strong and fairly direct
relationship between the partisanship of parents and children. Alford and Hibbing (2004)
argue that simple genetic heritability of traits is likely to shape political behaviors and
lead to similarities in such behavior between parents and offspring. Plutzer (2002) finds
that parental socioeconomic status and political activity play a large role in predicting
turnout among young, first-time voters. This parental impact on the likelihood of voting
persists in a weakened form as young voters age.
Other research has presented evidence of a more complex and indirect
relationship between the political behavior of parents and children. Conover (1988),
Niemi and Jennings (1991), and Barker and Tinnick (2006) all conclude the existence of
a less direct and more nuanced relationship between parental political traits and the
associated political traits of children, while Marsh (1975) argues very little evidence of
such a relationship exists.
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While there is debate over the specific mechanism, the consensus of the literature
on intergenerational political socialization appears to be that more often than not children
adopt the political party and something of the broad political traits of their parents
(Converse, 1969).
3.2. Determinants of Fertility Literature
This study seeks to determine if political characteristics are a significant
determinant of fertility behavior. This section briefly discusses the “determinants of
fertility” body of research. It appears that the standard determinants of fertility behavior
(and/or fertility change) in the literature may be grouped into three general types:
technical or biological determinants, economic determinants, and social determinants.
3.2.1. Technical Determinants of Fertility
This class of determinants is largely dominated by Davis and Blake (1956), who
detailed eleven intermediate fertility variables that they argued determined the likelihood
of childbirth in a given population. These variables (potential determinants) are largely,
but not entirely biological. The eleven factors in Davis and Blake (1956) were distilled
into four technical determinants by Bongaarts (1976): index of proportion married, index
of lactational infecundability, index of contraception, and index of abortion. Hobcraft and
Little (1984) test the importance of Bongaarts’ (1976) determinants on a very similar
population and get results that differ from Bongaarts’. These technical determinants are
most often tested using a small population in a less-developed state, perhaps limiting their
applicability to industrialized democracies.
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Marital status is a significant determinant of fertility in OECD states: married
women are more likely than single women to have children, despite a rising proportion of
children born out of wedlock - as high as 50% in Scandinavian countries (D’Addio and
d’Ercole, 2005).
3.2.2. Economic Determinants of Fertility
A good starting point for a discussion on the economic determinants of fertility is
Becker (1960, 1981), who addresses changes in fertility behavior through a discussion of
the demand for children. Becker asserts that the purpose of marriage and families is the
production of own children, and that parents often must make a trade-off between quality
and quantity of children when making fertility decisions. Becker sees children as having
characteristics similar to most other commodities: cost determines demand. Rural
children cost less because the value of the labor they provide offsets some of their cost.
This body of literature is summarized in more detail in Chapter 2 (2.2.1).
3.2.3. Social/Value-Based Determinants of Fertility
Many authors have discussed potential determinants of fertility that are not
directly technical or economic in nature; they may be grouped together as social or value
based determinants of fertility behavior. The literature on this subject is summarized in
Chapter 2. An example of such factors would be things like religion (Chamie, 1981;
Heaton, 1986), fertility-based social status (Fawcett and Arnold, 1975), and female
valuation of fertility versus labor market involvement (D’Addio and d’Ercole, 2005;
Gilbert, 2005).
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3.2.4. Political Characteristics as a Determinant of Fertility
This study examines whether political characteristics are indeed a significant
determinant of fertility behavior, as they are hypothesized to be below – politically
conservative individuals are expected to display higher levels of fertility than political
liberals. Political characteristics can be considered a non-economic determinant of
fertility, alongside religion and values, and such characteristics arguably subsume some
of the mechanisms behind other non-economic determinants. Political conservatives are
potentially more likely to endorse traditionally large families and gender roles. Political
conservatives are also potentially less likely than liberals to employ abortion, which can
of course lead to higher fertility. The ‘determinants of fertility behavior’ literature
appears to largely focus on the technical and economic determinants of fertility.
However, it seems possible that political characteristics are not only heritable (Converse,
1969); they may have a significant impact on fertility. The interaction of these two
occurrences can lead to scenarios in which one political cohort “out-reproduces” another.
The empirical analysis below determines the significance of political characteristics as a
determinant of fertility.
3.3. The Impact of Immigrants
A large number of studies have attempted to assess the variety of ways in which
immigrants can impact the host country. A sizable portion of these studies focus on the
fiscal impact of immigrants in the host country, with varying results (Borjas, 1990; Lee
and Miller, 1997; Lee and Miller, 1998; Auerbach and Oreopoulos, 2000). Other similar
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studies focus on immigrant impact on the host country labor market (Friedberg and Hunt,
1995; Borjas ,1987; Borjas, 2003; Borjas, 2006).
Immigrants can also impact other aspects of a host country: several studies
discuss the implications of immigration for poverty and income inequality (Borjas, 1990;
Camarota, 1999b; Kazemipr and Halli, 2001; Van Hook et al., 2004). Coleman (2006)
discusses the impact of immigrants on the long term racial/ethnic makeup of the
population of low-fertility countries, including the U.S.
Immigrant populations can also have implications for political outcomes: a
number of studies assess the political participation of immigrants in the United States
(Tam, 1995; Alvarez and Bedolla, 2003; Claassen, 2004). These studies broadly agree
that immigrants become politically active with more political exposure/socialization, and
that immigrants tend to adopt the partisanship of their fellow sending-country migrants:
Mexicans/Cubans/Koreans tend to adopt the partisan preferences of other
Mexicans/Cubans/Koreans, not the political preferences of Latinos/Asians generally.
These studies tend to focus only on the short-term political impact of immigrants. This
study is focused on the relationship between political characteristics and fertility, and the
long-term implications of this relationship, and thus has meaning for the long-term
political impact of immigrants in the United States.
3.4. Summary: Related Literature
This study draws from several bodies of literature. Perhaps the most important
previous finding is the tendency of children to adopt the partisan preferences of their
parents (Converse, 1969). This tendency suggests that differences in fertility across
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political cohorts can lead to changes in the future distribution of political preferences. So,
if political traits end up being a significant determinant of fertility it permits us to
consider the possibility that certain political cohorts will “out-reproduce” others based on
this difference and the often reliable intergenerational transmission of political traits.
This study also contributes to two different bodies of literature. First, it
contributes to the literature on the social/value-based determinants of fertility. This
literature mentions concepts such as the value of tradition/preferences for traditional
gender roles (Fawcett and Arnold, 1975; D’Addio and d’Ercole, 2005) and religion
(Chamie, 1981; Heaton 1986) as determinants of fertility, but political characteristics are
generally not discussed as a potential determinant of fertility. Second, it contributes to the
literature on the political impact of immigrants by identifying a way in which immigrants
can impact the political characteristics of a country in the long term.
4. The Political Implications of Fertility
Figure 3.1 illustrates why the current fertility behavior of different ideological
groups can have significant implications for the future political landscape, assuming that
children tend to adopt the political preferences of their parents – that is, political traits are
heritable.
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Figure 3.1: The Importance of Fertility Behavior in Intergenerational Political
Dynamics

In Figure 3.1, a population of 250 divided across three ideological cohorts exists in the
first generation, with the median voter located in the center of the Centrists. Since all
three cohorts have varied fertility rates (births per woman, assuming all cohorts are .5
female), Generation 2 displays a very different ideological makeup. The Right Wing
cohort shrinks substantially, the Centrist cohort remains the same size, and the Left Wing
cohort increases in size and now possesses the median voter. While this example is quite
an abstraction as it uses high variations in fertility rate and a total and equal mortality
rate, it illustrates a mechanism that could be at work, although certainly not to such a
dramatic degree, in current political landscapes.
In the simulation in Figure 3.1, children (those in Generation 2) adopt the
partisanship of their parents (those in Generation 1) with complete reliability. Of course,
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it is unrealistic to expect all persons to perfectly adopt the partisanship of their parents. It
is possible to represent the probability of children adopting the ideology of their parents
with a matrix, as in Figure 3.2 below.
Figure 3.2: Transition Probability Matrix
Parents

Children

Left

Moderate

Right

Left

.7

.2

.2

Moderate

.2

.6

.2

Right

.1

.2

.6

The numbers in this 3x3 matrix are transition probabilities, or the likelihood that
the child of a given parent (Left, Moderate, or Right parent) will end up on the left, as a
moderate, or on the right. The numbers shown in Figure 3.2 are examples only, but can
be used to simulate a scenario in which ideological differences in fertility and the
likelihood that children adopt the ideology of their parents have a significant impact on
the role of the future median voter. When the transition probabilities for each ideological
group are multiplied by the expected number of children of parents on the left, middle,
and right (Number of Leftists * Fertility Rate for Leftists, etc), the resulting figures are
the expected number of those on the left, middle, and right in the next generation. For
example, multiplying the matrix above by hypothetical ‘population (female) * fertility
rates’ for each cohort will produce the expected demographic breakdown by ideological
cohort for the next generation.
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Figure 3.3: Transition Probability Matrix Simulation A

Children

Parents
Left

Middle

Right

Generation 1
Population

Fertility
Rate

Generation 2
Population

Left

0.7

0.2

0.2

50

3.0

135

Middle

0.2

0.6

0.2

50

2.0

100

Right

0.1

0.2

0.6

50

1.0
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In this simulation, the (left-right) median voter remains in the “middle”
ideological cohort, but the left now makes up 45% of the population, as compared to the
middle (33%) and right (22%). Extending this simulation to a third generation while
keeping the same transition probabilities and fertility behavior produces the following
scenario:

Figure 3.4: Transition Probability Matrix Simulation B

Children

Parents
Left

Middle

Right

Generation
2 Population

Fertility
Rate

Generation 3
Population

Left

0.7

0.2

0.2

67.5

3.0

168

Middle

0.2

0.6

0.2

50

2.0

107

Right

0.1

0.2

0.6

32.5

1.0
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In generation 3, the left makes up about 50.2% of the population, placing the
median voter in the “left” political cohort. The middle (31.9%) and right (17.8%) are now
both ideological minorities, and would lose any majority (50%+1) contest to the left. This
simulation illustrates in a slightly more specific manner than Figure 1 the manner in
which fertility behavior across ideological cohorts can impact the position of the future
median voter.
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5. Data and Descriptive Statistics
Data for this study comes from the 2004 and 2008 National Annenberg Election
Surveys. The 2004 NAES randomly contacted households by telephone during the 2004
U.S. Presidential election campaign season (October 2003-November 2004). About
320,000 eligible households were contacted, and about 80,000 interviews were completed
for a response rate of roughly 25%. Interviews were conducted in both English and
Spanish at the respondent’s preference. The 2008 NAES randomly interviewed (by
telephone) about 58,000 respondents between December 2007 and November 2008.
About 250,000 eligible households were contacted, for a response rate near 23%.
The dependent variable of interest in this study is a rough measure of fertility:
respondents (in both 2004 and 2008) are asked how many children are in their household.
Responses range from zero to the teens, as in Table 3.15. The clear majority of
respondents do not have any children in their household. However, this does not mean
they do not have any children of their own – they might have children that have moved
out of their household due to age or other reasons. A survey item that directly measured
fertility (“how many children of your own do you have?”) would be ideal, but the survey
is limited to the “children in your household” wording. The frequency of respondents
declines almost uniformly as the number of children increases – the largest group of
respondents indicates zero children, the second-largest indicates one child, the thirdlargest two children, and so on.

5

Apparent errors lead to 24 counts of respondents indicating they had 88 children in their household in the 2004
NAES data. These cases, along with other fewer cases with apparent errors, were disregarded in the analysis.
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Table 3.1: Respondent Number of
Children in Household, NAES 2004-2008
Children in
Household

Frequency

Percent

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

89,718
19,450
18,051
6,801
2,126
660
198
65
117
102
11
6
4
7
6

65.33
14.16
13.15
4.95
1.55
0.48
0.14
0.05
0.09
0.07
0.01
0
0
0.01
0

Total

137,322

100

This study is intended to shed light on the relationship between political preferences and
fertility, and the NAES (both 2004 and 2008) provides several different measures of
political characteristics. Respondents are asked to identify their political party (Democrat,
Republican, Independent, or other) and are also asked if they strongly identify with that
party – do they consider themselves “strong Democrats,” for example. Respondents are
also asked to place themselves along a five point ideological scale (strong conservative,
conservative, moderate, liberal, strong liberal). Each of these measures of political
characteristics is included in the analysis, and the distribution of responses is presented in
Table 3.2 below.
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Table 3.2 indicates the presence of a relatively even three way split across the three
primary political parties in the 2004-2008 period. The conservative/liberal ideological
dimension indicates a larger number of self-identified conservatives as compared to
liberals: about 38%, compared to about 24% liberals. Self-identified moderates are a
plurality. Just over 18% of all respondents identify themselves as “strong” Republicans,
while about 21% identify as strong Democrats and 17% strong Independents. In addition
to these primary variables of interest (fertility and political characteristics), the NAES
2004/2008 also has a full complement of control variables. Percentages or means in each
category are given in Table 3.3 below.

Table 3.2: Respondent Political Characteristics, NAES 2004-2008
Political Party
%

Republican
30.2

Democrat
33.2

Independent
27.7

Other
4.8

Very Con

Con

Moderate

Lib

10.6

27.3

35.3

18.0

Strong Partisans

Strong Rep

Strong Dem

Strong Ind

%

18.4

20.9

17.2

Conservative
/Liberal
%
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Very
Lib
5.8

Table 3.3: Control Variables, NAES 2004-2008

Before turning to the estimation and results, the following tables (3.4-3.6) provide
cross-tabulations of respondent children in household and political characteristics. While
these figures are simple associations and not causal in any way, it can still be useful to get
a preliminary look at the relationship in question with this method. Table 3.4 gives
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Table 3.4: Children in Household by
Political Party, 2004-2008 NAES

average children in household by respondent political party. Table 3.4 presents evidence
of a modest but noticeable difference between respondents of different political parties:
on average, Republicans have the most children in their household, followed by “other
party,” Independents, and Democrats. A similar picture emerges when considering
average children in respondent’s household by the respondent’s self-identified political
ideology (Table 3.5): on average, very conservative and conservative respondents have
the most children in their households, followed by moderates, liberals, and the very
liberal.

Table 3.5: Children in Household by
Con/Lib Cohort, 2004-2008 NAES
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The magnitude of difference is again relatively modest, but noticeable. The
standard deviation also declines in the same order – the largest standard deviation is
associated with the very conservative, and the smallest with the very liberal. Finally,
Table 3.6 presents the average number of children per respondent household for the
“strongly partisan” respondents noted in Table 3.2 above. The pattern is similar to Table

Table 3.6: Children in Household by
“Strong Partisan” Group, 2004-2008
NAES

3.4 - strong Republicans have the most children in their household, on average, followed
by strong Independents with strong Democrats having the fewest number of children in
their household. These crosstabs suggest a possible relationship between political
characteristics and the number of children in a respondent’s household (a rough measure
of fertility) – it appears that more conservative/Republican respondents have more
children in their households on average than do liberal/Democratic respondents. The next
section uses these variables along with the controls in Table 3.3 to test the existence and
statistical significance of such a relationship.
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6. Model and Results
The previous sections have established several components that make up the
backbone for the research question in this study. Section 3.1 described research on the
determinants of policy preferences, and established the importance of intergenerational
political socialization as a significant determinant of political characteristics. Section 3.2
detailed previous research on the determinants of fertility, and noted the lack of research
on political characteristics as a determinant of fertility. Section 4 described a mechanism
through which differences in fertility behavior between political cohorts can lead to shifts
in the future political landscape, assuming that children tend to adopt the political
preferences of their parents. Section 5 described the data used in the analysis in this
section, and presented several cross-tabulations that indicated modest but noticeable
differences in fertility across political cohorts in the 2004-2008 NAES data. This section
presents several brief hypotheses, describes the estimation technique used in the analysis,
and the results of the analysis. Negative binomial regression (STATA command nbreg) is
used to estimate the results.
6.1. Hypotheses
This study is intended to address the relationship between political characteristics
(ideology and partisanship) and fertility behavior. What is the expected nature of this
relationship? The brief hypotheses below summarize the expected direction of political
characteristics as a determinant of individual fertility.

H1. Republicans will display higher fertility (more children in household) than
Independents and Democrats (when holding other factors constant).
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Republicans are expected to have higher fertility than Democrats (when
controlling for other factors like age, income, etc.) due to the increased likelihood that
they possess a traditional view of gender/family structure. Republicans are also less likely
than Democrats to support abortion, and thus less likely to seek access to abortions.
H2. “Strong” Republicans will display higher fertility (more children in household) than
either “strong” Independents or “strong” Democrats (when holding other factors
constant).
Strong Republicans are expected to display higher fertility than strong Democrats
(and Independents) due to the same reasons suggested for H1. The magnitude of
difference between “strong” Republicans/Democrats versus normal
Republicans/Democrats is expected to be greater.
H3. Self-identified conservatives will display higher fertility (more children in
household) than either political moderates or political liberals – political liberals are
expected to display the lowest levels of fertility (when holding other factors constant).
Conservatives are expected to have more children than moderates or liberals due
to their greater adherence to more traditional roles for women and family structure, their
views on abortion and contraception, and their tendency to be influenced by traditional
religious values, some of which encourage high fertility.
6.2. Model Estimation
The dependent variable in this study is a count of children in the respondent’s
household. As demonstrated in Table 3.1, the most common outcome for this variable by
far is 0 (1 is the second most common response, 2 is the third most common response,
and so on). For the sample of interest (errors excluded, as discussed in the footnote on
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page 20) the mean of this variable (children in household) is 0.667, the standard deviation
is 1.122 and the variance is 1.260. As the
variance is greater than the mean and the dependent variable is count data (cardinal/nonnegative), negative binomial regression is an appropriate estimation technique6. The
model is estimated in STATA using the command nbreg, with marginal effects then
generated as a follow up to the estimation. The model estimated can be written as:

CHILDRENinHH represents the number of children in an individual’s household.
POLIDEOLOGY and POLPARTY represent groups of dummy variables for each
category of an individual’s potential political ideology and political party. EDUCATION,
INCOME, RELIGOSITY, RELIGIONTYPE, RACE, and MARITALSTATUS represent
groups of individual-level dummy variables for each associated category of variable.
IMMIGRANT, FEMALE, and VOTED are all individual level dummy variables.
Results of the estimation are presented in Table 3.7.

6

Al-Qudsi (1998) uses negative binomial regression in a study on fertility behavior in Middle Eastern countries.
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age
agesquare
strong con
conservative
liberal
strong lib
republican
democrat
other party
strong rep
strong dem
black
asian
am. indian
other race
hispanic
not us born

Coef.
0.146***
-0.00241***
0.0570***
0.0466***
-0.0439***
-0.0804***
0.0388**
0.0368**
-0.0492**
0.0457***
-0.012
0.306***
0.118***
0.0702*
-0.0604**
0.194***
-0.0566***

S.E.
-0.002
0
-0.014
-0.01
-0.011
-0.018
-0.013
-0.013
-0.018
-0.014
-0.014
-0.014
-0.03
-0.033
-0.021
-0.015
-0.015

z
-60.86
(-85.65)
-4.08
-4.7
(-3.89)
(-4.41)
-3.05
-2.88
(-2.73)
-3.32
(-0.84)
-22.45
-3.99
-2.15
(-2.84)
-12.93
(-3.71)
voted last
female
catholic
evangelical
religious 5
religious 4
religious 2
religious 1
income 1
income 2
income 3
income 4
income 6
income 7
income 8
income 9

Coef.
-0.0952***
0.0434***
0.0103
-0.0435***
0.269***
0.273***
0.118***
-0.138***
-0.0277
0.0962***
-0.0445**
-0.0506***
-0.0593***
0.0567***
0.126***
0.179***

S.E.
-0.01
-0.008
-0.01
-0.009
-0.014
-0.011
-0.012
-0.013
-0.023
-0.022
-0.017
-0.015
-0.012
-0.013
-0.014
-0.016

z
(-9.27)
-5.59
-1.08
(-4.68)
-19.67
-25.51
-9.78
(-10.95)
(-1.21)
-4.39
(-2.62)
(-3.37)
(-5.10)
-4.41
-9.19
-11.24

S.E.
-0.029
-0.02
-0.012
-0.027
-0.015
-0.013
-0.024
-0.014
-0.027
-0.014
-0.025
-0.014
-0.051

z
-10.9
-11.81
-3.36
(-4.63)
-4.69
(-4.84)
(-7.64)
(-5.91)
-1.25
(-24.23)
(-6.11)
(-77.24)
(-35.08)
lnalpha constant -1.423*** -0.028 (-50.21)
N = 136108
Pseudo R2 = 0.180

education 1
education 2
education 3
education 4
education 6
education 7
education 8
education 9
widowed
divorced
separated
never married
constant

Coef.
0.313***
0.238***
0.0405***
-0.127***
0.0707***
-0.0606***
-0.182***
-0.0848***
0.034
-0.329***
-0.155***
-1.086***
-1.784***

Table 3.7: The Impact of Political Traits and Other Factors on Children in Household, Negative Binomial Regression Results

The most relevant estimation result for this study is the finding that certain
political characteristics are significant predictors of the number of children in a
respondent’s household. Strong conservatives and conservatives are significantly more
likely than moderates (the excluded category) to have higher numbers of children in their
home, while liberals and strong liberals are significantly less likely to indicate such.
Political party is not significant in the expected direction: both Republicans and
Democrats have significantly higher numbers of children in their household than
Independents. Self-identified “strong” Republicans do have significantly more children
than either strong Independents or strong Democrats.
Age has a nonlinear and significant impact on the number of children in a
respondent’s household. Figure 3.5 illustrates the relationship between age and the
average number of children in a respondent’s household. Figure 3 plots the values for the
following formula:

The resulting figure gives the impact of age on children in household by each year of age
(there are no respondents under the age of 18 in the sample). Age has its peak impact on
the number of children in a household at 30: the magnitude of the impact rises from age
18 to 30. The impact remains positive from ages 31 to 60 but decreases with each year of
age before it drops below zero at age 61.
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Figure 3.5 - Impact of Respondent Age on Children in Household
Magnitude of Impact
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Other notable findings include the impact of race and ethnicity: black, Asian,
American Indian, and Hispanic respondents all had significantly more children than
white/non-Hispanic respondents. Those born outside the U.S. had significantly fewer
children in their household than U.S. natives (holding other factors constant –the
noteworthy high fertility of recent immigrants to the United States is apparently captured
in the race/ethnicity variables). Voting in the last election had a significant and negative
relationship with the number of children in a household, as did self-identifying as an
evangelical Christian.
Females and those who attend religious services displayed significantly higher
numbers of children in their household than males and non-attendees, respectively7.
Income has a somewhat unclear total impact on the number of children in a household,
but the higher income categories (7, 8, & 9) do all have significantly higher numbers of
children than the excluded category. Broadly speaking, more educated individuals have

7

For the numbered categories (religion, income, and education) higher category values indicate “more” of the
variable at hand – the wealthiest respondents are “income 9,” while those who do not attend religious services are
labeled “religion 1,” etc.
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fewer children in their household than the excluded category (5), while less educated
individuals have higher numbers of children. Finally, the marital status categories are
highly significant predictors of the number of children in a respondent’s household: those
who are divorced, separated, or never married all have significantly fewer children in
their household than those who are married/living as married.
The straight negative binomial regression results are useful in that they
communicate the direction and significance of the impact of the independent variables,
but in order to communicate the magnitude of these effects the results of a follow up
marginal effects estimation (mfx in Stata) are given in Table 3.8 below.
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age
agesquare
strong con
conservative
liberal
strong lib
republican
democrat
other party
strong rep
strong dem
black
asian
am. indian
other race
hispanic
not us born

dy/dx
0.042***
-0.001***
0.017***
0.013***
-0.012***
-0.022***
0.011**
0.011**
-0.014**
0.013***
-0.003
0.099***
0.035***
0.021*
-0.017**
0.060***
-0.016***

S.E.
0.001
0
0.004
0.003
0.003
0.005
0.004
0.004
0.005
0.004
0.004
0.005
0.009
0.01
0.006
0.005
0.004

% change
14.62%
-0.24%
5.83%
4.71%
-4.33%
-7.77%
3.91%
3.71%
-4.81%
4.64%
-1.19%
34.92%
12.47%
7.27%
-5.88%
21.08%
-5.54%

voted last
female
catholic
evangelical
religious 5
religious 4
religious 2
religious 1
income 1
income 2
income 3
income 4
income 6
income 7
income 8
income 9

dy/dx
-0.028***
0.012***
0.003
-0.012***
0.085***
0.082***
0.035***
-0.038***
-0.008
0.029***
-0.012**
-0.014***
-0.017***
0.016***
0.038***
0.055***

S.E.
0.003
0.002
0.003
0.003
0.005
0.003
0.004
0.003
0.006
0.007
0.005
0.004
0.003
0.004
0.004
0.005

% change
-9.80%
4.33%
1.03%
-4.31%
29.90%
28.99%
12.36%
-13.27%
-2.73%
10.06%
-4.37%
-4.96%
-5.82%
5.80%
13.33%
19.38%

% change
36.51%
26.53%
4.09%
-11.94%
7.28%
-5.96%
-16.74%
-8.24%
3.45%
-29.27%
-14.41%
-77.69%

-1.784*** -0.051 (-35.08)

S.E.
0.011
0.007
0.004
0.007
0.005
0.003
0.006
0.004
0.008
0.003
0.006
0.003

N = 136108
mean number of children = 0.284

education 1
education 2
education 3
education 4
education 6
education 7
education 8
education 9
widowed
divorced
separated
never married
constant

dy/dx
0.104***
0.075***
0.012***
-0.034***
0.021***
-0.017***
-0.048***
-0.023***
0.01
-0.083***
-0.041***
-0.221***

Table 3.8: The Impact of Political Traits and Other Factors on Children in Household, Negative Binomial Regression Results
(Marginal Effects)

The results in Table 3.8 suggest political characteristics, especially ideology, have
a relatively modest but statistically significant impact on the number of children in a
respondent’s household. Strong conservatives had nearly 6% more children in their
household than moderates, and about 14% more children than strong liberals. The impact
of partisanship was more uneven: both Republicans and Democrats had about 4% more
children than Independents, while “strong” Republicans had nearly 5% more children
than “strong” Independents. These results suggest that political characteristics matter for
fertility, but ideology is a more important determinant of fertility than partisanship. The
results also suggest that political conservatives are “out-reproducing” political liberals,
although by a relatively modest margin. This difference in fertility suggests the
possibility that future generations will be composed of relatively more political
conservatives than liberals (again, assuming the majority of children adopt the political
ideology of their parents).
The large set of control variables offers some interesting outcomes. With the
exception of age and age squared, all other controls are dummy variables. As illustrated
in Figure 3.5 above, age has a nonlinear and significant impact on numbers of children in
a household. The impact of age on children in a household is statistically significant and
overall is positive, peaks at 30, and turns to a negative impact after age 60.
Minorities have far more children in their household than whites on average
(nearly 35% more for blacks, and over 20% for Hispanics). Respondents who are not
U.S. born have about 5% fewer children in their household than do natives, and voting in
the last election is also associated with a significantly lower number of children in the
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respondent’s household (about 10%). Females have about 4% more children in their
household than males.
Religion has an uneven impact on the number of children in a household: neither
Catholics or “evangelical” Christians have significantly more children at home than those
of other denominations, but those who attend religious services more often have more
children at home (30% more among respondents with the highest service attendance
levels) than the excluded group (those who occasionally attend religious services). Those
who never attended religious services had significantly fewer children at home (-13%)
than the excluded (middle) group.
Income has something of an inconsistent impact on the number of children in the
respondent’s household: income groups 1-4 (group 5 is the middle and excluded
category) display both positive and negative relationships, while groups 6-9 do the same.
However, the impacts of being in groups 7-9 are all significantly positive with relatively
large impacts by groups 7 and 8. Education has a fairly straightforward relationship with
the number of children in a household: groups 1-3 (the least educated) have significantly
more children in their household than group 5 (the excluded category). Groups7-9 (the
most educated respondents) all have significantly fewer children in their household than
the excluded group. Finally, marital status has a sizable impact on the number of children
in a respondent’s household: respondents who are divorced, separated, or never married
all have significantly fewer children than the excluded category (respondents who are
married or living as married). The “never married” variable has the single largest impact
out of all control variables on the number of children in a respondent’s household.
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7. Conclusion
Before a brief discussion, it is important to mention that there are several caveats
to the primary finding of this study (political characteristics matter for fertility, and this
relationship can have a long-term political impact). First, as mentioned above, the
dependent variable does not measure actual fertility, or even actual number of
respondent’s own children. It measures how many children live in their household. We
might expect it to be true in some cases that children in household equal own children,
but it is certainly not true a great deal of the time. For example, people with grown
children (who have moved out of their household) come up as 0 in this sample (this
particular case is somewhat alleviated by controlling for age). Respondents who might
live with an extended family are also not communicating their own fertility – they might
indicate the presence of several children in their household, but the children could be
nieces or nephews or grandchildren.
Another two caveats concern the long-term impact of politically-based differences
in fertility behavior. How likely is it that a significant majority of children will continue
to adopt the political characteristics of their parents? Previous literature suggests about
two thirds of children generally end up looking similar to their parents politically. This
relationship is not testable with the NAES data as there are no items that ask respondents
about the political traits of their parents. If the intergenerational transmission of political
traits does not hold, the primary finding of this study is made less significant: political
traits may still matter for fertility, but there are no long term implications of such.
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Another factor has the potential to wash some of the effects of potential intergenerational
transmission of political characteristics. Period effects (such as 9/11 or the Cold War) as
referred to by Erickson and Tedin (2005) can shift the political preferences of large
masses of the population. The argument in this study (fertility behavior in one generation
can lead to changes in the distribution of political preferences in later generations)
obviously does not attempt to account for the presence of such events and their impact on
the future political landscape.
This study has demonstrated that certain political characteristics were meaningful
determinants of children in a household (a rough measure of fertility) for the sample
analyzed: political conservatives had significantly more children in their households than
did liberals, holding other factors constant. This result suggests the possibility that
political conservatives will grow as a proportion of the U.S. ideological distribution in
future decades, assuming that some majority of children adopt the ideology of their
parents. The empirical results also suggest that “political characteristics” should be
included with other non-economic determinants of fertility, such as religion. Previous
literature in this area seems to have largely failed to consider individual political factors
when assessing the non-economic determinants of fertility. However, this study did not
find partisanship to be as meaningful of a determinant of fertility as ideology: generic
Republicans and Democrats were not different, although so-called “strong Republicans”
had significantly higher numbers of children in their household than either strong
Independents or strong Democrats.
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These results have implications for two bodies of literature. First, the empirical
results suggest that political characteristics should at least be considered as a potential
non-technical determinant of fertility. While not overly powerful in magnitude, certain
political variables were a statistically significant predictor of the number of children in a
respondent’s household. Second, the results of this study have implications for the
literature on the intergenerational transmission of political characteristics as they discuss
a scenario in which this line of research has great relevance.
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Chapter Four
Can Children be Luxury Goods? Fertility Behavior in Contemporary Europe
1. Introduction
This study uses data from the European Social Survey (Round 5) to assess the
predictive power of several potential determinants of individual fertility in 26 European
states. These 26 states are diverse enough to permit a comprehensive view of Europe:
Western, Eastern/Central, Southern, and Nordic states are all well-represented in the data
utilized.
This analysis addresses two distinct but related research questions. The first
question addressed is: Are political factors important determinants of individual fertility
in contemporary European states? The closely related second question is: What other
variables appear to account for individual fertility behavior in modern Europe?
Further study of the determinants of fertility is a justifiable pursuit for several
reasons. First, this topic has previously been subject to significant academic treatment
(most notably Becker, 1960; Becker and Lewis, 1973; Becker, 1997; Becker and Murphy,
1988), and using new data to assess the explanatory power of existing theories is
generally a worthwhile pursuit. Second, gaining the ability to help explain contemporary
fertility behavior has policy implications – many states have initiated aggressive
campaigns designed to either curb (China, Singapore) or stimulate (Italy, Russia)
individual fertility. A deeper understanding of the apparent underpinnings of these
individual behaviors is valuable, especially considering this study focuses on many states
where depressed fertility is a policy issue – for example, Spain, Portugal, and the
Netherlands (all represented in this study) exhibit some of the lowest fertility rates in the
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modern world. Finally, this analysis of the determinants of fertility includes an unusual
explanatory variable: individual political characteristics are included in the analysis in
order to determine if different ideological cohorts have systematically different patterns
of fertility behavior. If such patterns are found, they could be suggestive of possible shifts
in the ideological position of the future median voter in a given state - under the
assumption that political ideology tends to be inherited from one’s parents in a majority
of cases.
2. Relevant Research
This analysis draws from existing research in two distinct areas. The first relevant
body of research is that which explores the determinants of fertility. This research area
cuts across several academic disciplines, with different authors choosing to focus on
different types of fertility determinants: technical determinants, economic determinants,
and social/value-based determinants are the major categories discussed in this literature.
These determinants can be further divided into “micro” and “macro” level factors.
The second relevant research area focuses on the determinants of individual
political characteristics (with special attention paid to the intergenerational transmission
of individual political traits). As these research areas are discussed in more explicit detail
in Chapter 2 (Literature Review Chapter), they will be summarized in brief below.
2.1. Research on the Determinants of Fertility
The research on determinants of fertility can be divided into micro and macro
level factors. Micro level factors, while contributing to the decision to have one or more
children, are unique to the individual of interest. Macro level determinants (like national
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unemployment rates) can impact multiple people in the same time and space
simultaneously. This division is reflected in the sections below.
2.1.1. Micro Level Determinants of Fertility
Micro level determinants of fertility consider factors faced by individuals or
couples as they make decisions on their ideal family size, ideal number of children
conceived in a given time period, as well as their actual fertility behavior. An important
theme in this research is that mismatches between fertility preferences and behavior are
fairly common and can exist for multiple reasons (Meron and Widmer, 2002; Toulemon
and Testa, 2005).
Partnerships and Marital Status
Recent changes in patterns of marriage and cohabitation in wealthy states have
important implications for fertility behavior. Many authors have noted shifts away from
early marriage and toward either delayed marriage or a permanent state of cohabitation
(Bumpass et al, 1991; Corijn and Klijzing, 2001; Mills, 2004; Gibson-Davis et al., 2005).
This behavior tends to depress fertility in certain states: individuals are less likely to have
children when they are not in a stable relationship - including marriage, obviously (Brien
et al, 1999; Baizan et al., 2003; Philipov et al., 2006; Testa, 2006).
Wealth and Human Capital
Individual wealth and human capital (and education) have been heavily studied as
possible determinants of fertility behavior. An especially early effort is found in
Notestein (1936), where the author discusses the relatively low fertility of comparatively
wealthy and urban individuals. The relationship between wealth and family size has
perhaps been most notably examined by Becker (1960) and coauthors (Becker and Lewis,
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1973; Becker and Murphy, 1988; Becker et al., 1990). Becker (and others) assume
children (and the utility of such children) contribute to the utility of the householder:
having more well-cared-for children makes people happy. Householders choose to have
more children as they can support them, but reduce the number of children when the cost
per child becomes prohibitive (as the children of wealthy families demand higher
investment).
Other studies that focus on the relationship between individual resources (wealth
and human capital/education) often examine the opportunity cost of having one or more
children for a given individual (Happel et al., 1984; Cigno and Ermisch, 1989; Kraval,
1992 (Ameudo-Dorantes and Kimmel, 2005; Gustafsson, 2005; Kneale and Joshi, 2008;
Miller, 2010). These studies generally reinforce the point made by Becker and others: one
may expect to see delayed and/or lower fertility among wealthy families as the
opportunity costs of raising one or more children, especially for women, are higher than
for poor or middle income families.8
Economic Uncertainty
Many studies have explored the idea that levels of economic uncertainty faced by
individuals can impact fertility behavior. The mechanism behind such a relationship is
straightforward: as individuals are aware larger families will demand more resources they
will delay the addition of one or more children until they reach an acceptable level of
economic stability.

8

It is also important to consider that delayed fertility is likely to lead to lower overall fertility for
most women for biological reasons. Women who begin having children in their mid to late 30s are
biologically unlikely to have large numbers of own children.
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Easterlin (1976, 1978, 1980) discusses this relationship between resources and
fertility behavior by noting the historical patterns of reduced demand for both marriage
and children during times of economic hardship. Other studies estimate the role of
personal economic security in determining fertility and find lower levels of such security
depress fertility (Oppenheimer, 1988; Rindfuss and Vandenheuvel, 1990; Oppenheimer,
2003; Mills and Blossfeld, 2005).
Cultural, Social, and Familial Factors
One can easily envision the role of non-economic factors in determining demand
for children (and thus total fertility) – societal pressures, individual desires, and cultural
norms can all impact the fertility behavior of women and couples (Fawcett and Arnold,
1975). Religiosity is also tied to higher levels of fertility in this literature: adherence to
pronatalist theology/philosophy and tradition appears to matter in determining individual
fertility behavior (Chamie, 1981; Heaton, 1986).
The idea of political factors being important determinants of fertility would fit
under this subsection: while there are currently no major studies of this relationship one
can imagine adherence to the political ideology of a group (either “left” or “right,”
depending on the country) impacting individual fertility behavior in a significant way.
The desires of individuals and couples could lead them to smaller or larger family sizes
depending on the norms and culture present in the groups they most strongly associate
with, be they religious or political/ideological. For example, in the U.S. political
conservatives are potentially more likely to endorse traditional large families and gender
roles. Political conservatives are also potentially less likely than liberals to employ
abortion, the lack of which can of course lead to higher fertility. Political characteristics
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can be considered a non-economic (alongside cultural/ social/ familial/ religious)
determinant of fertility, and such characteristics arguably subsume some of the
mechanisms behind other non-economic determinants.
Some recent research suggests a fundamental shift in the cultural view of fertility
in many OECD states: younger women in such state are less likely than older women to
value traditional family/gender roles and more likely to endorse the participation of
women in the labor market (D’Addio and d’Ercole, 2005; Gilbert, 2005). However, it is
extremely interesting that there seems to exist in every OECD country a gap between the
“ideal number” of children for women and their actual terminal number of children:
women in advanced counties appear to be having fewer children then they say they would
like to (D’Addio and d’Ercole, 2005).
Summary: Micro Level Determinants of Fertility
In sum, it seems that individuals desire a “floor” or threshold of economic and
relational stability before deciding to engage in childbearing: those who are financially
stable and in stable relationships seem to be more likely to have a child (or additional
children) then those with greater uncertainty in their personal or economic situation.
Evidence of such behavior can be witnessed by examining fertility during severe
economic contractions. At some level those with higher levels of wealth/wages and
education/human capital are expected to be less fertile than otherwise comparable
counterparts due both to the increased cost of child rearing they face (due to their desire
to invest heavily in their child’s upbringing) and the high opportunity costs associated
with childbearing – they trade high quantities of children for a high quality child (Becker,
1991). Highly educated women face a substantial cost in both wages and career
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experience when they engage in childbearing. Finally, while it seems that the
modernization of norms is putting downward pressure on the demand for children there
exists a remarkable gap in the fertility desires and behaviors of women in OECD states:
on average, they have fewer children in their lifetime than they desire to. This finding is
suggestive of a dynamic that will be discussed in the results section of this study.
2.1.2. Macro Level Determinants of Fertility
Macro level determinants of fertility are factors experienced by groups of people that can
be expected to impact the fertility desires and behaviors of a significant portion of the
group. One can think of these as factors that may impact an entire country jointly, such as
changes in social norms or shifts in the labor market. Of course, these factors may
influence fertility behavior (and ideals) more for some than others – while not all
individuals may shift fertility behavior due to an unstable labor market, there is reason to
think such a change may have a significant effect on average.
Economic and Labor Market Conditions
While the previous section discussed research on the role of micro-level economic
and labor-related variables (employment status, income) other studies focus on the role of
macro-level economic indicators and the impact these broader economic conditions have
for fertility behavior in a country. Most of these studies operate by linking the TFR (total
fertility rate, or average births per woman) in a country and time period to changes in
GDP and unemployment in that country.
There is a fairly broad consensus among a subset of these studies that changes in
GDP are only weakly related to fertility behavior, and may have their greatest impact in
shifting the timing of births (Santow and Bracher, 2001; Kohler et al., 2002; Martin,
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2004; Mills and Blossfeld, 2005: Sobotka et al., 2011). Studies that examine the
relationship between fertility and other measures of national wealth generally
demonstrate the existence of a positive relationship between wealth and fertility at the
national level (Van Giersbergen and de Beer, 1997; Bryant, 2007; Fokkema et al, 2008).
There are other studies, however, which suggest economic expansions make
childbearing more “expensive” for women in some countries given the opportunity costs
of such, and thus demonstrate an association between positive GDP changes and the
postponement of childbearing (Butz and Ward, 1979; Macunovich, 1996; Kohler and
Kohler, 2002).
Some studies examine the impact of national level unemployment trends on
fertility rates. These studies consistently demonstrate a negative relationship between
unemployment rates and fertility rates (Macunovich, 1996; Adsera, 2004, 2010, 2011;
Örsal and Goldstein, 2010). Easterlin (1968) suggests members of large birth cohorts face
increased labor market competition and uncertainty, and are thus likely to have relatively
low levels of fertility.
Public Policies – Pronatalist and Others
Many governments have instituted national social welfare expansions of different
types over the past several decades. While these policies may not be explicitly designed
to encourage fertility, one can imagine how the public subsidization of childcare, for
example, could encourage higher levels of fertility. The relationship between childcare
provision and fertility is heavily studied; however a consensus does not appear to result
from this research in this area – some authors find a negative relationship (Kravdal, 1996;
Rosen, 2004) while others show a positive relationship (Del Boca, 2002; Rindfuss et al.,
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2010). Other social welfare policies appear to have an impact on fertility as well – when
old-age social welfare benefits are generous children are needed less to provide old-age
care, and fertility can fall as a result (Rendall and Bahchieva, 1998; Galasso et al., 2009;
Mills and Begall, 2010).
Norms and Values
Some authors suggest societal changes in attitudes or values can have a profound
impact on fertility behavior (Lesthaeghe, 1983; Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa, 1986;
Surkyn and Lesthaeghe, 2004, 2010; Billingsly, 2010). This research is largely theoretical
and is based in the study of demographic transition theory, and especially focuses on the
idea of the so-called “second demographic transition,” a term used to describe the
mechanism many authors (van de Kaa, Lesthaeghe, Neidert, and others) think is behind
the persistent below-replacement fertility seen in many parts of the advanced world over
the last several decades. This body of research suggests the existence of a shift in certain
societal norms over this time, most notably an increase in the individual pursuit of
personal fulfillment.
Technology
A final macro-level determinant of fertility behavior is technology; specifically
technology related to contraception and technology designed to increase fertility for
individuals or couples who are experiencing difficulty conceiving or birthing a first child
or additional children.
The bulk of studies on modern contraceptives (“the pill”) conclude that such
drugs have a causal link with postponed and reduced overall fertility (Sobotka, 2004;
Goldin, 2006; Frejka, 2008; Bailey, 2010). This research could be considered to be at
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odds with Becker (1960, 1981), who argues that demand for children determines their
supply above and beyond the existence of modern contraceptive technologies. There is of
course evidence of significant voluntary reductions in fertility prior to the widespread use
of modern contraceptives: US fertility during the Great Depression is a prime example.
Fertility dropped by over 30% in this period (CDC), apparently in response to reduced
demand for children, likely prompted in many cases by the concern for the welfare of
current and potential children in a period of great economic instability. Demand based
fertility behavior of this type is comprehensively discussed in Becker (1980, 1991).
Of course, technology has also aided individuals and couples who have had
trouble conceiving: assisted reproductive technology (ART) seems to make later-life
attempts to conceive more successful, in a way that not would have been possible five or
six decades ago (Billari et al., 2007; Leridon et al., 2008). Therefore, this technology may
make it feasible for modern individuals and couples to delay fertility by a significant
amount of time while still achieving something close to a desired family size. While
factors like economic stability and relationship status can impact the demand for children,
technologies like modern oral contraceptives and ART can significantly increase the
ability of individuals to control the supply of children.
Summary: Macro Level Determinants of Fertility
In summary, macro level factors can impact fertility in several ways. National
level economic conditions appear to impact childbearing in a fairly consistent way:
people respond to a contracting economy by putting off conception. In a similar way,
higher national level unemployment rates are associated with lowered or delayed fertility
among residents. National policies can impact national TFR (total fertility rate) as well:
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while childcare subsidies and provision seem to have inconsistent and rather
unimpressive effects on fertility, other public polices seem to matter more. In particular,
expansive old-age social welfare systems seem to have a relationship with fertility: as
individuals can be relatively assured of government funded care in their old age they may
be less concerned about having one or more own children in order to provide for such
future care. Changes in societal or macro level norms also appears to be tied to delayed
and depressed fertility in some cases: societal/cultural emphasis on values like
individuality, self-actualization, high levels of education, high income, increased
consumption, and ideal relationships appear to put downward pressure on fertility
behavior. Presumably these “new” values are replacing more traditional norms that would
emphasize the importance of a large number of own children and an extensive domestic
role for women. Finally, technical changes related to fertility have had two sets of
impacts: pill-form contraceptives appear to depress fertility by reducing unplanned
pregnancy, and ART (Assisted Reproductive Technology) appears to make higher levels
of “later life” fertility more feasible: ART permits women and couples to delay fertility
significantly while still achieving something close to their optimal family size.
2.2 Research on the Determinants of Individual Political Characteristics
One of the primary goals of this study is to estimate the impact of political
characteristics on fertility in individual European states. If such differences are found
they are meaningful because of the role of intergenerational socialization in shaping
political traits: people tend to look like their parents (politically). This dynamic is briefly
discussed in Section 3 below.
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Of course, while parental influences are an important determinant of political
traits (and likely of many policy preferences as well) there are many other factors that
contribute to such traits and preferences. These other factors – age, wealth and income,
and education and knowledge - are discussed in detail in Chapter 2. This section contains
a detailed discussion of intergenerational political socialization.
2.2.1. Intergenerational Political Socialization
If any significant differences in fertility behavior among ideological groups are
found in this study such differences are made more meaningful if children tend to adopt
the political ideology and partisanship of their parents with some regularity. Accordingly,
research on intergenerational political socialization is summarized below.
An introduction to political socialization (from an American context) is found in
Erickson and Tedin (2005). The authors note that children tend to share partisan identity
with their parents. The authors examine the socialization of children at four stages in
childhood then examine several agents of political socialization. The family is the first
agent they examine, and the most pertinent one to this discussion. They observe (from
Jennings and Niemi, 1974) that the relationship between parent and child attitudes on
various political issues is merely moderate. However, partisanship is transmitted much
more successfully: when parents agree on partisanship (26% do not), 76% of adolescents
match the partisan preferences of their parents. The authors note the finding of Beck and
Jennings (1991), which suggests that highly politically active and aware households tend
to transmit partisan preferences more successfully to children than do non-politicized
households. Erickson and Tedin note that older persons tend to have stronger partisan
attachments than do younger persons.
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Other research on intergenerational political socialization has found variation on
the strength and nature of the relationship between the political behavior of parents and
children. Some authors have argued that the impact of parental political behavior on that
of children is significant and fairly straightforward. Jennings and Niemi (1974),
Converse (1969) and Beck and Jennings (1991) argue for the existence of a strong and
fairly direct relationship between the partisanship of parents and children. Alford and
Hibbing (2004) argue that simple genetic heritability of traits is likely to shape political
behaviors and lead to similarities in such behavior between parents and offspring. Plutzer
(2002) finds that parental socioeconomic status and political activity plays a large role in
predicting turnout among young, first-time voters. This parental impact on the likelihood
of voting persists in a weakened form as young voters age.
Other studies have presented evidence of a more complex and indirect
relationship between the political behavior of parents and children. Niemi and Jennings
(1991) find parents have the ability to determine the initial partisan preferences of their
children, but that the policy and issue preferences of those children at later points in time
will be an important determinant of any partisan shifts, apart from parental partisanship.
Barker and Tinnick (2006) also present evidence of a significant and somewhat complex
relationship between the political preferences of parents and children. They apply
Lakoff’s (2002) work to suggest exposure to certain parenting styles leads individuals to
develop an idea of the proper role of authority figures, both parental and governmental,
which can shape political preferences and ideology in adulthood.
Marsh (1975) argues against the existence of a direct and highly significant
parental impact on political socialization. He argues that surveys which ask respondents
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to recall the political party of their parents are subject to considerable biases as
respondents will often falsely recall their parents’ political party as similar to their own.
While Marsh recommends that the “notion of the supremacy of the family in political
socialization” be “regarded with skepticism,” he notes that there does appear to be some
intergenerational stability in political attributes, specifically political party membership.
While there is debate over the specific mechanism, the consensus of the literature
on intergenerational political socialization appears to be that more often than not children
adopt the political party and something of the broad political traits of their parents
(Converse, 1969).
3. The Potential Importance of Political Determinants of Fertility
This section briefly illustrates how political traits as determinants of fertility can
be important in the long-run political climate of a jurisdiction. This study discusses
political traits in a simple “left-center-right” way. Of course there are policy preferences
that cut across these simple ideological distinctions (civil liberties, etc.) but in general we
see politics in most democratic states play out in some sort of left-right (or left-centerright) political competition.
Existing literature tends not to include political ideology as a potential
determinant of fertility, but there is certainly reason believe such identities can be an
important factor, similar to religion or social/cultural values. One goal of this chapter is to
test the explanatory power of political traits (in this case ideology) as a determinant of
fertility behavior. If ideology is found to be a significant predictor of fertility such an
outcome is interesting both for the “determinants of fertility” modeling/literature and for
the implications of such a finding for political outcomes.
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Figure 4.1 below uses transition matrices to illustrate the potential dynamic of
interest. In this example the political left is 3 times as fertile as the political right: the
average political left female has 3 children in her lifetime while the average political right
female has 1.
Additionally, the left is slightly more successful than the other ideological cohorts
at accomplishing intergenerational political socialization: 7 out of 10 “left” children will
become left themselves, while 2 out of 10 will move to the center and 1 all the way to the
right. The other 2 cohorts (middle and right) “keep” 6 out of 10 children and lose 2 each
to the other two cohorts.
As a result of these two conditions the distribution of the population shifts
significantly across the ideological cohorts given in the space of only three generations:
in Generation 1 the median voter is a member of the “middle,” but by Generation 3 the
median voter is (barely) a member of the Left.
Figure 4.1: Transition Matrices: an Illustration of Political Shifts Due to Varied
Fertility across Ideological Cohorts
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This relatively simple example illustrates a dynamic that is interesting from both
an academic and a practical perspective: if some ideological cohorts are out-reproducing
others significant future political changes can result. It is also important to note the
potential importance of this dynamic in the setting of contemporary Europe: because
fertility rates in this region are low (Figure 3) the potential marginal “political impact” of
a child (or children) can be rather high. Imagine an extreme case in which a political
cohort (say the “far right”) exhibits 19th century-style fertility (5-6 births per woman)
while the rest of the jurisdiction exhibits the fertility of modern Finland (1-2 births per
woman) – the “far right” would grow as a percentage of the population and gain political
importance assuming they were able to keep their children in the “ideological fold.”

Figure 4.2: Fertility Rate (Births per Woman in her Lifetime) For Selected
Countries
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Figure 4.3: Shifts in the Position of the Median Voter
120

100

80

60

40

20

MV2 MV1 MV0

0

Left

Center
Generation 1

Generation 2

Right
Generation 3

To further clarify this point, consider a simple median voter framework
(Hotelling, 1929; Black, 1948) as illustrated in Figure 4.3. In this example a voting
distribution is spread across the political left and right, and the median voter at MV0 is a
“perfect centrist.” Differential fertility behavior of the type illustrated in the matrices in
Figure 4.1 above can push the median voter to the left in only a few generations, as
illustrated by the median voters at MV1and MV2.
4. Data and Models
Data for this study comes from the Round 5 Edition of the European Social
Survey (2010). This is a valuable data source for a study of this type as it features
samples of sufficient size to make cross-country comparisons. This particular Edition of
the ESS is especially good for a study on fertility behavior as it features a healthy
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representation of each portion of Europe: the data is not limited to Western European
states. ESS Round 5 includes data from countries in Eastern and Central Europe9, Nordic
Europe10, Southern Europe11, and Western Europe12. Fertility rates in most of these states
have declined considerably over the last few decades, although perhaps for different
reasons. So, it is advantageous that this dataset contains a large sample of states as it may
permit untangling of the determinants of fertility in different European regions and
countries.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in this study is “youngchildren,” a composite measure
based on respondent answers to the numbers of and status of persons in their household

Figure 4.4: Distribution of “youngchildren” - Number of
Persons<21 in a Respondent's Household
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9

Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine
Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden
11
Cyprus, Greece, Portugal, and Spain
12
Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Switzerland
10
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and the ages of those persons (if they are younger than 21). The distribution of this
variable is illustrated in Figure 4.4.
The “youngchildren” variable is very obviously overdispersed: the modal (and
median) outcome for this variable is 0 by a large margin: a majority of survey
respondents report they have 0 young children in their household. While most ESS
respondents report they have zero young children in their household there are a nonnegligible number of respondents who indicate the presence of 1 or more young children:
the mean of this variable is 0.465, while the standard deviation is 0.895. This variable is
constructed in a way that takes advantage of the ESS question types that cover family
members: respondents are asked the relationship of household members to that
respondent, so “youngchildren” is able to select for “son” and “daughter” responses. This
feature increases the likelihood that the children being associated with the respondent’s
household are the respondent’s own children, which increases confidence in the
predictive power of the findings.
Explanatory and Control Variables
The primary explanatory variable of interest is “lrscale.” This variable permits
respondents to place themselves on an eleven-point “left-right” ideological scale. The
distribution of “lrscale” is given in Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5: Distribution of "lrscale" - Respondent Self-Placement on a
Left-Right Ideological Scale
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This variable obviously has a much more normal distribution than
“youngchildren” – its mean is 5.166 and its standard deviation is 2.202. So, while a
plurality of Europeans in this sample identifies themselves as “perfect” moderates,
15,320 place themselves somewhere on the center right-right, and 12,959 place
themselves in the center left-left.
The other independent variables in this study are selected both with an intention
to assess the explanatory power of determinants of fertility others have studied
(religiosity, wealth, education level, etc.) and to methodologically control for factors that
may impact fertility but are not accounted for by the independent variables of interest
(age, marital status, sex, etc.)13. All remaining independent variables are summarized in
Table 4.1 below. The potential for political change is captured by the left-right scale

13

Control variable selection is partially informed by the analysis in Brand & Davis (2011).
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variable (11 points). This variable permits testing of the effect of an individual’s
ideological identification (left, right, or center) on the number of young children in their
household.
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of Relevant Variables for ESS Round 5
Respondents (N=38,521)
Variable

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Young Children in Household (Count)
Left-Right Scale (0-10)
Education (years)
Income (deciles)
Age (years)
Religiosity (attendance)
Married (0-1)
Divorced/Separated (0-1)
Widowed (0-1)
Never Married (0-1)
Civil Union (0-1)
Immigrant (0-1)
Child of Immigrant (0-1)
Racial/Ethnic Minority (0-1)
Female (0-1)

0.465
5.166
12.300
5.076
48.407
5.374
0.483
0.093
0.101
0.268
0.009
0.095
0.165
0.062
0.543

0.895
2.202
4.053
2.785
18.760
1.536
0.500
0.290
0.301
0.443
0.092
0.294
0.371
0.241
0.498

0
0
0
1
14
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

13
10
55
10
102
7
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

For the purposes of the estimation “Left-Right Scale,” “Education,” “Income,” and
“Religiosity” are decomposed into multiple dummy variables with excluded outcomes.
Expected Relationships
The relationship between respondent political ideology and fertility is uncertain:
as previous studies have not focused on this relationship there is no consensus in the
existing literature. However, given the often tradition-emphasizing nature of the political
right (and the more self-actualizing tendencies of those on the political left) a positive
relationship between ideology (“lrscale”) and fertility is expected (Fawcett and Arnold,
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1975; D’Addio and d’Ercole, 2005; Gilbert, 2005) – “right leaning” respondents are
expected to have higher fertility than centrists or left-leaning individuals.
Education is expected to have a negative impact on fertility, as indicated in
numerous studies (Becker, 1960; Oppenheimer, 1994; Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2002;
Ameudo-Dorantes and Kimmel, 2005; Gustafsson, 2005; Kneale and Joshi, 2008; Mills
et al., 2008; Miller, 2010). This impact is generally tied to the higher opportunity cost of
one or more children when the individual of interest has made significant investments in
education and human capital.
In a similar fashion to education, income is expected to have a negative impact on
fertility. Numerous studies have argued both theoretically and empirically that higher
levels of wealth depress fertility. This relationship is often attributed to the high
opportunity costs of having children among the wealthy and the desire of the wealthy to
invest more in each child’s upbringing, therefore raising the cost of children and reducing
demand for such (Becker, 1960; Becker and Lewis, 1973; Butz and Ward, 1979; Happel
et al., 1984; Becker and Murphy, 1988; Cigno and Ermisch, 1989; Becker et al., 1990;
Kraval, 1992; Macunovich, 1996; Kohler and Kohler, 2002).
As this study specifies young children in the respondent’s household as the
dependent variable age is expected to have a negative overall relationship with
“youngchildren,” although this relationship would in actuality likely be curvilinear:
increasing from age 18 to age 40-45, then decreasing steadily thereafter.
Religiosity is expected to have a positive relationship with fertility: more religious
individuals are expected to have larger families. This expectation follows the pronatalist
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intentions of many Western religions and is in line with existing research on this
relationship (Chamie, 1981; Heaton, 1986; Hayford and Morgan, 2008).
Marital status is expected to have a significant impact on fertility in the following
fashion: as in existing literature, respondents in more stable relationships are expected to
have higher fertility (Brien et al, 1999; Baizan et al., 2003; Philipov et al., 2006; Testa,
2006). So, marriage is expected to have a positive relationship with fertility while “never
married” is expected to have a negative relationship.
Immigrant status/child of immigrant status are both expected to have a positive
impact on fertility, as it is likely immigrants to many of the European countries in this
study originated from lower income/higher fertility sending countries. The expectation is
that many of these immigrants originate from places in which the second demographic
transition has not yet occurred, and they are likely to exhibit high fertility relative to the
native residents of their European host country14 (Lesthaeghe, 1983; Lesthaeghe and van
de Kaa, 1986; Surkyn and Lesthaeghe, 2004, 2010; Billingsly, 2010). There is no
theoretical expectation for the relationship between minority status and fertility, other
than that minority status could indicate (2nd generation or more) membership in a
relatively high fertility migrant cohort.
Estimation
Models are estimated in STATA using negative binomial regression, similar to
the methodology described in Parrado and Morgan (2008). Negative binomial regression
is applied as it accounts for significant overdispersion in the dependent variable

14

Of course, it is also possible (perhaps likely) that many of these immigrants to European states
are Europeans themselves. If this is so, we may not expect them to be much more fertile than
natives aside from the fact that they are likely to be somewhat close to prime childbearing age.
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“youngchildren” – for this variable the variance is far greater than the mean. For all
sample respondents about 73% indicate they have 0 young children (younger than age
21) in their household, but the mean number of children per household is 0.465, while the
standard deviation is 0.895. The model estimated can be written as:

YOUNGCHILDREN represents the number of children a respondent indicates
they have in their household. LRSCALE, EDUCATION, INCOME, RELIGIOSITY, and
MARITALSTATUS variables represent groups of individual dummy variables for each
of these categories of variable. IMMIGRANT, MIGRANTPARENTS, MINORITY, and
FEMALE are all individual level dummy variables.
It is important to note that this model is estimated separately for each country
included in the ESS Round 5 sample. To illustrate, the same model is estimated for all
respondents from Britain, all respondents from Sweden, all respondents from Denmark,
and so on. This is done for several reasons. First, the European Social Survey specifically
mentions the methodological problems of analyzing all countries jointly while controlling
for country: proper weighting becomes a complication. Second, it is likely true that
several independent variables shift meaning from country to country: for example, the
meaning of “ideological left,” “ideological right,” or “minority.” Finally, policy issues
related to fertility (and perhaps any policy solutions) are most likely national level issues:
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national or subnational governments will usually be the political institutions most
involved with identifying and addressing such issues.
5. Empirical Results
The above model was estimated in STATA for each country of interest using the
“nbreg” command with the “irr” option to provide incident rate ratios to aid in more
intuitive interpretation of the impact of each independent variable. Population weights
were applied for each model as recommended in ESS documentation15. Incident rate ratio
results are given in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 below. Incident rate ratios permit relatively
straightforward interpretation of negative binomial regression results. The incident rate
given for the variable is x times the incident rate of the reference group in the case of
dummy variables: an IRR of 2.5 means the 1 outcome has an incidence of 250% as
compared to the 100% associated with the zero outcome. With an explanatory variable
like age, an IRR of 1.05 would be associated with a 5% increase in the likelihood of the
outcome of interest (death, for example) for each additional increase of one year.
The cells in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 are colored in order to aid in interpretation: red
suggests a negative relationship between the independent and dependent variables while
green indicates a positive relationship. Statistical significance is communicated using
asterisks in the standard fashion. All equations are statistically significant predictors of
the number of young children.

15

“Weighting European Social Survey Data,” ESS (2012).
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Region
Country
Left
LR1
LR2
LR3
LR4
LR6
LR7
LR8
LR9
Right
Age
Inc1
Inc2
Inc4
Inc5
Edu1
Edu3
Edu4
Edu5
Edu6
Rel1
Rel2
Rel4
Rel5
Immig
ParentMig
Minority
DivSep
NeverMar
Widow

ECE
Bulgaria
1.333
0.883
1.060
0.804
0.733
1.237
0.967
1.245
1.209
1.010
0.917***
0.888
1.028
1.082
1.101
1.271
0.942
0.691
0.767
1.106
0.850
1.112
0.984
1.119
1.241
1.037
1.332
0.954
0.118***
0.512

ECE
Croatia
1.163
0.903
0.787
0.714
1.110
0.998
1.219
0.989
0.568
1.582*
0.954***
0.627
1.244
1.152
1.279
0.479*
1.290*
1.019
1.170
1.038
1.065
0.767
1.324*
1.314
2.171
0.421
1.372
0.831
0.01***
0.000***

ECE
Czech
0.865
1.197
1.268
0.987
1.076
0.862
1.058
1.043
0.961
0.843
0.936***
0.764
0.754*
1.036
1.257*
0.676
1.055
1.009
1.078
0.864
0.928
0.802
0.978
0.946
0.000***
1.023
1.258
1.082
0.141***
0.364

ECE
Estonia
0.920
0.733
0.501
0.358***
0.561**
0.962
1.269*
0.824
1.069
1.085
0.950***
0.953
1.184
1.296*
1.264*
0.200**
1.519**
1.265
1.318*
1.556**
0.894
1.148
1.134
1.071
0.968
0.985
0.869
0.509***
0.014***
0.187

ECE
Hungary
0.390
1.049
1.095
0.646*
0.947
0.879
0.939
1.035
0.983
1.278
0.929***
0.649*
1.250
1.053
0.955
1.404
0.725
0.835
0.931
1.139
1.313*
1.037
1.103
0.981
1.436
0.864
0.992
0.867
0.04***
0.383**

ECE
Russia
1.235
1.014
0.854
0.858
1.183
1.136
1.059
1.124
0.752
1.275
0.947***
0.850
1.068
0.998
1.051
0.260*
0.869
1.128
1.131
0.903
1.023
1.061
0.764*
1.201
1.164
0.782*
1.012
0.701**
0.045***
0.482*

ECE
Slovakia
0.810
0.711
0.764
1.077
0.826
1.321
1.054
1.154
0.827
0.936
0.928***
1.672*
0.811
1.474*
1.105
0.376*
0.938
0.612**
0.792
0.653*
1.308
0.879
1.256
1.039
0.640*
0.959
0.693*
0.473***
0.251***
0.430**

ECE
Slovenia
0.575
0.568
0.858
0.951
0.500**
0.831
0.630
0.876
0.444
0.807
0.952***
1.194
1.061
1.268
1.428*
0.998
1.168
0.707
1.749**
1.66*
0.696
1.240
0.837
0.909
1.298
0.830
1.018
1.166
0.146***
0.422

ECE
Ukraine
0.498
0.918
1.325
1.142
0.681
0.840
1.241
0.899
1.279
1.558
0.936***
0.842
0.975
1.251
1.184
1.208
0.664*
0.809
0.695*
0.693
0.657
0.842
0.948
1.034
0.797
1.318
1.574*
0.706*
0.036***
0.000***

Nordic
Denmark
0.840
0.933
1.043
1.085
0.887
0.885
1.095
1.025
1.043
1.322
0.945***
0.412**
0.600*
1.363*
1.808***
1.253
1.538
1.940**
2.165***
1.835**
0.875
1.124
1.151
0.601**
1.863***
1.022
1.024
0.709*
0.185***
0.541

Nordic
Finland
0.515
1.038
0.415*
0.752
0.520***
0.665*
0.656**
0.962
0.914
1.231
0.968***
0.283***
0.680
1.900**
2.563***
0.196***
1.122
1.684**
1.901***
1.873***
0.950
1.366*
1.300*
0.823
0.948
0.948
1.085
0.802
0.108***
0.257**

Nordic
Norway
0.883
0.580
0.749
0.859
1.027
1.171
1.079
1.118
0.897
0.971
0.955***
0.668*
0.944
1.315*
1.169
0.709
1.462*
1.421*
1.641***
1.827***
0.972
1.111
0.942
0.999
1.343
0.881
1.106
0.608*
0.006***
0.388**

Nordic
Sweden
0.933
0.522*
0.571*
0.832
0.798
0.702*
0.869
0.724*
0.755
0.549*
0.959***
0.831
2.518***
3.295***
4.460***
0.451*
1.137
1.437*
1.498**
1.430*
0.834
0.833
0.745*
1.306*
1.257
0.829
1.054
0.668
0.005***
0.368*

Table 4.2: Negative Binomial Regression Results for Eastern/Central Europe, and Nordic Europe - Reported as Incident
Table 2: Negative Binomial Regression Results for Eastern/Central
Europe, and Nordic Europe - Reported as Incident Rate Ratios
Rate Ratios
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Region
Country
Left
LR1
LR2
LR3
LR4
LR6
LR7
LR8
LR9
Right
Age
Inc1
Inc2
Inc4
Inc5
Edu1
Edu3
Edu4
Edu5
Edu6
Rel1
Rel2
Rel4
Rel5
Immig
ParentMig
Minority
DivSep
NeverMar
Widow

South
Cyprus
1.868*
1.289
0.789
0.873
0.656
1.264
1.493
1.326
1.415
1.094
0.942***
0.752
0.633*
0.920
1.071
0.965
1.501
1.444
1.052
0.872
1.501
1.761*
1.485
0.946
2.550*
0.609
1.815**
0.717**
0.075***
0.235**

South
Greece
1.245
0.740
1.043
0.818
0.962
0.944
0.787
0.893
0.860
0.769
0.945***
1.170
0.984
1.071
1.314*
0.496***
0.929
0.924
0.998
0.867
1.373*
1.110
1.048
1.160
0.740***
1.382***
1.504***
0.499***
0.005***
0.147***

South
Poland
0.809
0.936
0.868
0.865
1.164
1.166
0.992
1.040
1.189
0.935
0.951***
1.079
0.996
1.158
1.011
0.506*
0.853
0.843
0.623***
0.861
0.834
0.685*
0.925
1.041
1.002
1.231
0.930
0.898
0.104***
0.358*

South
Portugal
0.473**
0.547
0.999
0.899
1.054
0.838
1.175
0.871
0.653
0.694
0.929***
.
.
.
.
1.003
1.028
0.214*
1.392
0.713
0.999
0.923
0.823
1.011
0.998
0.983
0.972
0.912
0.257***
0.438*

South
Spain
0.920
1.320
1.051
1.052
0.806
1.029
1.335*
1.056
0.672
0.611
0.950***
0.893
1.180
1.359**
1.279*
0.739*
0.689*
0.883
0.755*
0.875
1.057
1.005
1.163
0.904
1.111
0.630*
1.122
0.744*
0.073***
0.158***

West
Belgium
0.959
0.951
0.978
0.679**
0.830
0.609***
0.777*
0.712
0.393*
0.654
0.942***
0.555*
0.942
1.241
1.446***
1.279
1.512*
1.688**
2.003***
2.131***
1.101
0.889
0.892
1.008
0.971
1.104
0.465
0.783
0.055***
0.330**

West
Britain
1.377
0.817
0.773
1.110
0.969
0.751
0.860
0.845
0.594
1.420
0.936***
1.143
1.414*
1.262
1.258
1.197
1.238
1.119
1.146
1.099
0.885
0.964
0.836
0.999
0.984
1.076
0.836
0.466*
0.158***
0.186*

West
France
0.859
0.570
1.058
1.039
0.913
0.796
0.927
1.017
0.444
0.797
0.950***
0.965
1.347
1.156
1.525**
0.816
0.888
1.211
1.058
1.023
1.212
1.090
0.996
1.151
1.361
0.957
1.005
0.815
0.469***
0.620

West
Germany
0.938
1.209
1.309
0.856
1.003
0.966
0.979
1.175
1.037
1.814*
0.934***
0.986
1.100
1.076
1.256**
0.941
1.129
1.223
1.230
1.279*
1.121
1.001
1.149
0.821
0.833
1.246
1.337**
0.718**
0.064***
0.418**

West
Ireland
1.846
1.577
0.954
1.111
0.754*
0.913
0.950
0.713
0.616
0.348**
0.952***
1.182
0.971
1.365*
1.305*
0.555
1.317
1.343
1.368
1.555*
0.919
0.896
1.046
1.662***
0.970
0.780
0.889
0.748
0.027***
0.530

West
West
Israel
NetherlandsSwitzerlandIsrael
1.103
1.480
1.083
1.416
1.112
0.690
0.958
1.328
0.873
0.770
1.384*
1.229
0.921
1.387*
1.200
0.886
1.132
1.054
1.005
1.170
0.833
0.954
1.024
0.986
0.723
0.996
1.269
0.679
0.747
1.094
0.951*** 0.932*** 0.954***
1.428*
1.319
1.092
1.123
1.142
0.828
1.230
1.159
0.935
1.285*
1.274*
1.050
1.080
0.997
1.014
1.424*
1.088
0.823
1.266
0.815
1.115
1.042
0.976
0.842
1.192
1.058
1.217
0.934
0.764
0.958
0.890
0.926
0.997
1.006
1.129
1.034
1.428*
0.948
1.605***
1.625*
1.239
2.300***
0.819
1.068
0.599*
0.946
0.613
1.742
0.620*
1.383
.
0.046*** 0.040*** .
0.369** 0.545
.

Table 4.3: Negative Binomial Regression Results for Southern Europe, Western Europe, and Israel - Reported as
Table 3: Negative Binomial Regression Results for Southern Europe, Western Europe, and Israel - Reported as Incident Rate Ratios
Incident Rate Ratios

Discussion of Results
There are several notable findings apparent from this group of results. First, the
significance of the primary explanatory variable of interest - “lrscale” – does political
ideology have a significant impact on fertility16? These results suggest no such systematic
relationship: the “left-right” variables are insignificant determinants of fertility in most
sample countries, so the expected relationship is not found17. There are some exceptions:
the center-left is significantly less fertile than the center in Estonia, while the center-right
is more fertile. The right and left are both significantly less fertile than the center in
Sweden (and Finland, to some degree). The far left is significantly more fertile than the
center in Cyprus, but significantly less fertile than the center in Portugal. The center-right
in Spain appears to be more fertile than the center, while the center-right and right in
Belgium are less fertile than the center. The far right in Germany is notably more fertile
than the center, and notably less fertile than the center in Ireland. Finally, the center-left
in Switzerland is somewhat more fertile than the center. What do all of these results
suggest? The lack of a systematic pattern in the relationship between ideology and
fertility in these European states: it is clearly not the case that the “European left is outreproducing the European right” across the sample (or vice-versa). However, there are
some interesting and significant country-specific results.
The second notable set of findings relates to the results for income and
education18. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 both suggest the presence of a significant and fairly

16

Of course, this study is using number of young children (under age 21) in a respondent’s
household as a proxy for fertility. As this is a proxy it is obviously not a perfect measure of the
behavior of interest.
17
Testing all 11”lrscale” variables as a group yields insignificant coefficients for that variable.
11
Note that income and education in this study are measured in levels (deciles of income or years
completed of education) not changes – much of the literature in this area associates changes in
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reliable (across different countries) relationship between the respondent’s income
category and the number of young children in the respondent’s household19.
First, consider the case of the Eastern/Central European states; a region notable
for its very low fertility over the last several decades. In several of these states (Czech
Rep., Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia) respondents in higher income categories are
significantly more fertile than the excluded category (or lower income respondents). ECE
suggests a pattern, albeit a weak one, between wealth and fertility: wealthier people tend
to have more young children at home. Of course, this finding is in contrast to much of the
literature focused on this relationship20, and perhaps in contrast to the common wisdom
as well: many people generally associate larger family sizes with poverty: this not only
does not appear to the case in most of ECE, but the opposite appears to be true (in a
statistically significant manner) in several ECE states: wealthier respondents have more
young children. ECE respondents seem to have a similar experience with education level
and number of young children, although the pattern is not quite as reliable.
Next, consider the Nordic countries: here we see evidence of a dramatic and
reliable relationship between both income and education: in general, those who are
wealthier and well-educated (more years of schooling) have higher numbers of children
in their households than either those in the excluded categories or the relatively low
income/poorly educated. The magnitude of this effect in Nordic Europe is notable: for
example, switching from the middle to the top income quintile in Finland is associated
GDP with fertility. While they are not perfectly equivalent, both levels of income and national
changes in GDP communicate something about the likely economic stability of the respondent, a
factor the “determinants of fertility” literature suggests is significant: people in unstable economic
situations (at least in developed countries) tend to delay fertility.
19
Income is broken into quintiles in these models, with the middle quintile excluded. The
relationship holds if deciles are used instead.
20
As discussed in detail in 2.1.1 and 2.1.2. above.
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with an increased “young child” incidence of 256% (as compared to 100% for the
excluded middle quintile). Similarly, low levels of income appear to depress numbers of
children/fertility in Nordic Europe. A similar relationship holds for education level in a
very reliable way, and nearly all positive coefficients are highly significant.
Southern Europe has a pattern very similar to ECE for the relationship between
income and fertility: higher incomes are associated with significantly more children in a
household, but this pattern does not dominate the region. There does not appear to be a
systematic relationship between education level and fertility/number of children in
Southern Europe, although it does appear to be the case that the least well-educated tend
to have fewer children.
Finally, consider the relationship between income and fertility in Western Europe:
again, higher income levels appear to be significantly associated with more children
(statistically significant for the highest income quintile in all Western European countries
except Britain). Lower income quintiles are only significantly more fertile than the
excluded category in Britain (2nd quintile) and the Netherlands (1st quintile). The
relationship between education and fertility in Western Europe is less regular, although
there are a few countries where there is a significant positive relationship, most notably
Belgium. Taken as a whole, these finding suggest a fairly reliable pattern: Income and
Education are both positively associated with fertility in modern Europe – a finding in
contrast to much of the existing literature on this relationship (Becker, 196021; Becker
and Lewis, 1973; Butz and Ward, 1979; Happel et al., 1984; Becker and Murphy, 1988;
21

Note that Becker was especially interested in micro-level or household level fertility behavior.
While this study divides data by country, micro level behavior is still of primary interest except in
the case of the political ideology variables. For those variables to have meaningful impacts
patterns must exist across a significant portion of a country. All other variables are potentially
meaningful on their own merits in predicting micro or household level fertility behavior.
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Cigno and Ermisch, 1989; Becker et al., 1990; Kraval, 1992; Macunovich, 1996; Kohler
and Kohler, 2002).22
The third notable finding is the relationship between religion and fertility:
contrary to much of the existing literature (Chamie, 1981; Heaton, 1986; Hayford and
Morgan, 2008) religion among Europeans appears to have a very weak impact on their
fertility. There are some exceptions: more religious respondents in Ireland, the
Netherlands, Israel, and Sweden have relatively high fertility. However, those less
religious than average have relatively high fertility in Hungary, Finland, Cyprus, and
Greece. There certainly does not appear to be a systematic and reliable relationship
between religiosity and fertility.
The fourth significant set of findings relates to immigrant and minority status.
Contrary to the implications of some existing studies (Lesthaeghe, 1983; Lesthaeghe and
van de Kaa, 1986; Surkyn and Lesthaeghe, 2004, 2010; Billingsly, 2010) and
conventional wisdom, migrant status does not appear to be a major determinant of
fertility in most of modern Europe. There are some exceptions: immigrants are
significantly more fertile than non-immigrants in Denmark, Cyprus, the Netherlands, and
Israel, but they are less fertile than non-immigrants in Greece and Slovakia. The “migrant
parents” variable displays similar predictive power: a handful of instances of
significance, but not much of a pattern. The same is largely true for minority status. In
short, the popular image of highly fertile minority immigrants does not appear to be
validated by this estimation.

22

Some authors do find evidence for a similar positive relationship between education and
fertility: Oppenheimer, 1994; Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2002; Mills et al., 2008.

118

The fifth and final notable set of findings relates to marital status/partnership
stability. Note that the excluded category is “married” and the implications are obvious:
those in relationships less stable than marriage (either never married or divorced) are far
less likely to have young children in their household. This finding is in line with current
literature (Brien et al, 1999; Baizan et al., 2003; Philipov et al., 2006; Testa, 2006) and
seems to fit a general theme in these findings: contemporary Europeans tend to have
more children when they exhibit higher levels of stability- stability that can be related to
education, wealth, and relationship status.
6. Conclusion
This study uses recent data from a broad sample of European countries to address
two distinct but related research questions. First, are political characteristics important
determinants of fertility? The empirical analysis performed here suggests this is not the
case for Europe as a whole in any significant way, although there are European countries
where individual political characteristics (left-right) have a statistically significant impact
on fertility – in some cases positive, and in some negative.
The second research question: What other variables appear to account for
individual fertility behavior in modern Europe? The analysis resulting from this research
question leads to several interesting findings, most significantly is the existence of a
positive relationship between education and fertility and income and fertility in much of
Europe. This finding is contrary to much of the literature on this relationship and
certainly in contrast to the common idea that lower-income persons tend to have larger
families. What does this finding suggest about fertility in contemporary Europe? Perhaps
children in certain parts of modern Europe (especially Nordic and Western) are luxury
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goods: many people desire large families, but only the wealthy possess the stability
necessary to afford large families. This finding suggests that if European policymakers
desire increased fertility in their country (perhaps to replacement rate) they need only
increase the income and education level of their citizens! Of course, a more practical
approach may be to further decrease the cost of childbearing and upbringing23.
This study also suggests religion is a relatively weak determinant of fertility, as is
immigrant and minority status (in most countries). Finally, relationship status is a very
important determinant of fertility, endorsing the idea present in much of the existing
literature that individuals desire stability of different sorts (perhaps tied to income/human
capital, as well as marriage/relationship status) before they decide to have a child or
additional children.
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There is also the somewhat confounding possibility that people acquire income and human
capital with a family size in mind – for example, a Finn who desires a large family may become an
attorney as they know they will need a high income in order to support 4-5 children. This is related
to Becker’s (1960) idea that higher income householders will invest more in their children, which
can be expensive.
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Chapter Five
Determinants of Individual Preferences for and Assessments of U.S. Social Security
1. Introduction
This chapter uses cross-sectional survey data to test for the existence of age-based
differences in preferences for Social Security policy and confidence in the Social Security
system. This is a continuation of previous research that has used varied approaches in
order to explore the possibility of intergenerational conflict over policy. Previous relevant
work is summarized and discussed in Section 2.
Intergenerational conflict and cooperation are an especially salient research area
at this time for two primary reasons. First, the population aging in many states (including
the United States and most of Western Europe) is leading to a population age structure
that is increasingly old. One can easily imagine scenarios in which a large, relatively old
coalition of voters uses its electoral power to extract wealth from the relatively young in
what would clearly be a sub-optimal outcome for the country (or jurisdiction) as a whole.
Second, there are now several policy areas that feature policies with
intergenerational impacts of unprecedented size and scope. Old age social welfare (Social
Security in the United States), elderly medical care (Medicare) and K-12 education are all
significant features on the policy landscape. Each of these policy types features taxes and
benefits flowing across age cohorts simultaneously. Thus, it is especially important to
understand the current (and future) propensity for individuals from different age cohorts
to conflict over policies with intergenerational components.
One way of estimating the potential for age-based conflict over intergenerational
policies is to examine support for such policies: do the young and old have different
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preferences for education policy, environmental protection, or old age social welfare?
Many other studies have examined such relationships, as described in Section 2. The
contribution of this study is that it uses unusually detailed data on individual preferences
for and confidence in U.S. Social Security and estimates the relationship between age and
these outcomes with seldom-used methodological tools.
In order to empirically estimate the relationship between respondent age and
political characteristics, along with other factors, and Social Security confidence and
preferences, this study constructs indices for each of the dependent variables of interest:
individual preferences for Social Security benefit and tax levels (“benefits”) and
individual confidence in the Social Security system (“confidence”). The first empirical
stage utilizes ordered probit to estimate the effects of age (and other factors) on both the
“benefits” and “confidence” indices.
The results indicate that age is a significant determinant of both Social Security
tax and benefit preferences and confidence in the Social Security system. Certain political
characteristics are also significant determinants of these dependent variables. The results
also suggest that the survey population in the aggregate holds very different positions on
Social Security preferences and confidence: there is somewhat broad agreement across
the sample on the preference measure but no such agreement on the confidence measure.
The validity of these results is reinforced by further estimation using bivariate ordered
probit, a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation technique. The GMM
results indicate the use of ordered probit is valid: the assumption of a normal distribution
is supported.
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The remainder of this paper is organized in the following fashion: Section 2
summarizes and discusses relevant literature, most of which focuses on intergenerational
conflict and cooperation over policy. Section 2 also discusses the contributions of this
study to the current body of research. Section 3 discusses the data source and provides
descriptive statistics for the primary variables of interest. It also uses cross tabulations to
examine the responses of people of different age cohorts to the survey items that gauge
Social Security tax and benefit preferences and Social Security confidence. Section 4
outlines models of Social Security preference and confidence formation and uses these
models to generate three testable hypotheses. Section 5 presents and discusses the
empirical results, and Section 6 details the use of bivariate ordered probit and presents
additional empirical results. Section 7 briefly concludes.
2. Relevant Literature
Several strains of research have addressed the dynamics of intergenerational
conflict and cooperation. This research is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2 but is
summarized here. Some of these studies have used a theoretical approach to model policy
scenarios with overlapping generations, while others have used empirical evidence to
examine cases of potential intergenerational conflict over policy. This literature is largely
defined by a debate between those who assert the great potential for intergenerational
conflict over policy (often, but not always, from an economic/theoretical perspective) and
those who examine empirical evidence for cases or indications of actual intergenerational
conflict over some policy area (usually education or elderly-directed social welfare),
often finding little evidence that significant age-based differences in policy preferences
exist. Some of these empirical studies use survey data, while others examine policy
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outcomes (often per-pupil educational spending in a jurisdiction) or voting on referenda
that could be expected to elicit age-based differences in preferences (such as spending on
local public schools).
While most studies seem to agree that the potential for intergenerational conflict
of some type exists given certain conditions, there is great variation in supporting
evidence found (or not found) for such conflicts. The major findings of this body of
research are summarized in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 below. Section 2.1 discusses the
literature that examines the potential for intergenerational conflict, while Section 2.2
covers the empirical research that attempts to gauge the existence or severity of
intergenerational conflict over policy using survey or policy outcome data. Section 2.3
briefly discusses the conclusions of this research area.
2.1. Research on Intergenerational Conflict and Cooperation: The Potential for
Intergenerational Conflict over Policy
A common assertion in this literature is that jurisdictions with relatively old
population age structures have the potential to develop intergenerational political
conflicts over certain types of policy: those that benefit one age cohort at the expense of
another (such as spending on public education and social welfare benefits for the elderly).
The mechanism by which this occurs is straightforward: self-interested age cohorts can
vote for polices that benefit their cohort while being funded by other age cohorts. Several
studies have addressed this possibility. Kotlikoff and Rosenthal (1990) show that
cooperation on intergenerational policies can be difficult to achieve: older generations are
able to control bargaining as they have the “first move” advantage. Collard (2001) also
discusses the ability of “first move” generations to leave later generations at a
disadvantage. Other studies have taken a position similar to that of Kotlikoff and
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Rosenthal (1990): the combination of an aging population, redistributive policy, and selfinterested voters could lead to intergenerational policy conflicts over scarce resources in
the relatively near future in developed states (Preston 1984; Kotlikoff et al. 1992;
MacManus 1995; Lee 1996; Pratt 1997). Such a possibility is considered even more
likely in the United States, where voting is voluntary and elderly residents are a highly
active political cohort (Pratt 1993) with a disproportionate share of votes, especially in
local elections (MacManus 1995; Binstock 2000; Duncombe et al 2003).
While much of the theoretical literature on intergenerational dynamics focuses on
potential conflict, such an outcome is not a certainty. Several authors suggest ways in
which generations can cooperate to solve certain moral hazards present when populations
are relatively old and may borrow from future generations. Collard (2001) and Rangel
(2003) both use economic models to detail conditions under which different generations
can cooperate with one another. Boldrin and Montes (2005) show that public support for
investment in education is sub-optimal without some sort of social security system (when
credit markets are unavailable to the young). They mention that their research is an
extension of Becker and Murphy’s argument (1988) that public institutions can replace
families in the provision of intergenerational exchanges, especially as related to human
capital investment/old age support.
A sizeable body of research outlines the potential for conflict between generations
over certain policy types with varying degrees of grimness over the likely future of
intergenerational conflict. These studies note the increasing electoral power the elderly
will have over the next several decades as they make up a greater portion of eligible
voters (especially in the United States, where voting is voluntary and the elderly are a
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politically active age cohort). While there seems to be a consensus that intergenerational
conflict is plausible given the aging populations and redistributive spending in developed
states, this research also details ways in which generations can cooperate with one
another, primarily by tying support for young-benefitting goods like education to support
for old-benefitting goods like medical care for the elderly and social welfare spending.
2.2. Empirical Research on Intergenerational Conflict and Cooperation: Evidence of
Significant Age-Based Conflicts over Policy
There are two strains of literature that use an empirical approach to examine the
potential for intergenerational conflict (or the existence of such conflict) in certain policy
areas. One approach involves examining policy outcomes, either at the budgetary level
(most often focusing on an educational output, such as per-pupil spending in a
jurisdiction) or in voting on referenda that address policy issues upon which voters might
be expected to differ by age group (again, usually related to public education spending).
Another approach involves examining survey data for evidence of age-based differences
in preferences for certain types of policy; usually focusing on social welfare and medical
spending for the elderly and education spending. While the evidence for intergenerational
conflict over education policy is mixed, the consensus of the literature that uses survey
data to assess this issue is that there is not strong evidence of intergenerational conflict
over social welfare benefits for the elderly.
Spending on public education is a relatively high-profile policy area in which
coalitions could be expected to form among age cohorts: the young and middle-aged
might be expected to support increases in such spending, while the elderly might be
expected to oppose such spending as they see very little direct benefit from higher levels
of education spending.
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A certain portion of the research on the proportion of elderly residents in a
jurisdiction and the effect on school funding indicates a negative relationship between
these two variables: more elderly residents in a jurisdiction appear to depress public
school funding in that jurisdiction. Button (1992), Miller (1996), and Poterba (1997) are
all relatively early examples of this research that found such a relationship. Additionally,
Poterba (1997) and Ladd and Murray (2001) show that when the elderly and
schoolchildren in a district are of different races there tends to be an additional negative
impact on the willingness of the elderly to approve additional public education funding.
Berkman and Plutzer (2004) found that elderly “migrants” to a jurisdiction were less
likely to support education spending than were elderly “natives.”
Other studies have found something of an ambiguous relationship between the
elderly in a jurisdiction and education spending. Ladd and Murray (2001) and Harris,
Evans, and Schwab (2001) both find a less powerful relationship between elderly
residents and school funding than does Poterba (1997). Berkman and Plutzer (2004) and
MacManus (1997) also find a mixed impact by the elderly on local education spending
and voting on education funding referenda, respectively.
Finally, some studies have found little or no evidence that elderly residents in a
jurisdiction depress education spending. Button and Rosenbaum (1990), Ladd and
Murray [when not considering race of schoolchildren and the elderly] (2001), Duncombe
et al. (2003) and Lambert et al. (2009) all fail to find evidence of an age-group (elderly)
effect on public education spending (or in the case of Duncombe et al, voting on an
education funding referendum). Fletcher and Kenny (2008) argue (from a median voter
framework) that while the elderly in a district may desire less spending on education,

127

having more elderly residents means there are fewer children to educate in the
jurisdiction, and may actually lead to a very small rise in per-pupil spending on balance.
The survey data strain of research on intergenerational conflict is not as varied in
its findings: there is a consensus in the majority of this literature that survey data does not
tend to indicate age-based differences in preferences over salient policy areas (old age
social welfare and education). Kingson et al. (1986) argue that the perception of
“conflict” over cross-generational policy like social welfare for the elderly is due to the
way the discussion of such policy is framed. Reno and Friedland (1997) make a similar
argument: they assert that the contradiction between low confidence in but high support
for Social Security is mostly due to low-quality information and survey-biased snap
judgments. Baggette et al. (1995), Hamil-Luker (2001), and Street and Sittig Cossman
(2006) analyze survey data and fail to find evidence of age-based differences in
preferences for social welfare spending on the elderly. Plutzer and Berkman (2005) note
that public opinion in the U.S. has become more favorable toward education spending
even as the nation has aged, though they note the possibility of local conflicts over
education spending when there exists a large cohort of elderly “migrants.” Binstock
(2000) argues the elderly will play an increasingly important role in future elections as
they are highly participatory and will continue to grow in number.
While the survey-based research tends to find little evidence of current age-based
differences in policy preferences, several studies (along with Binstock [2000] and Plutzer
and Berkman [2005]) discuss the possibility of intergenerational conflict over policy in
the future due to the political participation behavior of the elderly (MacManus 1995;
Campbell 2002, 2003; Day 1993).
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2.3. Discussion of Intergenerational Conflict and Cooperation Literature
This review of the research on intergenerational bargaining and conflict illustrates
that significant political conflicts can potentially emerge in aging and aged populations. It
is reasonable to expect that age-cohort-based coalitions can form over several types of
policy issues, such as education spending, and spending on social welfare for the elderly.
These age-based coalitions often have conflicting interests and it is conceivable that
political conflict could arise in certain policy areas. Such conflicts could make it quite
difficult for policymakers to solve certain policy problems (social welfare problems, for
example) in representative governments.
The theory-based literature on intergenerational dynamics lays out plausible
conditions under which different age cohort can come into conflict over policy: older
cohorts have a “first move” advantage, are politically active, and are growing in size in
aging developed states. However, the empirically-based literature does not exhibit
evidence of rampant intergenerational conflict over scarce resources.
The literature on age-cohort based intergenerational conflicts over the funding of
public education is something of a mixed bag: while some pieces can point to some
evidence that elderly individuals depress school spending, they are varied on the
estimated strength of this effect, and even whether or not it is strong enough to be
meaningful. Factors like race, the “migratory” status of the elderly in an area, and the
level of education spending being considered (state vs. local) are all important in
determining the nature of this relationship. The survey-based research on individual
preferences for elderly-directed social welfare provision and education does not indicate
the presence of age-based conflict over these policy areas – individuals are generally

129

supportive of Social Security, Medicare, and education spending. Despite this lack of
evidence for age-cohort conflict over policy, a common thread in both the theoretical and
empirical research is the caveat that intergenerational conflict could become a significant
problem in the future as the population continues to age.
It is clearly not the case that intergenerational conflict is unavoidable. The
research on elderly support for the funding of public K12 education and intergenerational
exchange suggests something of a mix exists between the self-interest of each generation
and some type of intergenerational exchange. These analyses raise an issue that is at the
heart of intergenerational bargaining and is likely to become increasingly important as the
relatively old age cohorts gain increased electoral power: what can keep generations from
acting selfishly?
2.4. Value Added to the Intergenerational Conflict Literature
The data and approach used in this study present the opportunity to cover certain
aspects of research on intergenerational conflict that have not been fully explored by the
current body of literature. The ability to approach these research questions in a different
manner is largely due to the unique and in-depth nature of the 2004 NAES Inaugural
Survey: the relatively high number of survey items on Social Security preferences and
opinions add to the ability to understand such preferences among different age groups.
Several previous studies of this type have used data from the General Social Survey
(Hamil-Luker 2001; Street and Sittig Cossman 2006) which limits questions on Social
Security preferences to items that ask respondents about preferred government spending
on elderly care and Social Security.
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The first advantage this study has in relation to similar pieces is perhaps the most
obvious: the survey data used in this study is relatively recent. Many previous studies of
potential intergenerational conflict mention the possibility of the increased likelihood of
such conflict over policy as populations age in jurisdictions – this can be true for retireeattracting states like Florida or for countries as a whole. This increased potential for
intergenerational conflict in the near future in some jurisdictions is discussed in both the
theoretical and empirical strains of intergenerational conflict literature (Day 1993;
MacManus 1995; Campbell 2002, 2003; Plutzer and Berkman 2005). If the potential for
intergenerational conflict increases as populations age it is important to use the most
recent data possible to study intergenerational dynamics, especially considering the rate
at which populations are aging in many developed states. Of course, the data used are
cross-sectional, and the research question is certainly dynamic. However, the unusual
level of detail in the Social Security-focused survey items offered in the 2004 NAES
permits detailed measurement of respondent preferences on this issue in a way not
offered by other datasets. There is no doubt it would be better to have time series or panel
data to study research questions related to intergenerational dynamics, but in this case
cross-sectional data is the best available source.
A second advantage of this study is granted by the survey items in the NAES
survey, which permit the measurement of individual confidence in the Social Security
system alongside more common measures of individual preferences for levels of Social
Security benefits and taxation. While there is broad support among the American public
for Social Security as a whole, there is not great confidence in the viability of the Social
Security system, especially recently (Gallup: 20 July 2010 Poll). Relatively few studies
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have addressed this apparent contradiction (with the exception of Reno and Friedland
1997). Two NAES survey items used in this study measure individual confidence in the
stability of the Social Security system: one asks if Social Security needs (major/minor/no)
reform in order to remain viable, and another asks respondents how confident they are
that they will receive earned Social Security benefits when they retire (if eligible). These
items allow the measurement of not only individual preferences for Social Security
benefit level, but their opinion of its structural stability, both in general and as it concerns
their own retirement.
The data used in this study is especially appropriate for investigating potential
intergenerational conflict over Social Security due to its proximity to the Bushadministration-initiated discussion of the potential reform of Social Security in late
2003/early 2004. Several studies have discussed the significant political response of
relatively elderly individuals to potential changes to Social Security (Campbell 2002,
2003). Thus, one could expect age-based differences on Social Security preferences to be
more stark than usual due to the timing of the NAES survey: it was conducted during a
period when many individuals (and interest groups like the AARP) perceived a threat to
Social Security benefit levels. If evidence of age-based differences in Social Security
preferences and opinions is to be found, the timing of the NAES survey used in this study
makes finding such evidence somewhat more likely: previous literature (Campbell 2002,
2003) indicates that relatively old age cohorts should be more vocal than usual about
protecting Social Security benefit levels when they perceive a potential threat to benefit
levels.

132

Finally, the NAES data gives this study the ability to address the viability of
several potential policy changes to Social Security. While there is disagreement among
academics and elites about the stability (or lack thereof) of the Social Security system,
most would agree that some changes in the system are needed as the U.S. population
ages. The NAES survey includes items that gauge respondent receptiveness to several
potential policy solutions, including tax increases (of two types) and possible benefit
reductions.
The timing and the content of the 2004 NAES Inaugural Survey allows this study
to make a more precise attempt than similar previous efforts (Hamil-Luker 2001; Street
and Sittig Cossman 2006) to examine individual preferences on U.S. Social Security
policy for evidence of potential intergenerational conflict over Social Security. While not
perfect, the NAES data used in this study is relatively recent, and uses in-depth survey
items on Social Security that allow for simultaneous measurement of respondent
preferences for Social Security benefit and taxation levels, preferences for possible
reform measures of Social Security, and respondent confidence in the stability of the
Social Security system. Each of these outcome types can be examined to investigate the
importance respondent age (and other factors, such as partisanship and ideology) has in
determining preferences and opinions related to Social Security.
3. Models and Hypotheses
Descriptive figures (both raw percentages and cross tabulations by age cohort)
seem to indicate respondents broadly agree on Social Security taxation and benefit
policies but have very different levels of confidence in the Social Security system to fund
them upon their retirement. This section lays out several models (Section 4.1) of
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individual preference and opinion formation for various aspects of Social Security and
uses these models to generate several hypotheses. These hypotheses are tested with the
NAES 2004 Inaugural Survey data (Section 4.2). Does there appear to be the potential for
intergenerational conflict over Social Security policy? The results indicate that age is a
significant determinant of respondent preferences for Social Security tax and benefit
policy and respondent confidence in the Social Security system. The results are briefly
discussed in Section 5.
3.1 Models of Individual Social Security Preference and Opinion Formation
Similar previous studies that use survey data to test for evidence of age-based
conflict over certain types of public spending, including social welfare spending on the
elderly, tend to include similar predictive and control explanatory variables in their
models. These studies specify models in which the dependent variable is a respondent’s
preference for public spending of some sort (usually either elderly-directed social welfare
spending or education spending), and the explanatory variables consist of age (the
variable of greatest interest) and other respondent demographics as control variables,
along with respondent political characteristics (Hamil-Luker 2001; Plutzer and Berkman
2005; Street and Sittig Cossman 2006).
While this study follows the same basic pattern as previous similar work in
arranging models, there are several differences between the models used in previous
work and those used in this study, as discussed in Section 2.4 above, primarily that this
study measures respondent confidence in Social Security in addition to preferences for
levels of Social Security provision. A general model of individual Social Security
preference formation follows, along with a general model of individual confidence in
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Social Security. These models are used to design tests to assess the importance of age
cohort membership, political ideology, and other factors in determining respondent’s
Social Security preferences and assessments. These models each follow one of two
general forms, as given below.
General Model A – Determinants of Individual Preferences for Social Security Benefit
Levels

In this model and individual’s support for Social Security tax and benefit policy is
predicted to be a function of several types of independent variables. POLITICALTRAITS
contains dummy variables related to individual political identification: ideology and party
membership. EDUCATION, INCOME, EMPLOYMENTSTATUS, and RACE also each
represent a set of dummy variables for an individual. FEMALE is a dummy variable. In
this general model an individual’s preferences for more or less Social Security benefits
(as expressed by their desired Social Security tax and benefit levels) are assumed to be a
function of their age (the variable of interest for an age-based conflict investigation) and
political characteristics (which have been found to be significant explanatory variables in
previous work: Hamil-Luker 2001), along with education, income, employment status,
sex, and race. If individuals formulate Social Security preferences by considering how
they personally value the benefits of the system one might expect the relatively old,
uneducated, poor, and non-working to support higher Social Security tax and benefit
levels as Social Security income will be relatively more important for these respondents.
135

The 2004 NAES Inaugural Survey provides measures for each of the variables
listed in this model. The dependent variable can refer to one of three survey items:
respondents are asked if they support (1) cutting Social Security benefits for future
retirees, (2) raising the Social Security payroll tax rate, and (3) raising the Social Security
taxable income limit above $90,000. The explanatory variables of interest are represented
by survey items that capture respondent age, political party, and political ideology. A
similar model can be applied to questions of respondent confidence in the stability of the
Social Security system.
General Model B – Determinants of Individual Confidence in the Social Security System

In this model the same explanatory and control variables are used to explain an
individual’s level of confidence in the Social Security system. The NAES survey
measures such confidence with two items: one asks respondents if they think Social
Security will be able to pay them their full benefits when they retire, and the other if they
think Social Security needs changes (major, minor, or none) in order to stay viable.
As in General Model A above, respondent age is the primary explanatory variable
of interest. Relatively old respondents can be expected to be more confident in Social
Security as the period of time for which they personally need Social Security to be
“healthy” is shorter than that of a younger person. Political characteristics are an
additional explanatory variable of interest in this model, especially considering the timing
of the NAES survey: during a (largely) Republican-versus-Democrat discussion of Social
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Security reform. Education, income, and employment status are included as control
variables.
While these general models can apply to responses to individual survey items on
Social Security preferences and confidence it is possible to combine responses to several
survey items in order to produce index scores for both Social Security preferences and
confidence. Those with preferences for high levels of Social Security would support
raising the tax rate and taxable income level, and oppose benefit cuts. Those with high
confidence in Social Security would voice the belief that Social Security will be able to
fund their benefits and indicate that the system does not need major (or any) changes in
order to remain viable.
3.2. Hypotheses
The models in Section 3.1 generate several testable hypotheses that can shed light
on age-based differences in Social Security preferences and confidence and the potential
for intergenerational conflict over Social Security policy. These models (A and B above)
are informed by both existing literature on intergenerational conflict over policy and
theoretical intuitions about the role of an individual’s political traits in shaping their
preferences for old-age social welfare.
H1 – More liberal/Democratic (conservative/Republican) respondents are expected to
demonstrate preferences for relatively high (low) levels of Social Security benefits.
This hypothesis addresses general redistributive preferences among respondents,
which can be expected to be tied to political party and ideology to some degree. Ceteris
paribus, more liberal/Democratic respondents are expected to support higher levels of
Social Security taxes and benefits than more conservative/Republican respondents.
Political party is expected to be an important factor in this relationship due to the timing
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of the NAES survey in relation to the Bush Administration attempt to enact Social
Security reforms. If this hypothesis (and H3) operate as expected they may offset one
another somewhat as older persons tend to be more conservative on average than younger
persons.
H2 – Relatively old individuals are expected to favor higher levels of Social Security
benefit provision than younger individuals.
Any evidence of intergenerational or age-cohort-based conflict over Social
Security policy will be found in the testing of this hypothesis. It is based on the idea that
the relatively old perceive the unfunded/pay-as-you-go nature of Social Security and are
willing to support higher Social Security tax and benefit levels as younger age cohorts
bear the primary fiscal responsibility for funding such policies. Younger respondent are
also expected to perceive the unfunded nature of the Social Security system and be
resistant to such policy changes, especially in light of their pessimistic views on the fiscal
stability of the Social Security system, as discussed in Section 3.2.
H3 – Relatively old individuals are expected to display greater confidence in the
structural stability of the Social Security system than younger individuals.
Even if relatively old individuals believe Social Security faces future problems
and needs reform of some sort they are expected to be more confident in the ability of the
system to fund their benefits due to their time horizon, which is shorter than that of
younger individuals: a 25 year old needs the Social Security system to remain functional
for more than 60 years, while a 55 year old only needs the system to remain healthy for
another 30 years, on average.
These hypotheses are empirically tested in Section 5. H1 and H2 address
questions previously discussed in related literature: are respondent age and political
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characteristics significant determinants of Social Security-related preferences (HamilLuker 2001; Street and Sittig Cossman 2006)? Does there appear to be the potential for
age-based conflict over Social Security policy? What factors account for differences in
individual confidence in the Social Security system?
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics
Data comes from the National Annenberg Election Surveys (NAES) special 2004
Inaugural Survey (N = 1,202). This survey offers an unusually large number of relatively
detailed survey items that focus on Social Security, likely in response to the efforts of the
Bush Administration to reform the Social Security system just after the 2004 Presidential
Election. A reasonable complement of control variables is also included in this survey.
While these items permit a detailed exploration of respondent preferences for and
perceptions of Social Security, they are not entirely ideal for several reasons.
First, the number of respondents surveyed is not overly large; certainly not large
enough to allow for state-by-state comparisons. Second, while the 2004 NAES Inaugural
Survey is fairly recent relative to other studies on this topic (as mentioned above), the
time period in which this survey was conducted does not reflect current levels of anxiety
about Social Security in the wake of the 2008-9 economic contraction.
Finally, this survey was conducted during a time period in which a relatively
high-profile policy discussion over potential changes to Social Security was occurring.
This factor could bias any findings in favor of finding age-cohort conflict over Social
Security, as many old-age interest groups (most notably the AARP) vocally opposed the
Social Security modifications proposed by the Bush Administration.
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4.1. Descriptive Statistics
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics (Percentages)
Social Security Survey Item Responses
Needs Reform

Major
55.99
Will Be
Enough
26.71

Confidence

Minor
33.86

None
3

Don't Know
6.82

Not Enough

Not Covered

Retired

51.91

0.5

15.56

Raise Tax Rate

Favor
30.78

Oppose
61.4

Don't Know
7.4

Raise Tax Limit

Favor
70.88

Oppose
21.3

Don't Know
7.57

Cut Benefits

Favor
9.9

Oppose
86.11

Don't Know
3.74

Respondent Characteristics
Sex

Male
44.59

Female
55.41

Race

White
83.61

Black
8.4

Asian
1.5

<$25K

$25K-$35K

$35K-$50K

17.89

9.65

14.64

HS Dip. or
below
32.53

Some
college
28.45

Four-year
college
20.3

Age Cohort

17-24
7.49

25-34
14.14

35-44
17.72

45-54
22.21

Employment

Working
66.39

Unemployed
2.66

Retired
21.38

Other
9.23

Party ID

Republican
31.2

Democrat
31.95

Independent
25.71

Other
6.74

Very Con

Con

Moderate

Lib

Very Lib

7.74

28.45

39.02

17.3

3.16

Income
Level

Education

Conservative
/Liberal
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Am. Ind.
1.08

Other
3.24

$50K$75K
18.55

$75K$100K
11.98

>$100K
15.89

Graduate Graduate
school
degree
5.24
12.48
55-64
18.89

65+
18.64

Table 5.1 provides descriptive statistics on both the dependent and explanatory
variables used in this analysis. Results in Table 5.1 are percentages. These results indicate
something of a consensus on preferences for Social Security tax and benefit policy:
majorities oppose raising the payroll tax rate and cutting benefits, but support raising the
taxable income limit above $90,000. There is less of a consensus on the levels of
confidence respondents have in the stability of Social Security: a slight majority (56%)
believes the system needs major changes in order to stay viable, while about 37% think
only minor changes or no changes at all are needed. When respondents are asked if they
think Social Security will have adequate financial resources to be able to fund the
benefits they have earned when they retire about 52% express a lack of confidence in the
system, while 27% are confident they will receive all the benefits they have earned.
15.5% indicate they are already retired.
Table 5.1 also includes standard demographic, socioeconomic, and political
variables. Results are given in percentages of each category, with non-answers omitted.
These results indicate significant variation among respondents by age cohort, income,
education, political party, and political ideology. These variables permit the examination
of the importance of age and partisan factors in determining preferences for and opinions
of Social Security in Section 4 below. Before turning to results from statistical analyses
in Section 4, Section 3.2 below presents several cross-tabulations that shed some light on
several potential relationships between age and Social Security preferences and opinions.
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4.2. Cross Tabulations: Age and Social Security Preferences and Assessments
A set of cross tabulations (using responses to the variables of interest with
respondent age cohort) can shed some preliminary light on the distribution of responses
for the most salient NAES survey items. The first item of interest asks respondents if they
think there will be enough money in the Social Security system to fund the benefits they
have earned when they retire (while also giving respondents the option of indicating they
are already retired). A cross tabulation of responses to this item and respondent age
cohort is given below.
Table 5.2: Cross Tabulation – Age Cohort and Personal Confidence in Receiving SS
Benefits

Will Be
Enough

Not
Enough

Already
Retired

Don't
Know

Total

Percentage of Age
Group that thinks
Social Security
will not be able to
fund the benefits
they have earned.

16
21
31
85
122
23
17
321

69
141
166
161
59
14
11
624

0
0
1
3
32
88
63
187

5
7
13
17
12
4
2
61

90
170
213
267
227
131
93
1,202

77%
83%
78%
60%
26%
11%
12%
52%

Response
Age
Cohort
17-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65-74
75+
Total

These results indicate that many relatively young respondents are somewhat
pessimistic about the ability of the Social Security system to fund their benefits upon
retirement. Those close to retirement (the 55-64 cohort) are far more positive about the
soundness of Social Security in this context.
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Table 5.3: Cross Tabulation – Age Cohort and Opinion on Necessity of SS Reforms
for Viability
Response

Age
Cohort
17-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65-74
75+
Total

Major
Changes
Needed

Minor
Changes
Needed

No
Changes
Needed

Don't
Know

Total

47
115
148
176
108
45
30
673

37
45
46
73
97
65
39
407

0
0
4
4
6
10
12
36

6
9
15
14
14
11
12
82

90
170
213
267
227
131
93
1,202

Percentage of
Age Group that
thinks Social
Security needs
major or minor
changes in order
to remain viable.
93%
94%
91%
93%
90%
84%
74%
90%

Another item asks respondents if they believe Social Security needs changes in
order to remain fiscally viable. The cross tabulation in Table 5.3 indicates that there is
relatively broad agreement that some measure of structural changes to Social Security
will be necessary in the near future.There are two items that ask respondents if they
support increasing taxes on Social Security. One item asks if respondents support
increasing the eligible income limit above $90,000 (Table 5.4). The other asks if
respondents would support increasing the payroll tax rate above 12.4% (Table 5.5).
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Table 5.4: Cross Tabulation – Age Cohort and SS Taxable Income Increase
Preferences
Percentage of
Response
Oppose
Age Group that
Favor Taxes
Taxes on
Don't
favors Social
on Income
Total
Income
Know
Security taxes on
>$90K
Age
>$90K
income above
Cohort
$90,000.
17-24
58
27
5
90
64%
25-34
113
47
9
170
66%
35-44
143
56
14
213
67%
45-54
201
52
12
267
75%
55-64
173
39
15
227
76%
65-74
97
17
17
131
74%
75+
61
15
17
93
66%
Total
852
256
91
1,202
71%
Table 5.5: Cross Tabulation – Age Cohort and SS Tax Rate Increase Preferences
Response

Age
Cohort
17-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65-74
75+
Total

Favor
Increase

Do Not
Favor
Increase

Don’t
Know

Total

Percentage of Age
group that favors an
increase in the Social
Security payroll tax
rate

24
51
63
83
78
40
29
370

58
113
140
170
135
72
45
738

8
5
10
13
13
18
19
89

90
170
213
267
227
131
93
1,202

27%
30%
30%
31%
34%
31%
31%
31%

These results indicate fairly broad agreement among all age cohorts on both tax
measures: a clear plurality of respondents in each age cohort support permitting Social
Security taxes on income above $90,000, while only about one-third of respondents in
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each age cohort favor an increase in the Social Security payroll tax rate. In neither case
do the relatively old cohorts (age 65+) display preferences markedly different from the
remainder of respondents.
A final item of interest involves asking respondents if they favor reducing Social
Security benefits to the current cohort of workers upon that cohort’s retirement. The
results of this cross tab (Table 5.6) again indicate broad agreement across all age cohorts:
only about 10% of respondents favor such a benefit cut, and age cohorts do not appear to
differ significantly in their preferences on this issue.
Table 5.6: Cross Tabulation – Age Cohort and SS Benefit Reduction Preferences

Response
Age
Cohort
17-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65-74
75+
Total

Favor
Reduction
in Benefits

Oppose
Reduction in
Benefits

Don't
Know

Total

Percentage of Age
Group that favors a
reduction in Social
Security benefits to
future retirees (current
workers).

9
21
20
30
19
10
8
119

79
146
186
228
199
111
77
1,035

2
3
6
8
8
10
8
45

90
170
213
267
227
131
93
1,202

10%
12%
9%
11%
8%
8%
9%
10%

These cross tabulations indicate that while different age cohorts have markedly
different levels of confidence in the ability of the Social Security system to pay them
benefits when they retire, there appears to be relatively broad agreement on several other
important points. Respondents from all age cohorts tend to broadly oppose benefit cuts
and payroll tax increases and support raising the amount of income eligible for Social
Security taxes above $90,000. All age cohorts seem to broadly agree that Social Security
145

needs changes, either major or minor, in order to remain viable in the future (although the
elderly are less likely to indicate support for major changes). These results seem to
suggest that respondents are aware of some sort of horizon after which Social Security
will become unviable in some manner – most respondents agree changes are needed
while the young are very pessimistic about the health of the system as they themselves
enter retirement. Sections 4-6 will determine if these trends hold under a more formal
testing framework.
5. Empirical Estimation – Ordered Probit Results
In order to test the primary hypotheses of interest (H1-H3) index scores for both
respondent preferences for Social Security tax and benefit levels and respondent
confidence in Social Security were created. These indices were calculated by addition (as
in Fong 2001): for the “benefit index” respondents who wanted higher payroll taxes,
higher taxable income limits, and did not support benefit cuts were coded a 6 (2+2+2),
while those with the opposite preferences were scored a 3 (1+1+1), creating a “benefit
index” with four possible outcomes: 3 to 6, with higher values indicating support for
relatively higher Social Security taxes and benefit levels.
The “confidence index” was created in a similar fashion: by combining the scores
for respondents who believed the Social Security system would not be able to pay them
their benefits upon retirement (1), or would be able to pay them their benefits upon
retirement (2), or indicated that the system was already paying them their benefits (3)
with those same respondent opinions on the need for Social Security reform: major
changes needed (1), minor changes needed (2), or no changes needed (3) in order for the
system to remain viable. Thus, there are five possible outcomes for the “confidence
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index” – 2 to 6, with higher values indicating greater overall confidence in the Social
Security system. For both indices respondents who refused to answer (or answered “don’t
know on) the survey items that made up the indices were dropped from the analysis, a
loss of about 270 out of 1,202.
These indices were used to estimate two ordered probit regression models (one
each for the benefit and confidence indices). The NAES data allows the inclusion of a full
complement of explanatory and control variables. The primary explanatory variables are
age and political characteristics, as in General Models A and B above. Respondent age is
included in the models in a straightforward fashion, as the respondent self-indicated age
at the time of the survey. Political characteristics are measured with dummy variables for
party identification (Republican, Democrat, and other party, with Independent as the
excluded category) and political ideology (very conservative, conservative, liberal, and
very liberal, with moderate excluded). Respondent education level is measured with six
dummy variables (high school diploma, some college, two-year degree, four-year degree,
and graduate/professional degree, with ‘no high school diploma’ as the excluded
category). Respondent income is measured in a similar manner: seven categories of
household income, with the lowest income level (less than $15,000) excluded. Dummy
variables are also included for sex (female, male excluded), race (black, white excluded),
ethnicity (Hispanic, non-Hispanic excluded), and employment status (unemployed and
retired, currently employed is the excluded category). Ordered probit results for both
models are given in Table 5.7.
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Table 5.7: Ordered Probit Results – Social Security Tax/Benefit Index and
Social Security Confidence Index
Model A: Social Security
Dependent Variable Tax/Benefit Level Index

age
republican
democrat
other party
strong conservative
conservative
liberal
strong liberal
black
hispanic
female
unemployed
retired
no diploma
some college
two yr degree
four yr degree
grad/prof degree
income2
income3
income4
income5
income6
income7

Model B: Confidence in
Social Security Index

Coefficient

Std. Error

Coefficient

Std. Error

0.010**
0.006
0.155
-0.105
-0.299*
-0.113
0.094
0.307
0.008
0.004
0.031
-0.087
-0.024
-0.184
0.284*
0.005
0.149
0.112
0.003
0.052
-0.115
-0.041
-0.233
-0.448**

(0.003)
(0.098)
(0.096)
(0.159)
(0.147)
(0.093)
(0.104)
(0.219)
(0.135)
(0.162)
(0.074)
(0.216)
(0.128)
(0.167)
(0.112)
(0.145)
(0.112)
(0.124)
(0.156)
(0.146)
(0.130)
(0.128)
(0.142)
(0.138)

0.032***
0.072
0.281**
-0.205
-0.035
0.134
0.117
0.422*
-0.178
0.051
-0.266***
-0.568*
0.974***
0.333*
-0.090
-0.238
-0.191
-0.019
-0.221
0.109
0.016
-0.026
-0.063
-0.159

(0.003)
(0.103)
(0.101)
(0.172)
(0.154)
(0.097)
(0.111)
(0.216)
(0.144)
(0.168)
(0.078)
(0.256)
(0.133)
(0.168)
(0.114)
(0.154)
(0.117)
(0.128)
(0.165)
(0.149)
(0.134)
(0.132)
(0.150)
(0.144)

N=929; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

These results have several interesting outcomes in each model. The most obvious
result of interest in Model A is that age is a statistically significant predictor of Social
Security tax and benefit preferences, as predicted in H2, though the magnitude of this
relationship is not overwhelmingly powerful. H1 is partially confirmed: strong
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conservatives are significantly less likely than other ideological cohorts to support higher
levels of Social Security taxes and benefits. Respondents with some college (relative to
those with a high school diploma as highest education level achieved) were more likely to
prefer higher tax and benefit levels, and the highest income group was significantly less
likely to prefer higher levels of Social Security taxes and benefits.
Model B also features a significant relationship between age and the dependent
variable (Social Security confidence index), as predicted in H2. The magnitude of this
relationship is far greater in this model than in Model A. Democrats and liberals are
significantly more likely than those of other parties and ideological groups respectively to
display confidence in the Social Security system. Women are significantly less confident
in the system than men. Respondents who are retired are more likely to be confident in
Social Security, as are those with no high school diploma (relative to the excluded
category, those with a high school diploma as the highest level of education achieved).
These results suggest at least partial support for each of the hypotheses discussed in
Section 3.2 above.
In order to gauge the distribution of respondent preferences for Social Security tax
and benefit levels and respondent confidence in Social Security linear predictions for
each of the ordered probit models in Table 5.6 above were generated. These values can
be considered the propensity a given respondent has to prefer a level of Social Security
benefits, or to have confidence in the Social Security system. Graphs of these
propensities for the sample in the ordered probit models are given below in Figures 5.1
and 5.2.
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Figure 5.1: Linear Predictions of Respondent Preferences for Level of
Social Security Benefit and Taxation

Lower Taxes/Benefits

Higher Taxes/Benefits

Figure 5.2: Linear Predictions of Respondent Confidence in the Social
Security System

Lower Confidence

Higher Confidence
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These graphs indicate that respondents as a whole have quite different
distributions on the tax/benefit and confidence indices. Perhaps as suggested by the cross
tabulations in Section 3.2, Figure 1 indicates broad agreement among the respondents on
the Social Security tax and benefit issue: the distribution is close to normal, with the bulk
of the respondents preferring a similar mix of tax and benefit policy. Respondents do not
display the same type of distribution on the confidence index: this distribution is clearly
bimodal: a relatively large portion of respondents has low confidence in Social Security
relative to the rest of the sample (the ‘peak’ on the left), while a smaller group is
clustered at a relatively high level of confidence (this is the smaller ‘peak’ to the right).
The ordered probit results suggest the difference between these two clusters is largely
accounted for by the age of the respondents.
These empirical tests indicate at least partial support for each of the hypotheses
discussed above: older respondents are significantly more likely to both prefer higher
levels of Social Security taxes and benefits and to display confidence in the stability of
the Social Security system. Political characteristics are also significant predictors of
preferences and opinions (in the expected direction) in certain cases.
These results represent empirical evidence for a relationship that may seem
intuitively obvious but has not found great support in many previous studies on similar
topics: age is a significant determinant of preferences for old-age social welfare policy.
As discussed in Section 2.2 above, previous studies on intergenerational conflict over
policy that use survey data tend to find little or no support for the hypothesis that age is a
significant determinant of individual preferences for intergenerational policy (education,
Social Security, etc.) outcomes. This study clearly does find such support, which may
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largely be due to the unusual detail of the NAES survey items and the use of more
sensitive dependent variables and estimation techniques.
6. Bivariate Ordered Probit Estimation: Testing the Assumptions of Ordered Probit
This section uses the NAES data described above to test the assumptions of the
ordered probit model specified and tested in Sections 4 and 5 above. Generalized
Method of Moments estimation is employed to test for the existence of age-based
differences in preferences for Social Security policy and confidence in the Social Security
system, as well as the relationship between such preferences and levels of confidence.
This relationship is estimated with a bivariate ordered probit approach, a relatively
seldom used technique that allows simultaneous estimation of two related ordered probit
models. Bivariate ordered probit allows an estimation of the correlation between the
unmeasured aspects of the ordered categories. This is a continuation of previous research
that has used varied approaches in order to explore the possibility of intergenerational
conflict over policy, and is a direct extension and validation check of the analysis in
Sections 4 and 5 above.
6.1. Bivariate Ordered Probit: Previous Research, Applications and Theory
Ordered probit is a well-established model of ordered multinomial data
(Amemiya, 1985), but the extensions and tests used have not been used frequently.
Bivariate ordered probit is a much more rarely used technique, although there are several
examples of its use that are relevant to this study.
Calhoun (1989) is an early example of the use of this technique. Calhoun uses a
Fortran-based program (BIVOPROB, developed in Calhoun 1986) to estimate the desired
family size of women. He developed this technique to address the possible censorship in
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self-reported “desired family size” versus “children ever born.” Calhoun notes that this
technique is applicable to other similar demographic questions. Kahn and London (1991)
use a bivariate ordered probit estimation technique in LIMDEP to simultaneously
estimate two models, one of which estimates the risk of divorce while the other predicts
virginity status at marriage. They argue that this technique allows them to account for
previously unobserved differences that are driving the relationship between premarital
sex and risk of divorce. Previous research indicated something of a causal link – more
premarital sex leads to a higher risk of divorce. Kahn and London do not find a
significant difference in divorce risk across those with different levels of premarital
sexual activity when controlling for unobservable characteristics.
Butler and Chatterjee (1997) develop the bivariate ordered probit Fortran program
used in this study. The authors specifically focus on tests of specification for the
normality and exogeneity assumptions that bivariate (and univariate) ordered probit are
based on. These tests are replicated later in this study.
Lawrence and Palmer (2002) use survey-based public opinion data (1994 ANES)
with a bivariate ordered probit estimation technique to test the importance of heuristics in
shaping opinions on healthcare policy (and Hillary Clinton). The authors use bivariate
probit and bivariate ordered probit (in LIMDEP) as they believe the error terms of the
two models (opinion on healthcare policy and opinion of then-First-Lady Clinton) are
correlated. They argue that more sophisticated voters use heuristics more “accurately” as
they are better able to connect meaningful individuals (Clinton) to associated abstract
policy areas (government-backed health insurance).
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As in these earlier studies, bivariate ordered probit is an especially appropriate
estimation technique for the research question at issue here: the determinants of
individual preferences for and confidence in the U.S. Social Security system. It is entirely
possible that an individual’s confidence in the Social Security system shapes their
preferences for Social Security tax and benefit policy: in the extreme, those who see
Social Security as a doomed program are unlikely to support relatively high tax and
benefit levels. It is also possible that preferences for Social Security policy specifications
could shape confidence in the Social Security system. The use of a bivariate ordered
probit estimation approach allows us to test the relationship between the “preferences”
and “confidence” ordered probit models estimated Sections 4 and 5 above.
In political science and other social science disciplines, attitudinal scales appear
frequently. These scales, coded as a small finite number of values, are considered ordinal
but not cardinal because they convey an increasing or decreasing attachment, but with
unknown underlying strength. The standard model for such ordinal data is probit. With
more than two categories in the outcome, ordered probit results. The assumption, long
standing in statistics, is that there is a normally distributed unobserved propensity to
support some idea or carry out some behavior. This leads to the difficult question of
whether normality is really the correct distribution for the underlying propensity. The
remainder of this section review applications, then considers how the normality
assumption can be tested.
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With only two categories, in a standard binomial probit, it is impossible to test
normality, but it is also true that normality is unlikely to cause a problem relative to any
reasonable single-peaked distribution. With only probabilities above and below zero (or
any arbitrarily set limit), which is the information used to estimate the model, there is no
extra or unused information about the distribution. With more than two categories,
however, a test becomes possible, because the distribution is divided into three regions,
and the estimation does not make use of the subregions in the estimation. Imposing
normality across all regions results in extra constraints that can be tested. See Figure 5.3,
in which arbitrary limits between regions have been illustrated (-1.0, +0.5, +1.5).
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Figure 5.3: Probit Assumes a Normal Distribution
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Figure 1: Ordered probit assumes normal distribution
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If the model is estimated using MLE imposing one normal distribution across all
categories, there being four categories both in Figure 5.3, it is possible to follow the MLE
with estimation of category probabilities whose values need not support the normal
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distribution allocation. In effect, a multinomial distribution across categories is
compared to the restricted probabilities based on the normal distribution.
In addition, it becomes possible to test the exogeneity of the explanatory
variables, which is always subject to question in social science models. MLE assumes
strict exogeneity of all explanatory variables in addition to the shape shown in Figure 5.3.
By testing whether some or all explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the category
probabilities, it becomes possible to subject exogeneity to statistical test.
Finally, we expand the model further by assuming bivariate ordered probit. This
assumes that the two scales in which we are interested are bivariate normally distributed.
This further restricts the shape of the category regions, which are now regions in a twodimensional normal truncated by both outcome scales.
The resulting test could reject for reasons of non-normality or endogeneity or
both, but by restricting the set of explanatory variables included in the test, the
endogeneity of other variables can be isolated. This assumes that the normality itself
does not lead to overall rejection.
If the specification survives this test, that is not proof of normality or exogeneity,
but it does mean that conclusions are not affected by statistically significant deviations
from normality and assumed exogeneity. This removes some of the possible problems
inherent in the statistical setup and protects the political implications of the conclusions
from the complaint that they are a result of mathematical assumptions.
6.2. GMM Data Used and Variable Construction
The two scales used in this paper are typical for ordered probits. One goes from 0
to 3 (Social Security tax and benefit preferences), and the other from 0 to 4 (confidence
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in Social Security), but the value 4 is rare so it is combined with 3. Under the theory of
ordered categories representing latent variables, such combinations cannot create bias.
The bivariate ordered probit model has two scales as described above, and there
are assumed to be four discrete categories of each outcome as there are in the application.
This section lays out the mathematical assumptions, estimation strategy, and test
statistics. The explanatory variables could differ between outcomes, but in practice it
would be difficult to make exclusion restrictions, such restrictions are not necessary, and
in this paper there are not such restrictions.
As in described in Section 4 above data for this additional test comes from the
National Annenberg Election Surveys (NAES) special 2004 Inaugural Survey (N =
1,202). This survey was conducted one time only, so this analysis is cross-sectional.
There are 930 respondents who provided answers to the benefit support and
confidence questions, and of these, 927 also answered the questions from which
explanatory variables are obtained. So there is essentially no sample selection apart from
the dependent variable itself. The construction of the dependent variables (indices
indicating Social Security benefits preferences and Social Security confidence) is
discussed in detail in Section 5 above.
6.3. GMM Estimation and Results
There are 25 explanatory variables in each equation and four categories of each
outcome, thus three limits between categories, and two limit parameters, because the first
limit is fixed at zero. The last, 55th, parameter is the correlation of the disturbances. The
dependent variables are summarized in Table 5.8, and the explanatory variables are
summarized in Table 5.9. The results are shown in Table 5.10.
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Table 5.8: Dependent Variables – Social Security Benefits
Index and Confidence Index (Higher Number=More)

These are probit coefficients, so they show impacts on the propensity score, not
on an observable outcome. The emphasis here is on which factors appear to have the
strongest effects based on the estimates. First, consider support for benefits. Older
people, Democrats, and those with some college education support benefits more. Strong
conservatives oppose increasing benefits the most, and non-strong conservatives oppose
somewhat less. Liberals and strong liberals support increasing benefits less than
conservatives oppose. This is net of political party, however. The strongest effects are
conservative orientation versus Democratic Party affiliation. Income has no clear pattern
of effects on support for benefits, but people with high income oppose increasing benefits
(and taxation). Second, consider confidence in the Social Security system’s ability to
continue to disburse promised benefits. Older people have much more confidence. Both
Republicans and Democrats have confidence in benefits, apparently in opposition to
independents and people of other parties. Females and the unemployed have less
confidence.
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People with no high school diploma have the greatest confidence and those with
more than high school diploma have less confidence, relative to the base category, high
school diploma. Strong liberals are confident on average; other groups are
undifferentiated. People with low income, like people with no high school diploma, are
more confident.

Table 5.9: Descriptive Statistics
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Table 5.10: Results of GMM Estimation of Bivariate Ordered Probit Using
MLE and Additional Orthogonality Conditions.
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The correlation of the propensity scores for benefits support and confidence is
negative, -0.4885 (s.e. 0.0329), which implies that on average, people with measured
factors leading to supporting more benefits are not associated with confidence that the
benefits will be paid. The correlation of the unmeasured factors goes the other way,
positive. The correlation between the underlying scales has no directly observable effect,
but it is an estimate of the correlation of the propensity scores of sentiment toward
benefits and confidence based on factors omitted from the model, i.e. in the disturbances.
The point estimate is +0.1111, with a standard error of 0.0292, and a t-value of 3.80,
p<0.001. The conclusion is that unobserved sentiments for benefits and confidence are
positively correlated. So, observed factors included in the model produce a negative
correlation somewhat offset by unobserved factors. What these unobserved factors might
be must be speculative given that they are defined by not being measured and included.
However, age, sex, education, income, and overall political sentiment have been
controlled. Perhaps some specific factor related to supporting Social Security is
involved.
6.4. Test of Specification
Table 5.11 reports the results of the specification test. The estimation employs
the 55 gradients of the log likelihood function with respect to the parameters and 75
orthogonality conditions based on 25 explanatory variables and three region probabilities
(benefits=1, confidence=2; 1 and 3; and 2 and 1). The test statistic, which is minimized
in the estimation and distributed chi square under the null hypothesis that exogeneity and
probability distribution have been correctly specified, is 76.4 with 75 degrees of freedom
(the number of extra orthogonality conditions). That results in a p-value of 0.433,
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Table 5.11: Test of the Ordered Probit Specification.

showing no evidence to reject the specification. That does not prove the specification is
correct but shows that any deviations from the model assumptions produce statistically
insignificant changes in the estimated results.
6.5. Bivariate Ordered Probit Estimation: Substantive and Methodological
Conclusions
This study has substantive conclusions related to political components of Social
Security support and methodological application to social science research using Likert
scales and other discrete scales of attitudes. The scales in this study measure support for
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Social Security tax and benefit preferences and confidence in Social Security (benefits
and confidence).
On average, older people support increasing benefits and have more confidence
that benefits will materialize. Democrats support more benefits, and adherents of both
major parties have confidence relative to independents. Females lack confidence in
promised benefits. Those with some college support more benefits but have less
confidence; those with more education have less confidence but no clear support for
more. People with low education and low income have confidence, while those with high
income on average oppose more benefits.
Overall, the propensity scores (effects of measured explanatory variables) have a
negative correlation between the two scales, so on average people supporting more
benefits have some doubts about the promises made. The unmeasured factors in the
disturbances are positively correlated, however.
The bivariate ordered probit model specification is not rejected, so the
conclusions reached here are unlikely to result from specification decisions such as
normality of the propensity to support more benefits or have confidence.
Going beyond Social Security, this paper shows a way to test the assumptions of a
probit model, which is important for confidence of a different kind—confidence that the
normality encoded into probit is a reasonable assumption for empirical research with
Likert scales. What is needed is more testing of specifications like this.
7. Conclusion and Implications
This chapter used unusually detailed survey data to test for the existence of agebased differences in individual preferences for Social Security tax and benefit policy as
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well as individual confidence in the stability of the Social Security system. In contrast to
previous similar work (Hamil-Luker 2001, Street and Sittig Cossman 2006), age was
found to be a significant and positive predictor of respondent preferences for Social
Security tax and benefit levels. This study also contributes to the discussion on individual
confidence in Social Security (Reno and Friedland 1997) by finding that age and certain
political characteristics are strong predictors of confidence. The methodological
extension detailed in Section 6 provides further support for both the empirical methods
used in Section 5 (ordered probit) and the substantive conclusion of that chapter: there is
evidence of significant age-based cleavages over (1) preferences for Social Security tax
and benefit policy and (2) confidence in the structural stability of the Social Security
system.
These results have several policy implications. First, the cross tabulations in
Section 4.2 indicate somewhat broad agreement among all age groups on the three
aspects of tax and benefit policy: a clear plurality supports raising the taxable income
cap, while rejecting the idea of raising Social Security payroll taxes and cutting benefits
to future retirees. This suggests that something more than these direct policy instruments
will be needed if Social Security is to be reformed at some point in the near future.
Possible options include a gradual transition to a funded system, raising the retirement
age (a benefit cut of a sort, but this has been successfully undertaken in European
countries), and means-testing for Social Security benefits.
Second, while age is not an overwhelmingly powerful determinant of Social
Security preferences, it is statistically significant. This is suggestive of a possible cohort
effect with regards to Social Security preferences: it is possible that the younger cohort
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prefers less Social Security (and has less confidence in Social Security) for reasons that
will cause these positions to persist as this cohort ages (of course, it is possible that their
preferences could change as they age). In that case, significant Social Security reform
would almost certainly be possible at some point in the future. It is also possible that
these age-based differences could incentivize the relatively young to vote in greater
proportions than they do currently (as suggested in MacManus 1995), which could
significantly impact the political environment surrounding Social Security reform.
Finally, these results suggest a wide gulf in confidence in the Social Security
system (as predicted in H3). Policymakers who wish to gain popular support for Social
Security reform would be prudent to frame future discussions of such reform with this
confidence gap: while the politically active older age cohorts are rather confident in
Social Security, younger cohorts (those paying for current benefits) are markedly less so.

Copyright ©Joshua John Poulette 2013
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Chapter Six
Conclusions

This dissertation consists of three core chapters, each of which explores the
relationship between intergenerational dynamics of some type and potential political
outcomes. Chapters 3 and 4 use merged datasets from the 2004 and 2008 Annenberg
National Election Studies and the 2010 European Social Survey, respectively. The
research questions are fairly straightforward: are political traits significant determinants
of fertility behavior? What other factors are significant determinants of fertility in
contemporary countries of interest? That is, does it appear to be the case that different
political cohorts (partisan or ideological cohorts) are having children at different rates? If
so, and if children tend to adopt the political traits of their parents (as suggested in the
literature), certain political cohorts could be out-reproducing others and be poised to gain
an increased share of the political distribution.
The dependent variables of interest in Chapters 3 and 4 are based on a survey item
that asks respondents how many children they have in their household. While this is not a
perfect measure of fertility, it is the best available measure in this data. The dependent
variable is highly overdispersed: a majority of respondents have zero children; the second
most have one child, and so on. As the dependent variable is far from normally
distributed negative binomial regression is used for the estimation. The estimation results
in Chapter 3 (the US) indicate that political traits can be a significant determinant of
fertility: conservatives were significantly more fertile than liberals (a spread of about
14%), although there was no difference between Democrats and Republicans. While
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political traits were significant determinants of fertility, other independent variables had
larger effects: race, ethnicity, religiousness, and marital status were all highly significant.
These results are significant for the literature on the determinants of fertility
behavior, as they suggest political traits should be included as a possible determinant.
They also have a political implication: that the politically conservative will tend to outreproduce political liberals in the United States and, holding other factors constant,
should occupy a greater share of the ideological distribution in the future assuming the
continued regularity of intergenerational political socialization.
Estimation results in Chapter 4 (twenty-six European countries) are significantly
different from those in Chapter 3. There does not appear to be a systemic relationship
between political traits and fertility across Europe, although there are some country-level
cases where political ideology is a significant determinant of fertility. The more
interesting finding in Chapter 4 is the significance of the education and income variables
– there appears to be a strong and positive relationship between income and fertility and
education and fertility in many cases. This result holds especially well in Western Europe
and Nordic Europe.
Chapter 5 examines the impact of age (and other factors, like political traits,
education, income, etc.) on attitudes towards Social Security. More specifically, this
chapter explores a survey respondent’s preferences for Social Security tax and benefit
policy and the respondent’s confidence in the structural stability of the Social Security
system, including the level of confidence they have in eventually receiving the Social
Security benefits they have earned. The research question centers on the impact of age on
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these attitudes: does there appear to be the potential for intergenerational conflict over
Social Security?
Chapter 5 addresses this common question in different ways. This chapter uses
survey data from the one-time National Annenberg Election Studies Inaugural Survey
(2005). This survey features an unusually high number of especially detailed items
designed to capture respondent attitudes towards Social Security. Several of these items
are selected to create two indices: one that measures respondent preferences for levels of
Social Security taxes and benefits, and another that measures respondent confidence in
the stability of the Social Security system. These indices are used as dependent variables
in two ordered probit estimations that include age, political characteristics, income,
education, and several other types of control variables.
For both the “Social Security tax and benefit preference” and the “Social Security
confidence” indices/models age is a significant predictor, and in the expected direction.
Controlling for other factors, relatively old respondents prefer higher level of Social
Security taxation and benefits than do younger respondents. Relatively old respondents
are also much more confident the in the stability of the Social Security system.
These results make a contribution to the literature on intergenerational conflict
over policy: this chapter shows that age is a significant determinant of attitudes toward
old-age social welfare policy, a finding that has generally not been made in the surveybased research on cases of potential intergenerational conflict over policy. The central
causes for the difference in findings between this and previous related research are likely
the quality of the survey items used and the use of an index score, which allowed for
more possible respondent outcomes than most previous related research. Previous
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research of this type (on Social Security attitudes) often had to rely on a single yes/no
item (cut benefits, raise taxes, etc.), and thus was not able to apply a technique like
ordered probit.
The second set of empirical estimation in Chapter 5(Section 6) is broadly focused
on the same research question: the impact of age (and other factors) on attitudes towards
Social Security. However the primary contribution of this second estimation is
methodological in nature. Section 6 of Chapter 5 uses models similar to those in Section
5: the dependent variable is an index score of respondent attitudes toward Social Security
(either tax and benefit preferences, or confidence). The same body of explanatory and
control variable are used as well: age, political traits, income, education, and many other
control variables.
Rather than running two separate ordered probit estimations as in chapter one,
Section 6 uses a bivariate ordered probit estimation technique. This technique permits
simultaneous estimation of the two related models, and allows one to assess the
relationship between overall confidence in Social Security and tax/benefit preferences.
Bivariate ordered probit also permits tests of the appropriateness of certain assumptions
made by any probit estimation; primarily the assumption that the dependent variable is
normally distributed.
Many of the substantive results of the estimation are similar to those in Section 5:
age has a positive impact on both confidence in Social Security and support for higher
taxes and benefits. Republicans and conservatives prefer lower levels of taxes and
benefits than Democrats and liberals. Certain other interesting findings emerged,
including the negative impact of income and education on confidence in Social Security.
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The correlation between the scores for tax/benefit preferences and confidence is -0.488
(s.e. 0.032), which implies that support for more taxes/benefits does not equate with
confidence in the Social Security system. The probit model specification is not rejected
on the grounds of non-normality of the dependent variables.
The results of Section 6 provide more support for the primary finding of Chapter
5: age matters for attitudes towards Social Security. However, the more significant
implications of Section 6 are technical in nature: they detail a way in which to estimate
two highly related models that feature ordinal scores of some type (in the Likert scales
“family” of variables) as dependent variables. It is conceivable that confidence in Social
Security plays a role in a respondent’s preferences for Social Security tax and benefit
levels. The opposite may also be true: the two index scores are likely related to some
degree. The bivariate ordered probit estimation explores this possibility and concludes
that support for higher benefits and taxes is not associated, on average, with higher
confidence.
Each of these three empirical chapters focuses on the relationship between
intergenerational dynamics and potential political outcomes. This dissertation makes four
primary contributions to the existing literature. First, the finding that age is a significant
determinant of attitudes towards Social Security; as discussed in Chapter 5and supported
in a methodologically unique way in Chapter 5, Section 6. This chapter suggests that
there is the potential for age-based conflict over Social Security policy. Previous similar
literature has not found much evidence of such an effect. Second, Section 6 of Chapter 5
makes a significant methodological contribution: it demonstrates a way in which to apply
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a seldom used estimation method (bivariate ordered probit) to two related models that use
an ordinal score of the type typically found in survey data.
Chapter 3 presents evidence that political traits impact fertility in the U.S., and
describes a way in which this finding can have long term political implications. Chapter 4
demonstrates that while political traits do not impact fertility behavior among Europeans
in any systematic way, both income and education are positively associated with fertility
in contemporary Europe, a refutation of the common wisdom that wealthy households
tend to have fewer children.
This dissertation is motivated by research questions tied to the fascinating and
meaningful demographic shifts that have occurred in most advanced countries over the
past several decades. Life expectancy (both at birth and at given ages, such as 65) is
higher and fertility rates are lower. In most rich countries, people are living longer and
having fewer children than ever before. Such an outcome is not only of interest to
demographers, but should be interesting to other social scientists as well. These
demographic shifts have implications for those who study politics and policy primarily
due to the existence of many large public policies with intergenerational components.
Education, social welfare, healthcare, environmental protection, infrastructure
development, and public debt all distribute costs and benefits across different
generations. The rapidly shifting demographics of the advanced world and the presence
of many significant intergenerational policies demand a more complete understanding of
the relationship between demographic processes/intergenerational dynamics and political
outcomes. This dissertation contributes to this conversation in a meaningful manner.
Copyright ©Joshua John Poulette 2013
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